

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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Page 30 ~ b7D;

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1194253-0

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JDD:MEH

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : MR. A. ROSEN

SUBJECT: QUARTERLY REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR SEPTEMBER, 1945

DATE: November 27, 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

You will note on the attached report on Confidential National Defense Informants for the third quarter of 1945, that the field is maintaining 2,906 of these informants.

This is a reduction of about 300 informants from the second quarter of 1945, but is still an extremely large number in view of the fact that hostilities have ceased. About one half of this number or 1,381 are furnishing information concerning Communist activities but of the remaining number, a considerable reduction can probably be effected at this time. Specifically it is pointed out that there are about 220 German informants, 141 informants on Italian activities, and 764 furnishing information on general un-American activities. The field is evidently carrying a considerable number of informants of a National Defense type who are not furnishing any information at this time and can very well be deleted from the records.

Recommendation:

For your approval, there is attached a letter to all Special Agents in Charge instructing them to carefully check their records on National Defense Informants and immediately eliminate all those who are not in a position to furnish any information of value. Since some divisions are lax in furnishing this quarterly report, there is also contained in this SAC letter a suggestion that these reports be submitted more promptly in order to have an accurate picture of National Defense Informants readily available at the Seat of Government.

Attachment

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE.

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY SP-1A/10
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION

This is certainly an excessively large number of informants.

RECORDED

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DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 PMJ

CONFIDENTIAL

-325

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JED:del

TO : DIRECTOR

DATE: November 15, 1945

FROM : J. A. ROSEN

SUBJECT: SUMMARY REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR SEPTEMBER, 1945

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Coffey _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Mumford _____
 Mr. Jones _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Beahm _____
 Miss Gandy _____

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES

ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP

ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP

SLIP(S)

DATE 10/20/81 *am*

The reports submitted by the field for September, 1945 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 2,906 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows: *(u)*

Informants concerning German activities	220
Informants concerning Italian activities	141
Informants concerning Communist activities	1381
Informants concerning Japanese activities	107
Informants concerning other nationalities	293
Informants concerning general un-American activities	764
Total	2906

*Included in the total are 452 informants of the colored race. *(u)*

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic tendency.

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 OTHERWISE

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DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmd/mc/KC

Attachment

CLASSIFIED AND
 EXTENDED

REASON

FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2

DATE

DECLASSIFICATION

RECORDED

9-15-91

9-15-91 EX-20

2242 5-325

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

DECLASSIFIED BY 40.6.201/49
ON 5-19-84

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHERS*	UN-AMERICAN**	TOTAL
ALBANY	8	7	20 (1)	0	2	35 (3)	72 (4)
ALBUQUERQUE	0	0	2	0	0	2	4
ALBUQUERQUE	0	0	8 (2)	0	0	23 (3)	39 (5)
BALTIMORE	5	1	31 (5)	0	5	37 (9)	74 (14)
BIRMINGHAM	5	1	17 (7)	1	3	12 (3)	39 (10)
BOSTON	9	6	34 (7)	0	11	3	63 (7)
BUFFALO	1	0	30 (13)	2	2	0	35 (13)
BUTTE	1	0	21 (2)	13	3	2	40 (2)
CHARLOTTE	0	0	8	1	0	6 (5)	15 (5)
CHICAGO	5	4	147 (9)	18 (1)	4	53 (43)	231 (53)
CINCINNATI	12	2	17	1	4	9 (7)	45 (7)
CLEVELAND	3	0	39 (8)	2	9 (6)	7	60 (14)
DALLAS	2	6	12 (1)	0	1	9 (2)	30 (3)
DENVER	2	5	5	4	4	5 (3)	25 (3)
DES MOINES	3	4	69	0	2	5 (4)	83 (4)
DETROIT	5	0	39 (9)	2	6	21	69 (9)
EL PASO	0	0	2	1	2	1 (1)	6 (1)

Includes Vichy France, Spanish, Rumanian, Bulgarian, etc.

Includes Pelly's Silver Shirts, Christian Front, Ku Klux Klan, Technocracy Inc. etc.

Figures within this mark represent the number of informants that are negroes.

DATE 2/6/84 BY SP-4 JLD/mf

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	
GRAND RAPIDS	: 1	: 2	: 19 (4)	: 1	: 4	: 15	: 42 (8)
HOUSTON	: 7	: 2	: 17 (2)	: 4	: 2	: 14	: 46 (2)
HUNTINGTON	: 3	: 3	: 15 (3)	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 23 (3)
INDIANAPOLIS	: 9	: 4	: 31	: 2	: 3	: 49 (34)	: 98 (34)
JACKSON	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0
KANSAS CITY	: 16	: 8	: 17	: 1	: 0	: 30 (12)	: 72 (12)
KNOXVILLE	: 1	: 0	: 5 (1)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 6 (1)
LITTLE ROCK	: 0	: 0	: 5	: 0	: 0	: 8 (6)	: 13 (6)
LOS ANGELES	: 8	: 12	: 178 (12)	: 0	: 33	: 29	: 260 (12)
LOUISVILLE	: 1	: 0	: 5	: 0	: 0	: 11 (8)	: 17 (8)
MEMPHIS	: 1	: 1	: 10 (2)	: 0	: 0	: 15 (9)	: 27 (11)
MIAMI	: 2	: 0	: 15	: 1	: 0	: 8	: 26
MILWAUKEE	: 4	: 2	: 14 (7)	: 2	: 7	: 0	: 29 (7)
NEWARK	: 6	: 2	: 43 (9)	: 0	: 3	: 9	: 63 (9)
NEW HAVEN	: 0	: 0	: 16 (2)	: 0	: 0	: 1	: 17 (2)
NEW ORLEANS	: 5	: 5	: 6 (2)	: 1	: 17	: 73 (19)	: 107 (21)
NEW YORK	: 13	: 4	: 82	: 7	: 32 (4)	: 26 (8)	: 164 (12)
NORFOLK	: 0	: 1	: 7 (2)	: 2	: 0	: 17	: 27 (5)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	:	GERMAN	:	ITALIAN	:	COMMUNIST	:	JAPANESE	:	OTHER*	:	UN-AMERICAN**	:	TOTAL
OKLAHOMA CITY	:	1	:	0	:	11	:	0	:	0	:	11 (8)	:	23 (8)
OMAHA	:	0	:	0	:	6 (3)	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	6 (3)
PHILADELPHIA	:	11	:	10	:	51 (5)	:	1	:	10	:	5	:	88 (5)
PHOENIX	:	10 *	:	5	:	9	:	20	:	8	:	12 (1)	:	64 (1)
PITTSBURGH	:	0	:	2	:	19	:	0	:	1	:	9 (5)	:	31 (6)
PORTLAND	:	2	:	1	:	29	:	1	:	1	:	14 (8)	:	43 (8)
PROVIDENCE	:	0	:	8	:	5 (1)	:	0	:	0	:	4 (4)	:	17 (5)
RICHMOND	:	0	:	0	:	15 (3)	:	0	:	0	:	6 (6)	:	21 (9)
ST. LOUIS	:	18	:	7	:	20	:	4	:	6	:	13	:	68 (3)
ST. PAUL	:	2	:	1	:	26 (1)	:	2	:	2	:	11 (7)	:	44 (8)
SALT LAKE CITY	:	4	:	9	:	6	:	10	:	0	:	10 (5)	:	39 (5)
SAN ANTONIO	:	12	:	1	:	5 (2)	:	3	:	11	:	5 (3)	:	37 (5)
SAN DIEGO	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	0	:	3 (3)	:	7	:	14 (3)
SAN FRANCISCO	:	8	:	5	:	60 (11)	:	0	:	50	:	22 (2)	:	145 (13)
SAN JUAN	:	3	:	0	:	24 (4)	:	0	:	16 (2)	:	29 (1)	:	72 (7)
SAVANNAH	:	1	:	1	:	1 (1)	:	0	:	0	:	27 (13)	:	30 (14)
SEATTLE	:	0	:	0	:	32 (3)	:	0	:	3	:	6	:	41 (3)
SIoux FALLS	:	4	:	0	:	9	:	0	:	0	:	15	:	28

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	:	GERMAN	:	ITALIAN	:	COMMUNIST	:	JAPANESE	:	OTHER*	:	UN-AMERICAN**	:	TOTAL
SPRINGFIELD	:	2	:	3	:	10	:	0	:	1	:	5	:	21 (2)
SYRACUSE	:	1	:	2	:	36 (2)	:	0	:	2	:	1	:	42 (2)
WASHINGTON	:	3	:	1	:	21 (6)	:	0	:	20 (2)	:	15 (2)	:	60 (10)
TOTALS	:	220	:	141	:	1381	:	107	:	293	:	764	:	2906 (452)

(12)
(18)

UNRECORDED

UNRECORDED

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

ADD-MEX
TO: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

ROUTINE

Transmit the following message to:

JANUARY 4, 1946

SACs, BUFFALO, BUTTE, CINCINNATI,
INDIANAPOLIS

QUARTERLY REPORT CNDI. SUTEL WHEN REPORT SUBMITTED BUREAU IN ACCORDANCE
SECTION THIRTEEN I OF NATIONAL DEFENSE MANUAL.

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842

pm One/t

166-2543-3-326
EX-22 JUL 23 1946

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Egan
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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6582 JUL 23 1961

SENT VIA

12-55P M

Per

56 JAN 8 - 1946

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Confidential Informants in General Intelligence Work

(H) QUARTERLY REPORT - NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS -- It has been noted from a review of the quarterly report of Confidential National Defense Informants, based upon a compilation of data furnished by the field, that a considerable number of these informants are still being carried by the divisions in the field as active despite the cessation of hostilities.

For the third quarter of 1945, there are listed about 220 informants on German activities, 141 Italian, 107 Japanese, and 764 individuals furnishing

information concerning general un-American activities. There are also enumerated about 1,381 Communist informants. The activity of German, Italian, and Japanese groups would appear to be negligible and insufficient to justify the retention of some of these informants. With reference to informants on general un-American activities, it is thought that over 700 informants is an extremely high number. (u)

You should immediately check the National Defense Informants of your office to determine which of these informants are producing information of value in connection with investigations presently being conducted. If any of these informants are not productive, they should be considered inactive and the Bureau so advised in each instance. This check should be made as quickly as possible in order that the quarterly report, which is due on December 20, 1945, will reflect more accurately and clearly the number of true informants maintained by the Bureau.

SAC Letter #111
Series 1945

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DATE 7-6-81 BY 2842pm JMC JC

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 BJA/SP2
ON 5-10-94
83-1343

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY SP6 MAC/JC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-81

66-2542-3
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DEC 21 1945

59 JAN 17 1946

STAMP
DEC 21 1945
ORIGINAL

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12 11 1

General

(1) CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS -- To establish uniformity in the handling of written reports submitted by Confidential National Defense Informants you are directed to place these reports in a separate section in the administrative file relating to the particular informant. Excerpts from the reports are to be included in the regular investigative case report when information of value is submitted. The informants should be encouraged to submit their reports in duplicate in order that the duplicate copy may be filed in the appropriate case file. In those instances where informants supply data orally which is reduced to the memorandum in the office a copy of this memorandum should also be filed in the appropriate section of the administrative file relating to the particular informant.

166-2542-8-1

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DATE 2-16-81 BY 2842 Pm DMSC

166-2542-8-1
NOT RECORDED
54 DEC 17 1945

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 166-2542-8-1

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : MR. D. H. LADD *RH Ladd*

DATE: January 31, 1946

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: QUARTERLY REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR
DECEMBER, 1945

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF *class*

DATE *10/20/64* *WMS*

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Beahm _____
Miss Gandy _____

The reports submitted by the field for December, 1945 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 1,884 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows: *(u)*

Informants concerning German activities	63
Informants concerning Italian activities	40
Informants concerning Communist activities	1150
Informants concerning Japanese activities	43
Informants concerning other nationalities	163
Informants concerning general un-American activities	<u>425</u>

Total *1884

*Included in the total are 281 informants of the colored race. *(u)*

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic tendency.

CLASSIFIED BY *SP6 RJA/BJA*
ON *5-10-94*
83-1343

Attachment

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *SP6 RJA/BJA*
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *9-15-81*

ENCL

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R 582 JUL 19 1961

JDD:del

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DATE *7-16-81* BY *2842 DMU*
mc/jc

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OTHERWISE

19 FEB 8 1946

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

CLASSIFIED BY 67-57-50
UNCLASSIFIED BY 67-57-50
327

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	: TOTAL
ALBANY	: 0	: 4	: 54 (3)	: 0	: 3	: 26 (3)	: 87 (6)
ANCHORAGE	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 2
ATLANTA	: 0	: 0	: 3 (2)	: 0	: 0	: 4 (2)	: 4 (2)
BALTIMORE	: 0	: 0	: 29 (2)	: 0	: 0	: 29 (2)	: 29 (2)
BIRMINGHAM	: 0	: 0	: 8	: 0	: 0	: 9 (3)	: 9 (3)
BOSTON	: 2	: 1	: 33 (6)	: 0	: 0	: 45 (6)	: 45 (6)
BUFFALO	: 0	: 0	: 29 (13)	: 0	: 2	: 31 (13)	: 31 (13)
BUTTE	: 0	: 0	: 15	: 1	: 3	: 21	: 21
CHARLOTTE	: 0	: 0	: 8	: 0	: 0	: 14 (5)	: 14 (5)
CHICAGO	: 5	: 4	: 141 (8)	: 12	: 4	: 35 (28)	: 201 (36)
CINCINNATI	: 12	: 2	: 16	: 1	: 4	: 44 (7)	: 44 (7)
CLEVELAND	: 2	: 0	: 34 (6)	: 1	: 9 (6)	: 46 (12)	: 46 (12)
DALLAS	: 2	: 6	: 12 (1)	: 0	: 1	: 30 (3)	: 30 (3)
DENVER	: 2	: 0	: 2	: 4	: 0	: 8 (1)	: 8 (1)
DES MOINES	: 0	: 0	: 51	: 0	: 0	: 54 (3)	: 54 (3)
DETROIT	: 1	: 2	: 57	: 2	: 3	: 99 (12)	: 99 (12)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 67-57-50
REASON FOR EXTENSION 24
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-81
9-15-81

* Includes Vichy France, Spanish, Rumanian, Bulgarian, etc.

** Includes Pelly's Silver Shirts, Christian Front, Ku Klux Klan, Technocracy Inc.

() Figures within this mark represent the number of informants that are negroes.

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R 582 JUL 19 1961
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 dm/mc

(34)

FIELD OFFICE	:	GERMAN	:	ITALIAN	:	COMMUNIST	:	JAPANESE	:	OTHER*	:	UN-AMERICAN**	:	TOTAL
EL PASO	:	0	:	0	:	2	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	2
HONOLULU	:	0	:	0	:	2	:	3	:	2	:	0	:	7
HOUSTON	:	0	:	0	:	13	:	0	:	2	:	4	:	19 (3)
INDIANAPOLIS	:	1	:	0	:	18	:	0	:	0	:	5	:	24 (6)
JACKSON	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	0
KANSAS CITY	:	1	:	3	:	8	:	0	:	0	:	11	:	23 (5)
KNOXVILLE	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	0	:	0	:	1	:	5 (1)
LITTLE ROCK	:	0	:	0	:	5	:	0	:	0	:	8	:	13 (6)
LOS ANGELES	:	1	:	1	:	121	:	0	:	17	:	9	:	149 (5)
LOUISVILLE	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	4 (1)
MEMPHIS	:	1	:	1	:	11 (2)	:	0	:	0	:	11 (10)	:	22 (12)
MIAMI	:	0	:	0	:	9	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	13
MILWAUKEE	:	4	:	2	:	13	:	2	:	7	:	0	:	28 (6)
NEWARK	:	0	:	0	:	38	:	0	:	3	:	11	:	52 (5)
NEW HAVEN	:	0	:	9	:	15	:	0	:	0	:	3	:	18 (2)
NEW ORLEANS	:	5	:	5	:	3	:	1	:	15	:	70	:	99 (22)
NEW YORK	:	6	:	1	:	75	:	1	:	18	:	25	:	126 (10)
NORFOLK	:	0	:	0	:	7	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	7 (2)

32

FIELD OFFICE	:	GERMAN	:	ITALIAN	:	COMMUNIST	:	JAPANESE	:	OTHER*	:	UN-AMERICAN**	:	TOTAL
OKLAHOMA CITY	:	0	:	0	:	11	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	11 (1)
OMAHA	:	0	:	0	:	6 (3)	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	6 (3)
PHILADELPHIA	:	2	:	0	:	43	:	1	:	5	:	3	:	54 (4)
PHOENIX	:	5	:	2	:	8	:	13	:	4	:	10	:	42 (1)
PITTSBURGH	:	0	:	4	:	27	:	0	:	1	:	12	:	44 (7)
PORTLAND	:	0	:	0	:	20 (3)	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	20 (3)
RICHMOND	:	0	:	0	:	12	:	0	:	0	:	6	:	18 (7)
ST. LOUIS	:	5	:	2	:	13	:	1	:	1	:	2	:	24 (2)
ST. PAUL	:	0	:	0	:	16	:	0	:	0	:	6 (6)	:	22 (6)
SALT LAKE CITY	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	4
SAN ANTONIO	:	1	:	0	:	4 (2)	:	0	:	2	:	2 (2)	:	9 (4)
SAN DIEGO	:	0	:	0	:	10	:	0	:	4	:	4	:	18 (2)
SAN FRANCISCO	:	1	:	0	:	57 (10)	:	0	:	16	:	12 (1)	:	86 (11)
SAN JUAN	:	2	:	0	:	20 (4)	:	0	:	14	:	28	:	68 (4)
SAVANNAH	:	0	:	0	:	2 (2)	:	0	:	0	:	19 (12)	:	21 (14)
SEATTLE	:	0	:	0	:	28	:	0	:	3	:	6	:	37 (3)

32

FIELD OFFICE	:	GERMAN	:	ITALIAN	:	COMMUNIST	:	JAPANESE	:	OTHER*	:	UN-AMERICAN**	:	TOTAL
SPRINGFIELD	:	0	:	0	:	6 (2)	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	6 (2)
WASHINGTON	:	3	:	1	:	21 (6)	:	0	:	20 (2)	:	14 (2)	:	59 (10)
TOTALS	:	63	:	40	:	1150	:	43	:	163	:	425	:	1884 (281)

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JED:RM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE January 31, 1946

DATE 7-16-81

BY 2842 Jm Dm Kjc

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : MR. D. L. LADD

SUBJECT: QUARTERLY REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE DEVELOPMENTS FOR

DECEMBER, 1945

Reference is made to the attached report for the last quarter of 1945 indicating that at the present time the field is utilizing the services of 1884 confidential informants on security matters. (S)(u)

You will recall that the report for the third quarter of 1945 reflected a total of 2906 confidential informants of this type, which number has been reduced by elimination of 1022 informants. The reduction was effected in most part by the issuance of SAC Letter #111, dated December 4, 1945, calling the attention of all Special Agents in Charge to the fact that due to the end of the war many informants are naturally in no longer a position to provide information concerning the national security, and they were directed to review the confidential informants to eliminate all those who were no longer of value. (S)(u)

CONCLUSION

A close check will be maintained on the confidential informants presently maintained, in order that adequate coverage will be available at all times, yet all unproductive and unnecessary listings of informants will be eliminated from the records.

DECLASSIFIED BY Spk Ljc / ljc
ON 5-10-94

83-1343

RECORDED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE 7-16-81

CLASSIFIED AND

EXTENDED BY 2842 Jm Dm Kjc

REASON FOR EXTENSION

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION

FEB 13 1946

7-16-81

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

X

328

JED-5

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *JH*

FROM : J. C. STRICKLAND *JS*

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMANTS WITH REFERENCE TO
COMMUNIST MATTERS

DATE: February 8, 1946

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7-16-81 BY 3842

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. E. A. Tamm
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Coffey
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Carson
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Quinn Tamm
 Tele. Room
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Beahm
 Miss Gandy

The New York Field Division has requested that the Bureau clarify instructions issued on the development of confidential informants in Communist matters. You will recall that on July 24, 1945, a letter to all Special Agents in Charge stated that "From the time of the receipt of this letter no contacts should be made looking toward the development of a confidential informant in the investigation of Communist matters without prior approval of the Bureau. This approval should be requested in letter form, furnishing appropriate background data in accordance with Section 13C of the National Defense Manual."

At the same time a new insert prepared for the Handbook, Part 1, Section 26, B-3, states, "No contact should be made with a prospective confidential informant concerning the investigation of Communist matters without prior approval of the Bureau."

The New York Office has stated that at the present time there is confusion relative to the interpretation of the above referred to letter to all Special Agents in Charge. It has been pointed out that Agents have made several inquiries concerning this inasmuch as it was felt that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop an informant on Communist matters without first making some contacts. The New York Office also stated that the Bureau could not be advised concerning a potential informant until at least some contact were made in order to find out who could be a possible informant. At the same time the New York Office points out that in light of the Handbook instructions, it is interpreted to mean that a preliminary investigation of a prospective informant can be conducted to the point of actually interviewing the prospective informant. This interpretation was made in view of the sentence in the Handbook Section that "Approval should be requested in a letter furnishing the background data..."

It is believed that the phraseology in the letter to all Special Agents in Charge is inconsistent with that in the Handbook. It is believed that the Bureau had in mind in connection with the letter to all Special Agents in Charge, as subsequently elaborated on in the Handbook, that no contact should be made with the prospective informant, himself or herself, without prior Bureau authority. However, this does not mean that preliminary checks and criminal checks or contacts with reliable, established informants and sources should not be made.

Action

In view of the confusion which the New York Office states has existed there relative to the letter to all Special Agents in Charge dated July 24, 1945, I have had prepared a proposed letter to all Special Agents in Charge, referring to the reference letter and clarifying this instruction. I recommend that the proposed letter be submitted to the Executive Conference for approval.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
 New York, New York

January 31, 1946

DECLASSIFIED BY *2849 DMJ/mc/p*
 ON *7-7-80*

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Carson.....
Mr. Egan.....
Mr. Gurnea.....
Mr. Harbo.....
Mr. Hendon.....
Mr. Pennington.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....

Director, F.B.I.

Re: ~~DEVELOPMENT OF~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL~~
~~DEFENSE INFORMANT WITH REFERENCE TO~~
~~COMMUNIST MATTERS.~~

Dear Sir:

Reference is being made to New York letter to the Bureau dated January 11, 1946, entitled as above, in which reference was made to SAC Letter #70, Series 1945, dated July 24, 1945, which contained a statement that "From the time of the receipt of this letter, no contacts should be made looking toward the development of a Confidential Informant in the investigation of Communist matters without prior approval of the Bureau". This statement has been interpreted by the New York Field Division to mean that not even a preliminary investigation could be conducted in order to develop a prospective Informant's background in view of the Bureau's statement "...no contact should be made looking toward...". As a result of this, no effort whatsoever has been made toward the development of Confidential National Defense Informants on Communist matters.

Reference is being made to the F.B.I. Handbook, Part I, Section 26, B-3, which is a new insert and which reads "No contact should be made with a prospective Confidential Informant concerning the investigation of Communist matters without prior approval of the Bureau". This office has interpreted this to mean that a preliminary investigation of a prospective Informant could be conducted without prior Bureau authority up to the point of actually interviewing the prospective Informant relative to his becoming one. This interpretation has been made especially in view of the next sentence in this Section which stated that the "approval should be requested in a letter furnishing the background data...."

The Bureau is requested to advise whether or not the instructions referred to above as contained in the F.B.I. Handbook supercedes the instructions in SAC Letter #70, also referred to above, and whether or not this office has placed the correct interpretation on the statement found in the Handbook.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Conroy
 E. E. CONROY,
 SAC

WTH:EMA



Handled
 APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
 AND FIELD OFFICES
 ADVISED BY ROUTING
 SLIP(S)
 DATE *10/20/81 BMT*

Copies of this information on the re-entrance of water - General

Class 10/20/81 BMT

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
New York, New York

January 11, 1946.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Director, F.B.I.

Re: *DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMANTS WITH REFERENCE TO
COMMUNIST MATTERS

Dear Sir:

Reference is being made to Bureau letter to all SACs #70, Series 1945, dated July 24, 1945, Section "B", entitled "COMMUNIST POLITICAL ASSOCIATION - INTERNAL SECURITY-C". This letter contains Bureau instructions concerning the development of Confidential Informants on Communist matters. It states in part that "From the time of the receipt of this letter no contacts should be made looking toward the development of a Confidential Informant in the investigation of Communist matters without prior approval of the Bureau".

As a result of the above mentioned statement, there has been considerable confusion relative to its interpretation. The Agents have made several inquiries concerning the matter as it is felt that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop an Informant on Communist matters without first making some contacts. Further, that the Bureau could not be advised concerning the same until at least some contact were made in order to find out who could be a possible Informant. As a result, it would be greatly appreciated if the Bureau would clarify its position relative to the development of Confidential Informants in the investigation of Communist matters.

Very truly yours,

WTM:EMA

66-25493-331
J. E. CONROY,
S.A.C.



56 FEB 27 1946

DECLASSIFIED BY *2842 DMJ mrc*
ON *7-16-81*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

JDD:FVB

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

DATE: February 21, 1946

FROM : J. C. Strickland

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b7D

Potential Confidential National Defense Informant

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Coffey
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Carson
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Mumford
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Beahm
Miss Gandy

Pursuant to the request of the Director, this is to advise that the letter from former SAC N. J. L. Pieper concerning [redacted] was received in the Internal Security Section on January 28, 1946, at 5:11 P. M. The information contained in the letter relative to the use by Mr. Pieper of [redacted] during the war as a confidential informant was checked against the Confidential Informant Index with negative results. It was apparent, therefore, that [redacted] was not a Bureau confidential informant and had evidently been used by the San Francisco Office as a source of information or contact.

A complete search of the Bureau files was thereupon requested for all data concerning [redacted]. The Defense Review Unit of the Records Section furnished several files containing information regarding the [redacted] which was conflicting in nature. It appeared that though [redacted] was an official representative of the [redacted], some suspicion had been attached to him as [redacted]. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to check each and every reference, which consisted of 12 files and 20 references, before requesting any action by the New York Office, looking toward the development of Claude Lazard as a confidential informant. The files also revealed that [redacted] had furnished information to the San Francisco Office in several security cases.

After some difficulty in locating all the aforementioned files and references, a letter was prepared to the New York Division to thoroughly check its files and sources on French matters before contacting [redacted] as a confidential informant and an acknowledgment letter to Mr. Pieper was also attached.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 DMC
me/SC

RECORDED
&
INDEXED

57 MAR 7 - 1946

-332

ENCLOSURE

February 18, 1946

Mr. H. J. L. Pieper
Consultants Limited
716-717 Butler Building
135 Stockton Street
San Francisco 8, California

Dear Mat:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842pm

mc/b7D
JC

I have received your letter concerning [redacted]
[redacted] and I have transmitted copies to Mr. E. E. Conroy
in New York for his attention.

Your thoughtfulness and courtesy in forwarding the request of [redacted]
[redacted] are sincerely appreciated, and I want you to know that it is most
gratifying to have your continued support and cooperation.

With best wishes and kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

JDD:vrw

Tolson _____
E. A. Tamm _____
Clegg _____
 Coffey _____
 Glavin _____
 Ladd _____
 Nichols _____
 Rosen _____
 Tracy _____
 Carson _____
 Egan _____
 Gurnea _____
 Hendon _____
 Pennington _____
 Quinn Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Gandy _____

RECEIVED 7 - 1946

4
EJW

CONSULTANTS LTD.

GENERAL PUBLIC RELATIONS

716-717 BUTLER BUILDING
135 STOCKTON STREET

ONE ENGBROOK 5476
SAN FRANCISCO 9, CALIF.

946

b7D

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Carson	✓
Mr. Egan	✓
Mr. Gurnea	✓
Mr. Harbo	✓
Mr. Hendon	✓
Mr. Pennington	✓
Mr. Quinn Tamm	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Mr. Gandy	✓

St. John

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

[redacted] was a very fine confidential informant of the Bureau throughout the war and particularly during the United Nations Conference.

I think I spoke to you about [redacted] who is very close to [redacted]. He was an officer in the [redacted] and was decorated by our government for his liaison work. I have just had a note from him in which he advised me that he has assumed the functions of [redacted] in New York City. His address is [redacted]. His telephone number is Circle [redacted].

[redacted] has asked that I assist him in establishing contact with someone in the Bureau, similar to that maintained by [redacted] here. [redacted] has unusually good contacts in Europe, the Near East and Africa. He could be of great value to the Bureau and for that reason I wanted to write you about him.

I would greatly appreciate your arranging for someone to call on [redacted].

Best regards!

Sincerely,

M. J. L. Pieper

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY [redacted] mcl/jc

RECORDED

INDEXED

66-1111-3-3

Letter to Sec. H. G. 1/18/46

[Signature]

February 18, 1946

RECORDED

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

EX-48

66-2542-3-334

Mr. W. G. Banister
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Post Office Box 306
Butte, Montana

Dear Mr. Banister:

Reference is made to your letter dated January 24, 1946, in which you submit the suggestion that confidential national defense informants not be requested to submit their reports in duplicate, as suggested in Section I, SAC Letter #115, Series 1945, dated December 11, 1945.

I am referring this suggestion to a Special Committee, composed of equal representation from the Seat of Government and the field, for careful study and analysis, and I will subsequently review the recommendations of this Committee with reference to your suggestion. In the meantime, I desire to express to you my appreciation for your thoughtfulness in submitting this suggestion.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S)
DATE 10/20/61

Class
10/20/61 BMT

DECLASSIFIED BY 2842 JRM/mec
ON 7-16-82

HHC:BG

66-2542-3-7-288

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

32 APR 1 1946
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

21A

Q

Butte, Montana
January 24, 1946

Director, FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY *2842 pm Jme SC*
ON *7-16-84* ~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

RE: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS - *See #7*

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Section I, SAC Letter #115, Series 1945, dated December 11, 1945, concerning the above captioned subject.

In connection with the written reports submitted by confidential informants to this office, it has always been the practice to maintain the original report in the administrative file of that particular informant. Portions of the reports dealing with various individuals and organizations have always been placed in the appropriate case file. All informants are encouraged to submit their reports in writing in order to have as complete details as possible.

With reference to Section I of the above referenced SAC letter, it is noted that the Bureau suggests that informants should be encouraged to submit their reports in duplicate in order that the duplicate copy may be filed in the appropriate case file. I personally think this to be a potentially dangerous policy and recommend against it. The reason for this opinion is that the informant, once he gets in the habit of making a duplicate copy, may be encouraged to make a third copy for his own personal use, which copy might be subsequently lost and get into the hands of an undesirable person or group of persons, or the informant may wish to write a book some day.

The above letter points out that the reason for submitting the informant's report in duplicate was so that one copy could be placed in the informant's administrative file and the other copy placed in the appropriate case file. In this office, and it is believed in the majority of the field offices, there are few, if any, informants' reports, particularly in Communist matters, where the report deals with only one person. Therefore, in almost every case it is necessary to have the report stenciled and mimeographed copies run off for the various case files. In these instances, even if the informant submitted his report in triplicate, it would not eliminate the necessity of having to mimeograph the report, because it always deals with more than one person.

ack

2/15/46

4445

Original letter filed
Action by Special Committee
44

EX-44

RECORDED

2545-4-33
33
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22

Director, FBI
Re: Confidential National Defense Informants

January 24, 1946

Also, in this office -- and probably in most field offices -- the types of informants used do not always have typewriters, and obviously the field offices are not in a position to furnish typewriters for their informants. As a usual rule, it is oftentimes hard to get the informant to submit his report in writing under any condition, much less make a duplicate copy.

Unless advised to the contrary, informants of this office will not be requested to submit their reports in duplicate.

Very truly yours

W. G. BANISTER
SAC

WGB:DLT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR
FROM : THE JOINT COMMITTEE

DATE: February 25, 1946

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #7
EMPLOYEE: SAC W. G. BANISTER
BUTTE FIELD DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7/16/81 BY 2842pm Dmejc

MEMBERS PRESENT: H. H. Clegg E. E. Conroy
R. C. Hendon E. Scheidt

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTS:

That confidential national defense informants should not be encouraged to submit their reports in duplicate. (The present rule is that the informants should be encouraged to submit their reports in duplicate in order that a duplicate copy of the report may be filed in the specific case file, the original being placed in a separate section of the administrative file relating to the particular informant. The purpose of placing the copy in this administrative file is to permit a quick review of the information which has been submitted in writing by an individual informant, so that his value as an informant can be readily evaluated.)

ADVANTAGES:

1. SAC Banister cites as an advantage that the present policy is potentially dangerous because it might encourage informants to make extra copies for their own personal use.
2. SAC Banister points out that duplicate copies serve no purpose because, generally, informants' reports, particularly in Communist matters, deal with several case files.
3. SAC Banister points out that some informants cannot use typewriters and submit their reports in longhand.
4. SAC Banister further points out that, as a usual rule, it is difficult to get an informant to submit his report in writing under any conditions.

DISADVANTAGES:

1. In the interests of uniformity, the present Bureau rule should be maintained.
2. All of SAC Banister's recommendations are nebulous in that this rule does not curb the receipt of information, and it is merely suggested that they be encouraged to submit their reports in duplicate. It is not mandatory; it is just a suggestion.
3. The present rule is followed by most field offices effectively and will permit the discontinuance of payments to informants who are four-flushers and who do not merit any payments being made to them.
4. It does prevent, in many instances, the necessity of typing for filing purposes a second copy of a report submitted, thus saving stenographic time.

RECOMMENDATION: Unanimously unfavorable.

52 APR 8

1046⁴⁶

3/15/46

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

general
1066-2542-3/335

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: *The Executive Conference with Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Hendon, Clegg, Ladd, Mumford, Rosen and Nichols being present, unanimously recommends that no change be made in the present rule. The Conference felt that there was no merit to the suggestion of Mr. Banister and that confidential national defense informants should be encouraged to submit their reports in duplicate where practical and feasible. The present rule does not absolutely require the duplicate reports and it is helpful where it is possible to have the two copies submitted.*

*Respectfully,
For the Conference*

✓
Clyde Tolson

E. A. Tamm
E. A. Tamm

GK.
H.
CC - Mr. Clegg

RCH:DW

New Orleans, Louisiana

April 22, 1946

Director, FBI

Suggestion #202

The following suggestion is being submitted in accordance with Bureau memorandum dated April 12, 1946:

It is suggested that the quarterly report on Confidential National Defense Informants, which is submitted to the Bureau on the 20th of March, June, September and December, as set forth in Section 13H, Sub-section 1, National Defense Manual, be discontinued, and that this report be submitted on an annual basis. At the present time the Bureau is notified by separate communication of each addition or deletion from the Confidential National Defense Informant file, and it is believed that these separate communications would serve to keep the Bureau informed as to the number of Confidential National Defense Informants in each field division. It is believed that the number of these Informants does not change a great deal from quarter to quarter, and that by eliminating the quarterly report to the Bureau, the same information could be made available in the separate communications and in the annual report which would be submitted.

Respectfully submitted,

G. Myrman Alderson
G. MYRMAN ALDERSON
Special Agent

*Pres
Handled*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmd
mc/ljc

RECORDED & INDEXED

64-48-336

JUN 12 1946

gpc

FILED

*ack
5-7-46
WVC*

601

RR



IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO

FILE NO.

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, 25, D. C.

June 26, 1946



~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

BUREAU BULLETIN NO. 35

Series 1946

in General Intelligence Work - gent

(A) CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS - Volume II, Part 2, Section 13 of the Manual of Instructions, Confidential National Defense Informants; (this section formerly in National Defense Manual) provides in Section 13-H that the Bureau be advised quarterly on the 20th of March, June, September, and December concerning the total number of confidential National Defense Informants developed by each field office. This requirement is now changed and such a report shall be submitted in the future semi-annually on June 20 and December 20 of each year.

DECLASSIFIED BY 2812 PWD/MSJ
ON 7-16-82

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NOT RECORDED
100 Jul 9 1946

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-03-757

3 JUL 11 1946

SAC Letter No. 52

in General Intelligence Series 1946

(B) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INFORMANTS ON COMMUNIST MATTERS -- The Bureau is intensifying its activity in regard to Communist Party matters at this time and certain suggestions are being set forth to be followed whenever possible in the handling of these informants. A reliable informant was recently dismissed from the Communist Party and her failure to conceal her activity was the cause of her ultimate dismissal. To be certain that the services of other informants may not be jeopardized, the following suggestions are made:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

1. Open Communist Party activity such as canvassing, sale of literature, distributing leaflets, et cetera should be carried on.
2. When requesting assignments to inner-Party committees, the informant should

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY
DATE 10/20/81

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 DMJ
mc/r

5-9-46
SAC LETTER NO. 52
Series 1946

be circumspect and should seek these positions in such a manner as to avoid suspicion.

3. If the informant must take notes at Party meetings, the notes should be used in Party discussion or in connection with some official Party activity. The mere taking of notes at a meeting without any contribution in discussion naturally causes suspicion.

4. In the event an informant is accused as such, he should vigorously protest and not merely acquiesce. In most instances, the evidence which will be the basis for dismissal is not strong and a vigorous protest on the part of the informant will do much to confuse the Party officials and perhaps cause a change in attitude.

5. When an informant has been suspended or is about to be suspended and has been granted a hearing, the informant should appear and defend himself.

The above items are set forth for your guidance and utilization in the handling of informants in Communist matters to prevent, if possible, the disaffection of any other informants the Bureau is operating.

DECLASSIFIED BY 8063ja/ljs
ON 5-10-91
83-1343

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OTHERWISE
100-2542-3-
NOT RECORDED
56 MAY 16 1946

COMM STAMP
ON ORIGINAL
5/9/46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 201MAC/SCJ
L. ACO PCA EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-81

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-04

X
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DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842pm mc/jc

66-2542-3-337

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-37-483X
C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
 FROM : SAC, New York
 SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY USA
 INTERNAL SECURITY - C

DATE: March 7, 1946

Suggestion Letter #111

The following comments and suggestions have been offered by Special Agent Maurice E. Scroggins, Jr. of the New York Field Division for your consideration:

It frequently comes to the attention of this and other Field Divisions that various individuals have been expelled from or have resigned from the Communist Party. In most instances, it is not deemed advisable to contact these individuals, with the end in view of developing them as Informants, either because of the character of the individuals or because of the limited information to be supplied by them. However, in the event that prosecutive action should ever be taken against individual members or functionaries of the Communist Party, these former Party members would be in a position to supply legally admissible testimony as to the identities of members and functionaries, their attendance at Party meetings and functions and, in many cases, to statements which may have been made by them.

In view of the above facts, Special Agent Scroggins has suggested for your consideration that in the future the names, addresses, and groups to which they have belonged be indexed in a separate index maintained in a fashion similar to the Source of Information Index as their names come to the attention of the Field Office so that in case it should ever be deemed necessary or advisable to interview former members of any particular Party group, their names will be available for ready reference.

It is realized that any review of the files of the particular Field Division for the purpose of ascertaining the names of those individuals, who have resigned in the past, would involve more time than would perhaps be justified by the importance of the index. However, the index could be maintained on names of all those individuals who come to the attention of the particular Field Division subsequent to its inception.

This is submitted for your consideration.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842

ack

3/18/46

1/16

RECORDED 166-2542-338

JUN 19 1946

*Joint Comm. memo
 4/26/46. rch: Lch*

57 AUG 1 3 1946

100-4931

PER. FILES

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : THE JOINT COMMITTEE

DATE: 4/26/46

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #101
EMPLOYEE: SA MAURICE E. SCROGGINS, JR., NEW YORK

MEMBERS PRESENT:	H. H. CLEGG	E. E. CONROY
	R. G. HENDON	E. SCHEIDT

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTS: That a special index be maintained in a fashion similar to the Source of Information Index showing the names, addresses and groups to which they belonged of Communist Party members who have resigned or have been expelled.

ADVANTAGES:

1. This would make the names of such individuals available at any future date for any interviews which at that time might seem advisable for information of evidentiary value should legal action be taken against the Communist Party or any of its affiliated groups.
2. The index would make available the names of individuals who might be qualified and willing to testify in any future legal proceedings.

DISADVANTAGES:

1. It would setup a special index of most doubtful value which might never be utilized.
2. The information is available in the organizational files.
3. It would add to administrative detail.
4. In the small field offices of the Bureau this file might be maintained for years without a single card.
5. Many of the names in the index would become absolutely useless through death, changes of address and the passage of time.

RECOMMENDATION: Unanimously unfavorable.

RCH:HD

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE CONSIDERATION: (5/2/46)

Unanimously unfavorable, with Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Harbo, Quinn Tamm, E. A. Tamm, Hendon, Clegg, Ladd and Rosen in

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY SP4 JED

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde Tolson

E. A. TAMM

5 AUG 1 3 1948

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: QUARTERLY REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR
MARCH 1946

DATE: May 3, 1946

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

The reports submitted by the field for March, 1946 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 1,584 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows:

Informants concerning German activities	43
Informants concerning Italian activities	22
Informants concerning Communist activities	1135
Informants concerning Japanese activities	42
Informants concerning other nationalities	115
Informants concerning general un-American activities	287

Total #1584

*Included in the total are 255 informants of the colored race.

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic tendency.

DECLASSIFIED BY 896620/EP
ON 5-18-94
83-1343

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 EX-26

Attachment

JDD:dmg

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION

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R. 582 JUL 19 1961

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	: TOTAL
ALBANY	: 0	: 4	: 55 (3)	: 0	: 3	:	88
ANCHORAGE	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	:	0
ATLANTA	: 0	: 0	: 6 (3)	: 0	: 0	:	7
BALTIMORE	: 0	: 0	: 21 (3)	: 0	: 0	:	21 (3)
BIRMINGHAM	: 0	: 0	: 8 (3)	: 0	: 0	:	9 (3)
BOSTON	: 0	: 2	: 14	: 0	: 0	:	21 (6)
BUFFALO	: 0	: 0	: 27	: 0	: 2	:	29 (13)
BUTTE	: 0	: 0	: 15	: 1	: 3	: 2	21 (0)
CHARLOTTE	: 0	: 0	: 8	: 0	: 0	: 6	14 (5)
CHICAGO	: 3	: 4	: 132 (9)	: 12	: 4	: 25 (19)	180 (28)
CINCINNATI	: 13	: 2	: 17	: 1	: 4	: 8 (7)	45 (7)
CLEVELAND	: 1	: 0	: 29	: 1	: 4 (7)	:	40 (7)
DALLAS	: 0	: 0	: 4 (1)	: 0	: 0	:	4 (1)
DENVER	: 2	: 0	: 2	: 4	: 0	:	8 (1)
DES MOINES	: 0	: 0	: 41	: 0	: 0	:	45 (4)
DETROIT	: 0	: 0	: 42	: 2	: 5	:	75 (12)

* Includes Vichy France, Spanish, Rumanian, Bulgarian, etc.

** Includes Pelly's Silver Shirts, Christian Front, Ku Klux Klan, Technocracy Inc. etc.

() Figures within this mark represent the number of informants that are negroes.

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CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY: 2025
REASON FOR EXTENSION: 9-15-91
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION: 75 (12)

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66-2542-3
CONFIDENTIAL
BY 2502
pmj/mc/r

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R 582 JUL 19 1961

FIELD OFFICE	:	GERMAN	:	ITALIAN	:	COMMUNIST	:	JAPANESE	:	OTHER*	:	UN-AMERICAN**	:	TOTAL
EL PASO	:	0	:	0	:	2	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	2
HONOLULU	:	0	:	0	:	2	:	4	:	2	:	0	:	8
HOUSTON	:	0	:	0	:	16 (4)	:	0	:	2	:	4	:	22 (4)
INDIANAPOLIS	:	1	:	0	:	18	:	0	:	0	:	5	:	24 (6)
JACKSON	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	0
KANSAS CITY	:	1	:	3	:	8	:	0	:	0	:	11	:	23 (5)
KNOXVILLE	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	0	:	0	:	1 (1)	:	5 (1)
LITTLE ROCK	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	0	:	0	:	8	:	12 (8)
LOS ANGELES	:	1	:	1	:	120 (3)	:	0	:	17	:	9	:	148 (3)
LOUISVILLE	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	4 (1)
MEMPHIS	:	0	:	0	:	10 (2)	:	0	:	0	:	11 (10)	:	21 (12)
MIAMI	:	0	:	0	:	9	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	13
MILWAUKEE	:	4	:	2	:	14	:	2	:	6	:	0	:	28 (6)
NEWARK	:	0	:	0	:	26 (6)	:	0	:	1	:	10	:	37 (6)
NEW HAVEN	:	0	:	0	:	15	:	0	:	0	:	2	:	17 (3)
NEW ORLEANS	:	0	:	0	:	13	:	0	:	0	:	2	:	15 (8)
NEW YORK	:	5	:	1	:	77	:	1	:	10	:	2	:	96 (9)
NORFOLK	:	0	:	0	:	6	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	6 (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>FIELD OFFICE</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>GERMAN</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>ITALIAN</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>COMMUNIST</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>JAPANESE</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>OTHER*</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>UN-AMERICAN**</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>OKLAHOMA CITY</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>11 (1)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>11 (1)</u>
<u>OMAHA</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>6 (3)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>6 (3)</u>
<u>PHILADELPHIA</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>48 (3)</u>
<u>PHOENIX</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>11 (1)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>42 (1)</u>
<u>PITTSBURGH</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>13 (8)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>45 (8)</u>
<u>PORTLAND</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>24 (3)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>24 (3)</u>
<u>RICHMOND</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>17 (7)</u>
<u>ST. LOUIS</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>18 (3)</u>
<u>ST. PAUL</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>19 (6)</u>
<u>SALT LAKE CITY</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>SAN ANTONIO</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>4 (2)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>2 (2)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>8 (4)</u>
<u>SAN DIEGO</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>5 (2)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>17 (2)</u>
<u>SAN FRANCISCO</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>52 (9)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>6 (1)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>68 (10)</u>
<u>SAN JUAN</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>26 (4)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>68 (4)</u>
<u>SAVANNAH</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>2 (2)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>20 (12)</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>22 (14)</u>
<u>SEATTLE</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>:</u>	<u>36 (4)</u>

FE

FIELD OFFICE	:	GERMAN	:	ITALIAN	:	COMMUNIST	:	JAPANESE	:	OTHER*	:	UN-AMERICAN**	:	TOTAL
SPRINGFIELD	:	0	:	0	:	7 (2)	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	7 (2)
WASHINGTON	:	0	:	0	:	14 (5)	:	0	:	8	:	14 (2)	:	36 (7)
TOTALS	:	43	:	22	:	1135	:	42	:	115	:	287	:	1584 (255)

2
(12)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM : SAC, KANSAS CITY

DATE: JUNE 6, 1946

SUBJECT: QUARTERLY REPORT
NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

Reference is made to Bureau Bulletin #30, Series 1946, dated May 29, 1946, Subsection 8 thereof, which relates to the destruction of certain portions of the National Defense Manual. Current regulations require the submission of a quarterly report on the National Defense Informants throughout the field, broken down as to nationalistic type of information they can furnish.

In view of the elimination of such a large portion of the National Defense Manual it would appear possible at this time to discontinue the submission to the Bureau of the number of confidential informants relating to German, Italian, Japanese and other nationalistic groups with the possible exception of Communist informants. It is suggested that the Bureau give consideration to the elimination of this requirement which would save, it appears, considerable time and expense and would at the same time not effect the efficiency of the organization.

HCB:JF
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DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 PMK
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Approved by
 Special Committee
 & Subgroup P.B.
 Union Veterans

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DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 DMU
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC - 156

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

TO: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

[JULY 23, 1946]

~~CODE UNDERLINED~~ (U)

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, ATLANTA
BOSTON 3
CINCINNATI
EL PASO
PITTSBURGH

(U)

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

SEMIANNUAL REPORT CNDI. SUPPL WHEN SEMIANNUAL REPORT SUBMITTED BUREAU.

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CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 pm mc/SC
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-91
7-16-81

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Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

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DATE 7-16-81 BY 280 Dmc
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66-2542-3-49-168X

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS
JUNE, 1946

DATE: August 1, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

DECLASSIFIED BY *88612/af/88*
ON *5-18-94* *83-1343*

The reports submitted by the field for June, 1946 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 1,522 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows:

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY
SEPARATE
DATE *Classified*
1/21/47

Informants concerning German activities	40
Informants concerning Italian activities	18
Informants concerning Communist activities	1023
Informants concerning Japanese activities	49
Informants concerning other nationalities	106
Informants concerning general un-American activities	286

Total *1522

*Included in the total are 247 informants of the colored race

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic groups.

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DATE *7-16-81* BY *2842 DMJ*
mclsc

Attachment

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *SP1 JMS*
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *9-15-94*

JDD:cmg

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LATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pm J mlt/c

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

DECLASSIFIED BY 806-814/183
ON 5-19-74
8-9-74

FIELD OFFICE	GERMAN	ITALIAN	COMMUNIST	JAPANESE	OTHER*	UN-AMERICAN**	TOTAL
ALBANY	0	0	40 (3)	0	4	14 (1)	58 (4)
ANCHORAGE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ATLANTA	0	0	6 (3)	0	0	1	7 (3)
BALTIMORE	0	0	15 (3)	0	0	0	15 (3)
BIRMINGHAM	0	0	8 (3)	0	0	1	9 (3)
BOSTON	0	2	14	0	0	5	21 (6)
BUFFALO	0	0	27 (5)	0	2	7 (7)	36 (12)
BUTTE	0	0	17 (2)	13	2	2	34 (2)
CHARLOTTE	0	0	9	0	0	7	16 (5)
CHICAGO	3	4	129 (11)	12	4	34 (27)	186 (38)
CINCINNATI	13	2	18	1	3	8 (7)	45 (7)
CLEVELAND	1	0	23	1	2 (1)	4	31 (7)
DALLAS	0	0	5 (3)	0	0	0	5 (3)
DENVER	2	0	2	4	0	0	8 (1)
DES MOINES	0	0	41	0	0	4 (4)	46 (4)
DETROIT	0	0	41	2	6	24	73 (12)

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 5011/183
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2
DATE OF REVIEW 9-15-91
DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 6-15-8

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* Includes Vichy France, Spanish, Rumanian, Bulgarian, etc.
** Includes Pellvi's Silver Shirts, Christian Front, Ku Klux Klan, Technocracy Inc. etc.
() Figures within this mark represent the number of informants that are negroes.

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	: TOTAL
EL PASO	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 2
HONOLULU	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 4	: 2	: 0	: 8
HOUSTON	: 0	: 0	: 16 (2)	: 0	: 2	: 8	: 26 (2)
INDIANAPOLIS	: 1	: 0	: 17	: 0	: 0	: 5	: 23 (6)
JACKSON	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0
KANSAS CITY	: 1	: 3	: 8	: 0	: 0	: 11	: 23 (5)
KNOXVILLE	: 0	: 0	: 4	: 0	: 0	: 1 (1)	: 5 (1)
LITTLE ROCK	: 0	: 0	: 3	: 0	: 0	: 8	: 11 (8)
LOS ANGELES	: 1	: 1	: 118 (3)	: 0	: 16	: 12	: 148 (3)
LOUISVILLE	: 0	: 0	: 4	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 4 (1)
MEMPHIS	: 0	: 0	: 9 (2)	: 0	: 0	: 11 (10)	: 20 (12)
MIAMI	: 0	: 0	: 8	: 0	: 0	: 3	: 11
MILWAUKEE	: 4	: 2	: 14	: 2	: 6	: 0	: 28 (6)
NEWARK	: 0	: 0	: 20	: 0	: 0	: 6	: 26 (5)
NEW HAVEN	: 0	: 0	: 15	: 0	: 0	: 1	: 16 (3)
NEW ORLEANS	: 0	: 0	: 11	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 13 (7)
NEW YORK	: 3	: 1	: 64	: 2	: 16	: 2	: 88 (9)
NORFOLK	: 0	: 0	: 6	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 6 (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

RE

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	: TOTAL
OKLAHOMA CITY	: 0	: 0	: 11 (1)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 11 (1)
OMAHA	: 0	: 0	: 6 (3)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 6 (3)
PHILADELPHIA	: 2	: 0	: 41	: 1	: 5	: 2	: 51 (3)
PHOENIX	: 4	: 2	: 8	: 4	: 2	: 5	: 25 (2)
PITTSBURGH	: 0	: 0	: 31	: 0	: 1	: 13	: 45 (8)
PORTLAND	: 0	: 0	: 20 (3)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 20 (3)
RICHMOND	: 0	: 0	: 10 (1)	: 0	: 0	: 6	: 16 (7)
ST. LOUIS	: 1	: 1	: 18	: 1	: 1	: 1	: 23 (2)
ST. PAUL	: 0	: 0	: 22	: 0	: 0	: 6 (6)	: 28 (6)
SALT LAKE CITY	: 0	: 0	: 4	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 4
SAN ANTONIO	: 1	: 0	: 4 (2)	: 0	: 1	: 2 (2)	: 8 (4)
SAN DIEGO	: 0	: 0	: 7	: 2	: 3	: 5 (1)	: 17 (1)
SAN FRANCISCO	: 1	: 0	: 47 (8)	: 0	: 2	: 5 (1)	: 55 (9)
SAN JUAN	: 2	: 0	: 26 (4)	: 0	: 14	: 23	: 65 (4)
SAVANNAH	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 0	: 0	: 19	: 21
SEATTLE	: 0	: 0	: 28	: 0	: 4	: 4	: 36 (4)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	:	GERMAN	:	ITALIAN	:	COMMUNIST	:	JAPANESE	:	OTHER*	:	UN-AMERICAN**	:	TOTAL
SPRINGFIELD	:	0	:	0	:	7 (2)	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	7 (2)
WASHINGTON	:	0	:	0	:	15 (6)	:	0	:	8	:	14 (2)	:	37 (8)
TOTALS	:	40	:	18	:	1023	:	49	:	106	:	286	:	1522 (247)

②
③

THIRTEEN

THIRTEEN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmk/mef/c

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66-2542-3-346

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-9-1604X
C

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

DATE: September 27, 1946

FROM : J. C. Strickland

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL
DEFENSE INFORMANTS

The Seattle Office has advised concerning the results of a recent project in regard to confidential informants and the suggestion was made that the Bureau might desire to advise other Field Offices concerning the same method of redeveloping Confidential National Defense Informants.

In connection with the preparation of the Brief on the Communist Party, a number of files on discontinued Confidential National Defense Informants were reviewed. It was found that many informants were discontinued for unavoidable reasons such as entrance into military service, extended illness and temporary departure from the area. In many instances these informants were valuable in the past and no reasons other than the above were enumerated for the discontinuance. It was believed that these files could be a fertile source for redevelopment of informants in all Field Offices and would prove valuable since considerable less investigation would be necessary to reinstate them than to develop and investigate a new informant.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the necessity for the Field to continually obtain and develop confidential informants, particularly in the Communist field, the procedure followed in Seattle could without too much trouble be followed in all offices. It is possible that a similar check has been made in most offices in view of the emphasis that has recently been placed on informants, but the suggestion has merit as a reminder to the Field to overlook no possibilities. There is attached, therefore, a proposed Bureau Bulletin containing the suggestion that all discontinued files on Confidential National Defense Informants be reviewed to determine whether any of these informants could be recontacted at this time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 3842 pme/jme/bc

JDD:rb

Attachment

EX - 25

66-2542-3-347

60
SEP 25 1946

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842201
me/jc

66-2542-3-348

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-34-2495

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmj
mc/jc

K
66-2542-3-349

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-5-502X
C

F65M72K70

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC - 150

January 17, 1947

(U) ROUTINE - ~~CODE IN FULL~~ (U)

TO: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Transmit the following message to:

SAC, St. Louis
Portland
Norfolk
Louisville
Dallas
Butte
Boston *2*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEMI ANNUAL REPORT ORD. SUBMIT REPORT CONCERNING NUMBER ORD.

ending 1950

JED:rb

~~CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 P.M. (U)
REASON FOR EXTENSION 2)
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-91
7-16-81~~

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S)
DATE 1/20/81

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by 9803AD/bjs
Declassify on: OADR
CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRG)
DATE 6-8-94

RECORDED

LG

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Carson
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Hendon
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 JAN 20 1947
Teletype 1/19/47 (c) 4⁰² P.M. Per *mk*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmw
mcj/c

66-2542-3-357

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-53-7677

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

January 28, 1947

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmj/mj
 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. Tamm
 RE: DEVELOPMENT OF
 CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

In response to your request for my observations concerning the suggestion in the attached memorandum, the following is set forth.

In the attached memorandum the view is expressed that because of existing Bureau regulations we may be missing some golden opportunities insofar as the development of informants in the Communist field is concerned, since under existing instructions, no contact can be made with a prospective Communist informant until a check of the Bureau indices at the Seat of Government has been made and until Bureau approval is granted for same. The memorandum suggests that consideration be given the advisability of granting the Field permission to make pretext approaches to potential informants.

A proper understanding of this problem necessitates a knowledge of the following:

Since the Field is considerably curtailed under the existing regulations insofar as its informant development program is concerned, an Agent assigned to Communist investigations will review cases on Communists or Communist associates in his field division with a view to uncovering information indicating factionalism, a revisionist attitude or general distrust and possible alienation of sentiments on the part of a given individual. If such information is available, a complete check of that field office's indices will be made and, in the absence of information which would dictate the inadvisability of approaching this individual, the field office will direct a communication to the Bureau requesting a check of our indices and authority to approach the individual with a view to developing him as an informant. The request is received at the Bureau, a complete check of our indices is made and again, in the absence of information which would dictate action to the contrary, the Bureau will direct a communication to the Field authorizing contact with the subject under consideration. It is generally two weeks or longer before the Field is finally in a position to approach the prospective informant.

68 FEB 27 1947

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES
 TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES

1/28/47

I have ascertained from the supervisor on the Confidential Informant Desk that since this program has been in effect not too much success has been obtained insofar as the development of good Communist informants is concerned. It can be conservatively stated that 75% or more of the individuals checked out in this manner indicated above never pan out. Obviously this consumes a great amount of time and effort, which time and effort is wasted in at least 75% of the cases, at least insofar as the actual development of informants is concerned. Of course, it is not a waste of time insofar as the protection of the Bureau is concerned, and eventually this is an important element to be considered. While considering this element, however, I think that the Bureau can reach a compromise between the presently existing rule and the old procedure on the developing of informants without in any way compromising the Bureau itself.

It is my suggestion, after discussing this matter with some of the interested supervisors in the Security Division, that the Bureau grant the Field permission to make pretext approaches to potential informants without prior Bureau clearance, provided (1) a complete check is made of the Field Office indices, (2) that a preliminary check is made on the individual in question (criminal record, credit check, etcetera), and (3) that the SAC personally approves this approach. If the initial approach then proves to be successful, (1) the Bureau should be immediately notified, (2) a complete check should be made of our files, and (3) the Field should be advised of the results of that check and of course, if the information disclosed from the check of our central files warrants such action, the Field should be instructed to discontinue its efforts to further develop the party in question.

It is understood, of course, that pretext approaches will not, under these circumstances, extend to Communists in trade unions for reasons which are readily apparent.

During recent months, as a result of the Director's address before the Catholic Youth Organization and his talk before the American Legion, as a result of publicity emanating from other substantial quarters concerning the Communist movement, the American public is becoming more cognizant of the Communist menace. The Congress is likewise becoming so cognizant. Consequently, I think we have less to fear now than when this rule was promulgated. Our only fear is that one of our approaches to a prospective informant would be ill-advised to the point to which there would be attendant derogatory publicity for the Bureau. There is not so much fear of this situation arising at this time, and furthermore, I think that the Bureau has probably arrived at the point where an attack from

Memorandum for Mr. Tamm

1/28/47

the Communist Party or "The Daily Worker" on the Bureau is actually a plug for the Bureau.

If you concur, this matter will be discussed along the lines indicated in this memorandum, rather than in the attached communication, with the Agents attending the Internal Security School; pertinent views advanced at the School will be called to your attention; and the matter will ultimately be presented to the Executive Conference for its views.

Respectfully,

J. P. Coyne
J. P. Coyne

Attachment

JPG:MAB

OK - make it clear that
this is not now a rule.
Present to school for views, then
present views to Ex. Conference
E. J.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

MEMORANDUM FOR

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD
FROM : J. C. Strickland
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY SP8 Dm
mc/jc

January 21, 1941

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

8942 pm mjc
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY SP8 Dm
mc/jc

As you know, the current Bureau policy with regard to developing new confidential informants in Communist matters requires that the Field does not make any approach to a potential confidential informant without prior authority of the Bureau. This policy arose in 1941 when, through an error involved in a file check, an approach was made to a Communist in a trade union on the West Coast for the purpose of developing her as a confidential informant. This Communist divulged the approach to the Communist Party, who in turn seized upon it and twisted the approach and published it as an attempt by the Bureau to investigate the trade union involved.

While it is realized that the Bureau must necessarily be most circumspect in its development of confidential informants in Communist matters and particularly Communist informants who are affiliated with trade unions, it is felt that the Bureau may be missing some golden opportunities in view of the fact that there are occasions which arise momentarily wherein an approach to a Communist on the basis of a pretext might lead to the development of that Communist as a good confidential informant. It can be readily seen that by the time communication is made with the Bureau that the opportunity might be lost. An example of this hypothetical case is cited:

There are at the present time current indications of dissatisfaction within the Communist Party. People who formerly held respected positions in the movement when Earl Browder was the leader of the Party are being given "back seats" in many instances. There have been indications received that these people are most dissatisfied with their present plight in the movement. In addition, there have been indications that Communists of long standing have been expressing their extreme dislike for the "bureaucracy" character of the national leaders of the Party.

A pretext approach after it is ascertained through established sources of the dissatisfaction of certain Communists might well result in that Communist letting his or her "hair down." The approach, it is conceivable, can be made on a number of grounds, such as, seeking information concerning a fictitious substantive violation or a character check of some fictitious applicant or some other seemingly logical reason.

It is felt that possible consideration should be given as to the advisability of granting the Field permission to make pretext approaches to potential informants in order to attempt to secure from them their feelings. It is not felt, of course, that pretext approaches should be made to Communists in trade unions and that such pretext approaches should be confined on a most select basis to nontrade union members. It is of course not contemplated that any offer or any approach of this nature be entered into

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY 10710 AC JCS
REASON: 1.25
AUTHORITY: 1.25
DATE 10-15-91
DECLASSIFYING OFFICE: 10710 AC JCS

RECORDED - 64
EX-107

EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

without prior Bureau authority and without the thorough check of the Bureau's files.

While specific instances are not available at the present time wherein the Field has been handicapped in the past of developments of informants in not being able to make prior approach without Bureau authority, this subject has been brought up on occasions in In-Service training classes and in informal discussions with representatives of the Field.

Another consideration in this matter is the militant nature of the Communist Party and its extreme antagonism toward the Bureau. The Bureau could not be in any more hated position as far as the Communists are concerned than it is at the present time. Consequently, whatever charges might be made would only be a continuation of the attack against the Bureau.

Action:

It is suggested that consideration be given to this matter. It is pointed out that the Special Internal Security School on Communist and Soviet matters begins February 10, 1947, and that this matter can readily be discussed with the representatives of the Field to obtain their views.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: January 30, 1947

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR DECEMBER, 1946DECLASSIFIED BY *846 JJA/LSP*
ON *5-18-94*
83-1343

The reports submitted by the field for December, 1946 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 1,479 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows:

Informants concerning German activities	30
Informants concerning Italian activities	17
Informants concerning Communist activities	1017
Informants concerning Japanese activities	45
Informants concerning other nationalities	115
Informants concerning general un-American activities	255
Total	*1479

*Included in the total are 245 informants of the colored race.

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic tendency.

attachment

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DATE 7-16-8 BY 2802 *me/PC*

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CONTROLLED BY *APPROVAC*

EXCEPT FOR EXTENSION

FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION

9-15-91

9-15-81

FEB 5 1947

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OTHERWISE

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CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	: TOTAL
ALBANY	: 0	: 0	: 41 (3)	: 0	: 6	: 3 (1)	: 50 (4)
ANCHORAGE	: 0	: 0	: 3	: 0	: 1	: 0	: 4
ATLANTA	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 1	: 1
BALTIMORE	: 0	: 1	: 13	: 0	: 3	: 1	: 18 (3)
BIRMINGHAM	: 0	: 0	: 8 (3)	: 0	: 0	: 1	: 9 (3)
BOSTON	: 0	: 2	: 14	: 0	: 0	: 5	: 21 (6)
BUFFALO	: 0	: 0	: 29	: 0	: 2	: 0	: 31 (13)
BUTTE	: 0	: 0	: 16 (2)	: 13	: 2	: 2	: 33 (2)
CHARLOTTE	: 0	: 0	: 10	: 0	: 0	: 5	: 15 (4)
CHICAGO	: 3	: 4	: 126 (10)	: 12	: 4	: 34 (27)	: 183 (37)
CINCINNATI	: 13	: 2	: 23	: 1	: 4	: 7 (7)	: 50 (7)
CLEVELAND	: 1	: 0	: 22	: 1	: 2	: 4	: 30 (7)
DALLAS	: 0	: 0	: 5 (1)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 5 (1)
DENVER	: 2	: 0	: 1	: 4	: 0	: 0	: 7 (1)
DETROIT	: 0	: 0	: 39	: 2	: 6	: 23	: 70 (12)
EL PASO	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 2

* Includes Spanish, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Yugoslavian, etc.

** Includes Ku Klux Klan, Allah Temple of Islam, The Columbians, Inc., People's Institute of Applied Religion, Universal African Nationalist Movement, etc.

() Figures within this mark represent the number of informants that are negroes.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 7-16-81 BY 2882 pml/jnc/ljc

66-2542-3-38-247
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2882 pml/jnc/ljc

DECLASSIFIED
DATE 10-15-81
BY 9-15-81

THINKING

CONFIDENTIAL

67-1-58
DECLASSIFIED
DATE 10-15-81
BY 9-15-81

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	: TOTAL
HONOLULU	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 4	: 2	: 0	: 8
HOUSTON	: 0	: 0	: 16	: 0	: 2	: 6	: 24 (4)
INDIANAPOLIS	: 0	: 0	: 15	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 17 (5)
KANSAS CITY	: 1	: 3	: 8	: 0	: 0	: 11	: 23 (5)
KNOXVILLE	: 0	: 0	: 4	: 0	: 0	: 1 (1)	: 5 (1)
LITTLE ROCK	: 0	: 0	: 3	: 0	: 0	: 8	: 11 (8)
LOS ANGELES	: 1	: 1	: 118 (3)	: 0	: 12	: 6	: 138 (3)
LOUISVILLE	: 0	: 0	: 4	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 4 (1)
MEMPHIS	: 0	: 0	: 11 (2)	: 0	: 0	: 10 (9)	: 21 (11)
MIAMI	: 0	: 0	: 8	: 0	: 0	: 4	: 12 (1)
MILWAUKEE	: 4	: 2	: 14	: 2	: 6	: 0	: 28 (6)
NEWARK	: 0	: 0	: 21	: 0	: 0	: 5	: 26 (5)
NEW HAVEN	: 0	: 0	: 15	: 0	: 0	: 1	: 16 (3)
NEW ORLEANS	: 0	: 0	: 11 (7)	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 13 (7)
NEW YORK	: 0	: 0	: 57	: 1	: 16	: 6	: 80 (4)
NORFOLK	: 0	: 0	: 10	: 0	: 0	: 1	: 11 (5)
OKLAHOMA CITY	: 0	: 0	: 11 (1)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 11 (1)
OMAHA	: 0	: 0	: 42 (3)	: 0	: 0	: 8 (5)	: 50 (8)

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	: TOTAL
PHILADELPHIA	: 2	: 0	: 46	: 1	: 5	: 1	: 55 (3)
PHOENIX	: 0	: 1	: 8	: 0	: 3	: 4	: 16
PITTSBURGH	: 0	: 0	: 26	: 0	: 3	: 13	: 42 (7)
PORTLAND	: 0	: 0	: 20 (3)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 20(3)
RICHMOND	: 0	: 0	: 10	: 0	: 0	: 6	: 16 (7)
ST. LOUIS	: 1	: 1	: 18 (2)	: 1	: 1	: 0	: 22 (2)
ST. PAUL	: 0	: 0	: 22	: 0	: 0	: 6 (6)	: 28 (6)
SALT LAKE CITY	: 0	: 0	: 4	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 4
SAN ANTONIO	: 0	: 0	: 3 (1)	: 1	: 1	: 2 (2)	: 7 (3)
SAN DIEGO	: 0	: 0	: 11	: 2	: 4	: 5 (1)	: 22 (1)
SAN FRANCISCO	: 0	: 0	: 48	: 0	: 3	: 7	: 58 (7)
SAN JUAN	: 2	: 0	: 26 (4)	: 0	: 14	: 20	: 62 (4)
SAVANNAH	: 0	: 0	: 1 (1)	: 0	: 0	: 17 (11)	: 18 (12)
SEATTLE	: 0	: 0	: 30	: 0	: 3	: 4	: 37 (4)
SPRINGFIELD	: 0	: 0	: 7 (2)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 7 (2)
WASHINGTON	: 0	: 0	: 15 (6)	: 0	: 10	: 13	: 38 (6)
TOTALS	: 30	: 17	: 1017	: 45	: 115	: 255	: 1479 (245)

RECORDED

353

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAC, Los Angeles

April 5, 1947

Director, FBI

MAINTENANCE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT REPORTS

Reference is made to your letter dated February 21, 1947, setting forth the procedure used to maintain the reports of confidential informants. The method which you set forth is that the original report of the informant has two holes punched in the report and a 3" x 5" slip of paper is stapled thereon.

This stapling and punching does not appear to alter or deface the document in any way which would affect its admissibility and there is no objection to this procedure.

DECLASSIFIED BY *7-16-81* ON *7-16-81* *me/bc*

JDD: PES

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
Class S
10/20/81 *EAR*

RECEIVED COPY FILED

- Tolson
- E. A. Tamm
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Carson
- Coffey
- Harbo
- Quinn
- Nease
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Tele. Rm.
- Mr. Holloman
- Miss Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL
APR 12 1947

7-16-81
me/bc

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Los Angeles

SUBJECT: MAINTENANCE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT REPORTS

DATE: February 21, 1947

I should like to have the benefit of the Bureau's observations upon the proper method of maintaining the reports of paid confidential informants.

This office has, as the Bureau is aware, a number of paid confidential informants, the large majority of whom are being retained in connection with investigations of the Communist Party and related matters. Except in a few instances where it is not feasible to do so, these informants submit written reports in duplicate. A copy of each report is filed in the case file covering the particular Communist club or section covered by that informant, and this copy is the one that is block-stamped, marked for indexing, and otherwise handled as any other incoming serial. The original of the report, however, is, in accordance with Bureau instructions, maintained in a separate case file containing only the reports of that particular informant and nothing else. The original report is, of course, not block-stamped, marked for indexing, or serialized on the report itself, and is retained in the exact form in which it was originally submitted with the exception that it is necessary under this system to punch the two holes in the top margin by which it is fastened in the file cover. In addition, however, for the purpose of being able to account at all times for the location of a particular original report, it is, of course, necessary to serialize it in some manner. Therefore, this office is following the procedure of attaching a 3 x 5 slip of paper by means of a staple to the lower right corner of the original report, and the block stamp is thereafter placed upon this piece of paper rather than on the report itself, and is appropriately serialized and initialed for the file. It will be noted, therefore, that under this system of maintaining the original report the only change in its original form is the two punch holes mentioned and the staple affixing the 3 x 5 slip of paper. This system has the advantage of making the reports more readily accessible, but has the possible disadvantage of the punch holes and the staple.

The only other method for properly maintaining the original informants' reports would seem to be that of placing each original report in a separate white envelope appropriately stamped with the exhibit stamp along with identifying data as to the nature of the exhibit. Under this system:

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 DMJ
mc/jc

353

Director

February 21, 1947

Re: MAINTENANCE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT REPORTS

no punch holes, staples, etc., would be necessary. However, this system would have the disadvantage of making it necessary periodically to make up bulky exhibit envelopes which would result to some extent in additional work for the file room and exhibit clerk as well as making the reports not nearly so readily accessible to Agents. It is noted that in this office numerous reports are received from each informant and that reference is being constantly made to them by Agent personnel.

As stated, I should appreciate the Bureau's comments in regard to this matter and particularly concerning the point as to whether the stapling and punching of the original report as outlined would detract in any way from the admissibility of such reports as the original notes of the particular informant concerned.

MMB:KH

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

CLASSIFIED AND

EXTENDED BY 2842 Jme 150

REASON FOR EXTENSION

FCIM, II, 24.2

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION

DATE: February 14, 1947

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Pursuant to your conference with Mr. J. K. Mumford on February 12, 1947, in regard to a check of the confidential informants, I wish to advise that at the present time the Bureau maintains 249 regularly paid confidential informants on Communist matters. These informants report information not only on the Communist Party but on the extremely radical Socialist Workers Party, the Workers Party, and on various Communist dominated or infiltrated groups. This number of paid informants, 249, also includes Bureau Informant [redacted] who has many sources and informants working for him and furnishing information to the Bureau.

With regard to the total number of Communist informants, the last report from the field, December, 1946, lists 1017 informants, both paid and unpaid, on Communist matters. The paid informants are those individuals receiving more than \$10.00 per month on a regular basis and are closely supervised, both in the field and at the Seat of Government, to be certain that they produce information commensurate with the money which they are paid. These informants range from rank and file members to local unit secretaries, treasurers, organizers, state officers, and also individuals who because of their positions provide trash coverage on numerous Party headquarters in the country. The work of these informants is regularly evaluated and they are urged to keep advancing as much as possible within the Party to increase their value as informants. With regard to the trash coverage, it has become increasingly important due to the fact that the Party is becoming increasingly security conscious and the members are more careful than ever in talking over the telephone.

The New York Field Division which, of course, is the center of Communist activity, is completing arrangements whereby we will have trash coverage not only on the Communist Party headquarters in New York but also on the headquarters of the International Workers Order.

As stated above, the live informant coverage ranges from local units to state committees and within the past few months considerable effort was expended to place an informant close to the National Committee if not obtain an informant from the Committee itself. This entailed the use of an individual named [redacted] who was personally acquainted with [redacted] and it was believed that through him [redacted] could be reached. Due to [redacted] extreme dislike to be considered a stool pigeon and his neurotic condition, this plan was not successful. However, the New York Office and, in fact, all offices are constantly on the alert to observe any dissension, disaffection, or any indication on the part of prominent Party members which would make it possible to develop them into confidential informants. By continuing to check through technical sources, live informants, and investigations the field is always in a position to utilize any slight deviation by prominent Party members who might be developed into confidential informants.

62 MAR 11 1947

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Hendon _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Nease _____ b7D
 Miss Gandy _____

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
 OTHERWISE

*Files
 2/14*

March 4, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLS

DATE _____
 CLASSIFIED AND
 EXTENDED BY 207 M. A. Jones
 REASON FOR EXTENSION
 FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
 DATE OF REVIEW FOR
 DECLASSIFICATION 9/5-91
9/5-81

Reference is made to the telegram dated March 2, 1947, from the captioned individual sent at Oakland Pier, California, from [redacted] Southern Pacific train northbound to Portland, Oregon. Files were checked against the name of [redacted] and no record was found.

b7D

File 66-2542-3-47-178 reflects a letter dated May 31, 1941, from the San Francisco Field Division establishing [redacted] as confidential national defense informant [redacted] of the San Francisco Field Division. At that time [redacted] was employed as a waiter on the SS President Coolidge. He was expected to furnish information regarding subversive activities in the American Merchant Marine. He attended school in Spokane and Seattle, Washington, and at Los Angeles, California. He also attended the University of Washington one year and the University of Oregon one year.

File 100-3-23-536 entitled "Communist Political Association, USA, District Number 13, San Francisco Field Division - Internal Security, C" on page 4 lists [redacted] as having a Communist Party book in 1944 having joined the Party in that year and as being a member of the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union. *(u)*

b7D

File 100-16249-3 entitled "Alden Otis Clark - Security Matter, C" reflects that Clark was reported to have recruited [redacted] San Francisco, California, a seaman, into the Communist Party in 1944. *(u)*

No other record could be found which might possibly be identical with the captioned individual.

RECOMMENDATION: That the incoming communication be filed and no reply made.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842pm
mc/jc

Respectfully,
 M. A. Jones

166-2-113-3-355

RECORDED
 MAR 6 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

50 MAR 13 1947

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES
 TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 2 1947

WESTERN UNION

WU6 PD

OW OAKLAND PIER CALIF MARCH 2 1947 346P

J EDGAR HOOVER HQ OF FBI

DEAR SIR I EARNESTLY IMPORE AND REQUEST YOU TO SAVE MY LIFE
TON THIS TRIP PLEASE HELP ME AND USE SOME OTHER MEANS THAT WILL
BEST SERVE YOU AND MY BELOVED COUNTRY I PRAY GOD YOU HEED
THIS REQUEST WILL ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS

SP TRAIN NORTHBOUND TO PORTLAND

COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 19 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 RmJ me/jc

66-2542-330P356
15 MAR 6 1947

50 MAR 13 1947

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 DMG
mc/jc

K
66-2542-3-357,358

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-9-1679X

66-2542-3-53-895X

U

SAC, Savannah

March 18, 1947

Director, FBI

359

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

EX - 72

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Reference is made to your letter dated February 13, 1947, concerning instructions presently outstanding in regard to Confidential National Defense Informants as set forth in Section 9A (4), (5) a and (12) c.

Your interpretation of the instructions concerning the submission to the Bureau of information on Confidential National Defense Informants as set forth in your letter is correct. The Bureau does not desire that all informants be given symbol numbers regardless of how frequently they may be utilized. A permanent symbol number should be furnished to any informant, either National Defense or general investigative, who has been found to be reliable and can and does provide information with sufficient regularity. By giving an individual of this type a permanent symbol number and advising the Bureau of such designation, this number can be used in reports without the necessity of attaching an informant sheet.

It is realized that many informants are developed in the field whose names are maintained and who are utilized from time to time without their having been furnished a permanent symbol number, and there is no objection to this latter procedure.

With regard to informants on Communist matters, instructions have been issued that before a direct contact can be made with a prospective informant on Communism, authority must be obtained from the Bureau. When the name of a prospective informant is submitted to the Bureau with certain background data it is searched against the Bureau files and other authority is given to contact the individual directly or, in the event derogatory information is revealed, the field is advised to make no contact. After the individual who is a possible informant on Communism is contacted and agrees to provide information, he should thereafter be considered as any other confidential informant; that is, maintained without a symbol number if he is only contacted from time to time or furnished a symbol number if he is used with sufficient regularity to justify a symbol.

DECLASSIFIED BY 2542 R/mc/jc
ON 7-16-81

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

JLDECOR

Class
4/10/81
SNT

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 13, 1947

FROM : SAC, Savannah

SUBJECT: CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS - *Continued*

Reference is made to Section 9A (4), (5) a and to Section 9A (12) c of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, containing instructions as to the submission of information to the Bureau concerning National Defense Informants.

can + does In the past I have interpreted the above instructions to mean that information need not be submitted to the Bureau concerning Confidential National Defense Informants and that symbol numbers need not be assigned to them unless the informant has displayed his ability to furnish information. it is believed that he will from time to time continue to furnish information and information is received from him frequently enough to justify giving him a permanent symbol number, just as the rules apply to Confidential General Investigative Informants.

It appears, however, it may be the desire of the Bureau that all Confidential National Defense Informants be submitted to the Bureau regardless of how frequently they may be utilized.

Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the Bureau advise me as to the correct interpretation in this connection.

PMC:ted

hm
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pme
mc/jc

RECORDED

EX - 72

66-2544-15-359

100-5

*for Savannah
3-18-47*

66-2540-3-360, 361

CHANGED TO

MAY 5 1952

100-75848-2X2, 2X1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pme
mc/SC

Bureau Section #51
Oct 9, 1946

Gene

(F) ⁰ CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS - COMMUNIST MATTERS -- In an attempt to obtain and develop confidential informants on Communist matters, one office recently reviewed a number of files of Confidential National Defense Informants who had previously been discontinued. This review reflected that in a number of instances the services of the various informants were discontinued for reasons such as entrance into the military service, extended illness, and temporary departure from the area. The informants had been valuable in the past and in many instances no reason was given for the discontinuance other than these circumstances.

In view of the necessity to continually obtain and develop informants, particularly in the Communist field, the suggestion is made, if it has not already been done, to review the discontinued files of Confidential Informants to determine whether any of these individuals could not be recontacted and again utilized.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 3842 pmc

1-16-85 42-3
NOT RECORDED
55 OCT 23 1946
mc/jc

57 OCT 28 1946

5 JAN 18 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmj
mkt/c

15
66-2542-3-362,363

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-26-2017X
100-376072-8
C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 dm
mc/jc

K
MAY 5 1952
JRC

66-2542-3-364, 365, 366,
367

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-42-420X
66-2542-3-34-2744X1
66-2542-3-3-605X
100-75848-2X3
C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC - 150 *aw*

AUGUST 5, 1947

TO: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

SACS BOSTON
BUTTE
KANSAS CITY
MOBILE
NORFOLK
PORTLAND
ST. LOUIS

Transmit the following message to:

ROUTINE

SEMIANNUAL REPORT CNDI'S. ADVISE WHEN SEMIANNUAL REPORT
SUBMITTED CNDI'S.

HOOVER

JUD: PES
jes

#62
RECORDED

100-368
34 AUG 7 1947

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY SP4 JPC/mc/jc

COPIES DESTROYED
R 582 JUL 19 1961

Tolson _____
E. A. Tamm _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 5 1947

TELETYPE

SENT VIA

150 P M

Per

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: August 21, 1947

FROM : MR. D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS FOR JULY, 1947

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES

ARMY

NAVY

AIR FORCE

STATE

DATE 10/20/81

The reports submitted by the field for July, 1947 relative to National Defense Informants reflects the Bureau has 1,485 National Defense Informants. The distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups is as follows:

Informants concerning German activities	29
Informants concerning Italian activities	15
Informants concerning Communist activities	1017
Informants concerning Japanese activities	50
Informants concerning other nationalities	129
Informants concerning general un-American activities	245

Total *1485

*Included in the total are 234 informants of the colored race.

To give you a more complete picture regarding the distribution of this informant coverage according to nationalistic groups throughout the field offices, I am attaching a compilation setting forth the number of Confidential National Defense Informants developed and utilized by each field division according to the nationalistic tendency.

Attachment

JDD:dmg

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842

PME/mc/re

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9-15-91

DECLASSIFIED BY 8066/ajp/ps
ON 5-10-81
83-1343

66-2542-3-368X

66-2542-4

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

COPIES DESTROYED

R. 582 JUL 19 1967

62 SEP 10 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANTS

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	TOTAL
ALBANY	: 0	: 0	: 43	: 0	: 6	:	: 53 (2)
ANCHORAGE	: 0	: 0	: 3	: 0	: 2	:	: 5
ATLANTA	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 0	: 0	:	: 4 (1)
BALTIMORE	: 0	: 0	: 9	: 0	: 1	:	: 11 (3)
BIRMINGHAM	: 0	: 0	: 4 (2)	: 0	: 0	:	: 5 (2)
BOSTON	: 0	: 0	: 26	: 0	: 0	:	: 27 (7)
BUFFALO	: 0	: 0	: 28 (6)	: 0	: 2	:	: 30 (6)
BUTTE	: 1	: 0	: 20	: 12	: 1	:	: 37 (2)
CHARLOTTE	: 0	: 0	: 12	: 0	: 0	:	: 17 (4)
CHICAGO	: 3	: 4	: 101	: 11	: 4	:	: 133 (23)
CINCINNATI	: 13	: 2	: 23	: 1	: 3	:	: 49 (7)
CLEVELAND	: 1	: 0	: 23	: 1	: 2	:	: 30 (7)
DALLAS	: 0	: 0	: 5	: 0	: 0	:	: 5
DENVER	: 2	: 0	: 1	: 4	: 0	:	: 7 (1)
DETROIT	: 0	: 0	: 41	: 2	: 6	:	: 66 (11)
EL PASO	: 0	: 0	: 3	: 0	: 0	:	: 5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE
OTHERWISE SHOWN

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY SP7 MAC/2
REASON: 1.5-7.6-91
DATE: 10/15/91
DECLASSIFICATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

COPIES DESTROYED
JUL 25 1964

DATE 7-24-81 BY 28622
pml/mc

* Includes Spanish, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Yugoslavian, etc.

** Includes Ku Klux Klan, Allah Temple of Islam, The Columbians, Inc., People's Institute of Applied Religion, Universal African Nationalist Movement, etc.

() Figures within this mark represent the number of informants that are negroes.

DECLASSIFIED BY 28622
DATE 7-24-81

37
CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	: GERMAN	: ITALIAN	: COMMUNIST	: JAPANESE	: OTHER*	: UN-AMERICAN**	: TOTAL
HONOLULU	: 0	: 0	: 4	: 5	: 2	: 0	: 11
HOUSTON	: 0	: 0	: 10	: 0	: 2	: 4	: 16 (4)
INDIANAPOLIS	: 0	: 0	: 16	: 0	: 0	: 3	: 19 (5)
KANSAS CITY	: 1	: 3	: 8	: 0	: 0	: 11	: 23 (5)
KNOXVILLE	: 0	: 0	: 5	: 0	: 1	: 1 (1)	: 7 (1)
LITTLE ROCK	: 0	: 0	: 1	: 0	: 0	: 8	: 9 (8)
LOS ANGELES	: 2	: 1	: 124	: 0	: 14	: 7	: 148 (4)
LOUISVILLE	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 3	: 0	: 0	: 3 (1)
MEMPHIS	: 0	: 0	: 13 (3)	: 0	: 0	: 10 (9)	: 23 (12)
MIAMI	: 0	: 0	: 8	: 0	: 0	: 3	: 11
MILWAUKEE	: 1	: 2	: 15	: 2	: 6	: 0	: 26 (7)
MOBILE	: 0	: 0	: 4 (1)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 4 (1)
NEWARK	: 0	: 0	: 19	: 0	: 0	: 6	: 25
NEW HAVEN	: 0	: 0	: 16	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 16 (3)
NEW ORLEANS	: 0	: 0	: 10 (4)	: 0	: 0	: 2	: 12 (4)
NEW YORK	: 0	: 0	: 52	: 1	: 29	: 5	: 87 (6)
NORFOLK	: 0	: 0	: 15	: 0	: 0	: 1	: 16 (6)
OKLAHOMA CITY	: 0	: 0	: 13 (1)	: 0	: 0	: 0	: 13 (1)

3

32

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FIELD OFFICE	:	GERMAN	:	ITALIAN	:	COMMUNIST	:	JAPANESE	:	OTHER*	:	UN-AMERICAN**	:	TOTAL
OMAHA	:	0	:	0	:	27 (8)	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	27 (8)
PHILADELPHIA	:	2	:	0	:	52	:	1	:	5	:	1	:	61 (6)
PHOENIX	:	0	:	2	:	11	:	0	:	3	:	4	:	20
PITTSBURGH	:	0	:	0	:	25	:	0	:	3	:	13	:	41 (7)
PORTLAND	:	0	:	0	:	13 (3)	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	13 (3)
RICHMOND	:	0	:	0	:	12	:	0	:	0	:	6	:	18 (7)
ST. LOUIS	:	1	:	1	:	22 (2)	:	1	:	1	:	0	:	26 (2)
ST. PAUL	:	0	:	0	:	26	:	1	:	0	:	6 (6)	:	33 (6)
SALT LAKE CITY	:	0	:	0	:	4	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	4
SAN ANTONIO	:	0	:	0	:	6 (1)	:	1	:	1	:	2 (2)	:	7 (3)
SAN DIEGO	:	0	:	0	:	7	:	4	:	2	:	7 (3)	:	20 (3)
SAN FRANCISCO	:	0	:	0	:	60	:	0	:	3	:	10	:	73 (8)
SAN JUAN	:	2	:	0	:	25 (4)	:	0	:	15	:	19 (1)	:	61 (5)
SAVANNAH	:	0	:	0	:	1 (1)	:	0	:	0	:	17 (11)	:	18 (12)
SEATTLE	:	0	:	0	:	32	:	0	:	1	:	4	:	37 (4)
SPRINGFIELD	:	0	:	0	:	9 (2)	:	0	:	0	:	0	:	9 (2)
WASHINGTON	:	0	:	0	:	11 (5)	:	0	:	14	:	19	:	44 (5)
TOTALS	:	29	:	15	:	1017	:	50	:	129	:	245	:	1485 (234)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. I. LADD

49286

DATE: August 13, 1947

FROM : Mr. J. F. Coyne

SUBJECT: NEGRO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Coffey	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

At your request the Confidential Informant Desk had a count made of all active negro informants on this date. There are fifty male and ten female negro informants who are paid more than \$10 per month on a regular basis. In addition, there are 374 male and 36 female informants who are either unpaid or paid on a C.O.D. basis. The grand total is 424 male negro informants and 46 female negro informants.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 28422

JDD:edm

pmc/jmc
fc

G. I. R. -10

RECORDED - 83

EX. 100 JUL 10 1947

7-204

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pmc
mc/jc

F, M, R.

R-141

66-2542-3-369

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-53-137

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 RmJ/mef
JC

K
66-2542-3-370

CHANGED TO

66-2542-3-47-1834X
c

SAC, New York

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

September 22, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Communist Party Informants on
National Committee Level or Higher

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-6 J. J. [illegible]*
ON *5-10-98*
83-1343

The Bureau, as you are aware, has been considering for some time the development of an informant on the highest possible level in the Communist Party. Several good possibilities were proposed as a result of a special project with the New York Field Division and the Bureau is now contemplating an approach to one or more of these persons. It is anticipated that this approach will be made by a third party who will not indicate in any way his connection with the Bureau. *(u)*

The Special Agents in Charge receiving copies of this letter are requested to furnish the Bureau as soon as possible, any suggestions, views, or comments concerning the approach to a member of the National Committee or higher by a third party on behalf of the Bureau. It is requested that the Bureau be advised of any individuals or organizations, specifically or generally, who could be used as a pretext or a cover in making an approach such as described. The contacting of such a high functionary need not be confined to the New York area but you should consider a contact by an intermediary within your own territory to a member of the National Committee in your area. *(u)*

On that basis, submit your views in order that consideration may be given to making an approach in the future through a third party to a National Committee member anywhere in the country. You may also wish to express an opinion as to the advisability of this method of approach to such a high functionary within the Party and you should do so. *(u)*

It has been suggested that a direct approach be made by Special Agents under an appropriate pretext but not under cover. The pretext, of course, could be some investigative function which would be a legitimate reason for conducting an interview. *(u)*

Your comments in this entire matter are desired as soon as possible as a decision must be made by the Bureau in a short time concerning an approach to one or more members of the National Board, National Committee and the National Review and Control Commission. *(u)*

Chicago

Detroit

Cleveland

Seattle

San Francisco

Los Angeles

Portland

San Diego

San Jose

Stockholm

Washington

Wichita

Winnipeg

Worcester

Yonkers

Zurich

London

Paris

Rome

Berlin

Moscow

Beijing

Tokyo

Manila

Cebu

Baguio

Davao

Iloilo

Marikina

Quezon

Taguig

Valenzuela

Alabang

Belmont

Glavin

Ladd

Nichols

Rosen

Tracy

Harbo

Quinn

Nease

Belmont

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49285

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

October 18, 1947

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2852 dmy/mc/jc

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TANN
MR. LADD
MR. TOLSON

In connection with the attached communication from the Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence dated October 15, 1947, which is in reply to my letter of October 7, 1947, I would like to be advised exactly what the facts are in this situation. Is it a fact that the two informants about whom we complained have been employed by Naval Intelligence for six years and six months, respectively. Is it a fact that these informants did not furnish information to the FBI and would furnish it only to ONI; is it a fact that the Office of Naval Intelligence in Philadelphia has been furnishing this Bureau with information obtained from these two informants; just what has been the value and character of the information secured from these two informants; and any other facts in this matter which will give me a complete and true picture of this situation.

I would also like to have any other instances in which ONI has operated or is operating informants in situations in which this Bureau has a primary interest and jurisdiction.

My recollection is that ONI has been the most persistent of the Armed Services' intelligence units in invoking the portion of the delimitation agreement which provided for more than one agency being interested in a certain field. Of course, such interpretation as the ONI advances practically makes the delimitation agreement useless. However, before entering into any further controversy about the situation I would like to have all the facts not only in this particular case but in similar cases so I will be fully informed.

Very truly yours,

B. G. H.
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Attachment (With Mr. Tamm's copy)

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

NAWT FROM D. O.
TIME 10:35 PM
DATE 10-18-47
BY WUK

RECORDED
INDEXED

127

1 10 11 12
23 24 25 26
27 28 29 30

372

66-2542-3-373

CHANGED TO

MAY 5 1952

gic

100-75848-274

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 PMD
me/jc

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : E. A. Tamm

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
COMMUNIST PARTY HISTORY

DATE: October 17, 1947

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 PMJ/mls C

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Coffey _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Carson _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

In connection with the preparation of the Communist Party Brief, it was ascertained that the complete Party history of some confidential informants has not been previously obtained from these informants during the course of their being contacted by Agents in the Field. In several selected instances, the Field was requested to thoroughly interview the particular informant who had a long Party history, and considerable information in regard to the individual's background was obtained which will be of assistance in the preparation of the Brief.

Meticulous, thorough and complete interviews with all national defense informants on Communism and related matters would appear to be in order so that the Bureau will have on hand at all times a complete history of these informants which has been demanded in many instances by the Communist Party itself.

RECOMMENDATION: There is attached for approval a proposed letter to all Special Agents in Charge directing that as soon as practicable, all confidential informants on Communism and related matters are to be thoroughly and completely interviewed, and a history of their activities in the Communist Party or other subversive organizations similar to that demanded of them by the Communist Party should be obtained.

JDD:map

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Enclosure

RECORDED

116-2542-5-374

OCT 21 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

CLASSIFIED AND

DATE: October 3, 1947

FROM : ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN

EXTENDED BY 2547 (m) mel 10

EXTENSION

FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION

SUBJECT: OTHERWISE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Gandy

At a meeting of the Executive Conference on September 29, 1947, attended by Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Tracy, Harbo, Nichols, Mohr, McCabe, Nease and Ladd, the suggestions in the attached memorandum with reference to the handling of Communist informants was discussed. It was pointed out to the Conference that at the present time the Bureau has some 266 Communist informants on the lower levels. A schedule of these informants is attached hereto. (u)

It was pointed out that all of these have been developed and approached directly by Bureau Agents, that they are reporting direct to Bureau Agents and the supervision of their work is under Bureau Agents. A great many of them are doing this work primarily for patriotic motives and would discontinue in the event they were working for some third party. It was further pointed out that the value of the work of such informants is greatly increased when they can be directed by a Bureau Agent as has been shown in the past in other cases where a third person has operated an informant. It was pointed out in such instances in the past that when the Bureau has taken over and run these informants itself the quality and quantity of their work has greatly increased. (u)

The Executive Conference was unanimously of the opinion that we should continue to handle the Communist informants on the lower levels as is presently done, i.e., by direct approach on the part of Bureau Agents. (u)

The Executive Conference was advised with reference to approaching informants on a high level in the Communist Party that there were several suggestions: (u)

II. INDIRECT CONTACT BY MEANS OF A THIRD PARTY

As far as the Bureau being identified in the event of a development, this method seems to be better. If handled properly, the informant does not know that the FBI is in the picture at all and has no reason to suspect anything goes wrong. On the other hand, efficiency is sacrificed because better control can be had over an informant by handling him yourself than by giving control to another person. Another thing which should be kept in mind is that an extremely high percentage of our informants on Communist matters are in the Party providing information to us because we encouraged them. In many instances the individual had to be persuaded even though indirectly to assist the Bureau. The fact that they have become informants for us, the FBI, does not mean that the same individuals would have become informants for a purely private or non-Governmental organization. As regards efficiency of operation, many of the informants taken over from [] did not measure up to the informants developed by ourselves and closer handling and supervision resulted in many eliminations. (u)

DECLASSIFIED BY 8664 JPL/SLJ
ON 5-10-94
83-1343

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1. Specific Suggested Approaches

a. ~~Agents~~ - Select a small group of agents well versed in the Party, underwrite them with funds and operate undercover in New York City. They would be controlled by the Seat of Government and though their funds would be unlimited, specific authority would be obtained before approaching a prospect and making an offer. If approval is given to this general plan, a cover could easily be decided upon and leads furnished concerning individuals on the National Committee who could be contacted. This would have to be correlated with any action contemplated by TT-1. ~~(u)~~

b. ~~Ex-Agents~~ - Reliable ex-agents who may have an occupation at the present time which could be used as a means for them to approach high functionaries in the Party. The New York Office and the Seat of Government could decide who should be utilized in this manner, both from a personnel standpoint and the type of business that the ex-agent may be operating such as attorney, investment counselor or public relations man. ~~(u)~~

c. [] - It has already been mentioned that [] has made a preliminary review of [] file and the suggestion has already been made that he work on []. If [] efforts in this regard are unsuccessful, it is suggested that he continue as he is a third party, whose reliability is unquestioned. Any operation through a third party depends upon the integrity of the individual acting for the Bureau. Therefore, [] should be used on this project just as long as possible as it will obviate the necessity of investigating another intermediary for this work. ~~(u)~~

d. [] - This writer of the New York World Telegram has cooperated to a certain extent with the New York Office and is well-known for his articles on Communism. His information at times has indicated that he has good informants and it is suggested that an inquiry be made to determine, if possible, whether any of these informants are high in the Party. This inquiry could consist of a technical surveillance on Woltman's residence and if unproductive, consideration be given to placing a surveillance on his office telephone. He must have good sources in order to continue to publish the articles which he has, and we ought to attempt to find out who they are. ~~(u)~~

e. Place a Special Agent in the Party - From a long-range viewpoint, a Special Agent within the Party would be the most ideal witness in the future that we could have. The biggest difficulty in this situation would be the covering of the agent's background. It will be recalled that Agent Sullivan some time ago was to proceed to New York under cover but the plan was dropped, partly due to his background. If approval is given to this suggestion, the field should be advised that instead of discontinuing immediately the investigation of an applicant who indicated a Communist Party or other subversive background, to discreetly ascertain whether his

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connections could be used by him to go into the Party upon our behalf. The applicant could then be quickly given an Agent's status, briefed on his duties and without any lapse of time showing on his record, be placed in a logical position in the business world and work his way up within the Party. (u)

f. Views of Representative SAC's - It is suggested that the SAC's of the field offices having considerable Communist work submit suggestions concerning third party possibilities as go-betweens in reaching a potential informant on National Committee level. These Field Divisions have Communist Party Districts which are represented on the National Committee and the Offices may through the SAC's be able to furnish a good intermediary to reach a local National Committee in New York. (u)

Other individuals and organizations have been considered such as the Railway Audit and Inspection Bureau, Central Industrial Services, and business organizations such as NAM. It is not believed advisable to use these groups if we can operate without them in view of their known activity in the labor field. Ostensibly these organizations are interested in Communist infiltration, but at the same time are more concerned with the activities of the Communists more than anything else as effecting labor relations. *

Consideration has been given to religious groups, but the most militant, the Catholic Church, would be in a difficult position in attempting to approach a functionary of the Party unless it were an exceptional case such as Budenz. We are obtaining, of course, through Budenz, many leads and much information of value not only in regard to high Party officials, but also the brief. (u)

The Conference was advised that letters have already gone out to the representative SACs requesting their views.

Messrs. Tracy and Harbo recommended that the Bureau endeavor to make a direct approach to those informants in the Communist Party on a high level feeling that to do so would permit a much better chance of developing an informant and obtaining information of value. (u)

Messrs. Tracy and Harbo also recommended that an effort be made to set up an Agent or an ex-Agent on a long-range basis with the idea of having him work into the Communist Party. (u)

The rest of the Conference, Messrs. Tolson, Glavin, Nichols, Mohr, N. McCabe, Nease and Ladd recommended that there be no direct approach on a high level but that Informant [] continue his efforts to contact and develop some of the high Communist Party officials as informants on behalf of the Bureau without disclosing his principal. (u)

Attachment

Respectfully,
For the Conference

Clyde A. Tolson

E. A. Tamm

cc - Mr. Clegg
Mr. Mohr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo for The Director

as an informant lie; in the utilization to best advantage of his criminal record, [] which indicates that he was arrested by the Newark, New Jersey Police Department in 1930 and charged with adultery. In 1931 he was arrested by the police department in Washington, D. C. for assault with intent to rob, and sentenced to ~~Wharton~~, Virginia for three years. It may be possible to use this record as a lever in convincing [] that its disclosure would do him no good in the eyes of the Party and could, if notoriety resulted from its disclosure be the means of his dismissal from a high position. (u)

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Another item indicative of [] possibilities is a memorandum in the New York files concerning a visit by [] to that office on March 31, 1937. He volunteered information on white slave activities in the vicinity of Newburgh, New York and wanted to be reimbursed for this information. It may be that [] would be susceptible to providing information for money since in 1937 at least he was not adverse to accepting money for reporting white slave activity. (u)

Finally, the development of [] as an informant would be practical from a long range point of view since he might well be worked into the National Committee in time. (u)

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[]
[] who is a member of the National Committee and was [] has been suggested as an informant possibility. In the opinion of the New York Office, close scrutiny of [] during recent years make it appear unlikely that he is presently operating as a paid informant. This is borne out by investigation and contacts with other informants, which all agree that [] is continuously in need of money. If he were being paid for information, there is a good likelihood that he would receive sufficient to keep him in funds. The Baltimore Office recently advised in checking the activity of [] while he was in that territory, advised that his only income appeared to be his Party salary and expenses and he remarked to informants he never had any money and expected the members to "take care of him." (u)

One New York informant, [] has advised that while [] gives the impression of being an ardent Marxist, having attended the Lenin School in Moscow in 1934, [] is not convinced of his sincerity. However, [] has been a member of the Communist Party since 1931 and investigation has revealed that he has a severe hatred for the Bureau as well as (u)

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Memo for The Director

being a most energetic worker for the Communist Party. (u)

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There is also some possibility that [] could have been a high-placed official in the National Maritime Union with a high salary, but seems to have preferred to work for the Party at a very nominal one. Notwithstanding the conflict in regard to the possibilities of [] he has been suggested for informant possibilities, principally because of his need for money, his recent trouble with the Maritime Service and the suspicions that perhaps he did act as an informant at one time in the past for other individuals. (u)

Coincident with the efforts of the field in checking the background of [] a review was made at the Seat of Government of the allegations concerning his possible use in the past by other parties as an informant. You will recall in this regard a memorandum dated March 31, 1947 based upon the note from confidential informant [] indicating that [] could enlist the services of [] who [] alleged was the highest paid undercover man in the Party. [] further said that he had [] for awhile during the war. [] is thoroughly unreliable, however, and very little credence can be placed in anything he says. It will be noted, however, that this recent assertion by [] through [] was a reiteration of a report from [] in 1946 indicating that he heard from one of the sources that [] had been used as informants by [] was requested to obtain a clarification of this information reported in 1946 and furnished the note in March 1947 from [] who is possibly the original source. (u)

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In my memorandum of March 31, 1947 on this entire matter, it was pointed out that the Bureau files contain a communication from [] dated July 7, 1942, originally from [] in which he said [] could be made an informant but it would cost a considerable sum. He also asserted that [] had offered her services to the Hearst Syndicate. Other valuable Communists as possible informants were listed by [] as [] and several others. (u)

[] was recommended as an informant possibility by New York in view of her background and recent attitude. She comes from a quiet, respectable, Italian family with deep religious convictions, all members of the Roman Catholic Church. A neighborhood inquiry indicated that when [] embraced Communism, the family was very unhappy and considerably moved. It was the opinion of several persons interviewed that an accident occurring around 1916 had much to do with the change in mental attitude of []

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Memo for The Director.

At that time, shortly after her elementary school graduation, she [redacted] leaving her with a permanent disability and a noticeable limp. The accident allegedly had a marked effect on [redacted] and she became extremely serious and very intellectual. She subsequently accumulated scholastic honors in high school and college and became identified with Communist activities in the 1930's.

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There is no indication that [redacted] has swerved from her loyalty to the Communist Party but she has evidenced dissatisfaction with the present leadership and it is known that she has a pressing need for money. In this last letter, through a technical surveillance on her office, it was learned that she was trying to obtain \$2,000 by placing another mortgage on her house. She stated she already has a \$1600 second mortgage outstanding. (u)

Concerning her attitude toward the Party leadership, it is known that earlier this year she and [redacted] met at the home of [redacted].

In view of [redacted] disaffection, the Party certainly would not approve of [redacted] continued association with him. (u)

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Another item obtained by this technical surveillance on [redacted] on March 19, 1947 was a conversation between [redacted] believed to be [redacted] of the Newspaper Guild in which [redacted] stated that the present leadership of the Communist Party is "corrupt at the core." Another conversation reported by the same informant on June 28, 1947 between [redacted] and [redacted] was the statement by [redacted] "I am black and blue all over from down town." It could be an implication that she was being pushed around by the Communist Party leadership. She went on to say referring to the Communist Party leadership: "They're a bunch of nuts. I wouldn't say this to anybody except the most loyal people, but they're a bunch of nuts. They're off the reservation." (u)

PRESENT STATUS OF PROPOSED CONTACTS WITH [redacted] (u)

[redacted] as mentioned above, is not a member of the National Committee but has been suggested that steps be taken to develop him as he is a likely prospect for the National Committee and if he were developed as an informant on a long range basis, we would have excellent coverage. The New York Office has not been advised to take any action as yet in regard to [redacted] and pending the outcome of our attempts to reach [redacted] who already are on the National Committee, it is suggested that [redacted] be held in abeyance. (u)

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Since [] is openly antagonistic to the Bureau, an approach to him by Agents openly or under pretext would probably be useless. [] however, has reviewed the entire file on Lammon and was to have made an approach to [] within the past month. [] however, was found to be residing in a summer camp in New York State and it was decided to wait until he returned to New York City. [] is ready to proceed in this regard at any time. (X)(u)

Since [] has indicated several times dissatisfaction with the Party leadership and needs money, it was also decided to have [] work on her. He has not, however, had the opportunity to review the file on [] and since it appears she is a very likely prospect, when [] is briefed more completely on [] prior to sending him to New York, he should also be prepared on [] (X)(u)

METHODS OF APPROACHING POTENTIAL INFORMANTS (X)(u)

The work which has been done for the past months with the objective of reaching a high Party functionary as a possible informant has been concerned primarily with the individuals who would be the most logical prospects. Secondly, the method of approach must be given considerable thought. (X)(u)

I. Direct Contact

In obtaining Communist informants, a rule was laid down in 1945 that no one was to be directly contacted in this regard without prior Bureau approval. Appropriate inquiries and checks were to be made and submitted to the Bureau for consideration. Advice was then to be given to the field regarding approach or not approaching the individual. This rule is still in effect. (X)(u)

In completing the project regarding possibilities as informants, the New York Office eliminated contact through a third party in favor of direct interview wherein Bureau Agents will identify themselves as such and proceed with the interview under an appropriate pretext devised for the occasion. It was felt that a prospect would prefer to deal with a person known to him as a representative of the FBI rather than someone working for a reactionary group such as the NAM. The New York Office further said that the candidate would know that he would be furnishing to an authorized source which would treat it with utmost confidence. By acting indirectly, someone sufficiently close to and within the confidence of the potential informant must be obtained and requires considerable investigation which is unnecessary in a direct interview. It was also mentioned that the direct approach removes the question of future security which is always present when using an intermediary. (X)(u)

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Memo for The Director

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[redacted] Authority was just given to Washington Field for Special Agent F. M. Fawcett to develop his friendship with [redacted] for the District of Columbia and [redacted] and Washington Field was told to have Fawcett sound out [redacted] as an informant possibility. [redacted] is aware that Fawcett is a Special Agent, and therefore, any approach in the future will necessarily be direct if we are to utilize [redacted] friendship. It is suggested that this matter be pushed as [redacted] has been offered the position of Secretary of the Party in the District of Columbia at \$50 a week. He desires \$75.00. If this plan is successful and Branca becomes an informant, we could contribute toward his salary as Secretary and make it worth while. The Party in the District is not represented on the National Committee, but [redacted] due to his past Communist activity might be pushed and there is always the chance that a representative from the District will be allowed on the National Committee in the future. (u)

IF. INDIRECT CONTACT BY MEANS OF A THIRD PARTY (u)

As far as the Bureau being identified in the event trouble develops, this method seems to be better. If handled properly, the informant does not know that the FBI is in the picture at all and has no recourse to us if anything goes wrong. On the other hand, efficiency is sacrificed because better control can be had over an informant by handling him yourself then by giving control to another person. Another thing which should be kept in mind is that an extremely high percentage of our informants on Communist matters are in the Party providing information to us because we encouraged them. In many instances the individual had to be persuaded even though indirectly to assist the Bureau. The fact that they have become informants for us, the FBI, does not mean that the same individuals would have become informants for a purely private or non-Governmental organization. As regards efficiency of operation, many of the informants taken over from [redacted] did not measure up to the informants developed ourselves and closer handling and supervision resulted in many eliminations. (u)

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1. Specific Suggested Approaches

a. Agents - Select a small group of agents well versed in the Party, underwrite them with ~~unlimited~~ funds and operate undercover in New York City. They would be controlled by the Seat of Government and though their funds would be unlimited, specific authority would be obtained before approaching a prospect and making an offer. ~~Until~~ approval is given to this general plan, a cover could easily be decided upon and leads furnished concerning individuals on the National Committee who could be contacted. This would have to be correlated with any action contemplated by TT-1. (u)

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Memo for The Director

- b. ~~Ex-Agents~~ - Reliable ex-agents who may have an occupation at the present time which could be used as a means for them to approach high functionaries in the Party. The New York Office and the Seat of Government could decide who should be utilized in this manner, both from a personnel standpoint and the type of business that the ex-agent may be operating such as attorney, investment counselor or public relations man. (u)
- c. [] - It has already been mentioned that [] has made a preliminary review of [] file and the suggestion has already been made that he work on []. If [] efforts in this regard are unsuccessful, it is suggested that he continue as he is a third party, whose reliability is unquestioned. Any operation through a third party depends upon the integrity of the individual acting for the Bureau. Therefore, [] should be used on this project just as long as possible as it will obviate the necessity of investigating another intermediary for this work. (u)
- d. [] - This writer of [] has cooperated to a certain extent with the New York Office and is well-known for his articles on Communism. His information at times has indicated that he has good informants and it is suggested that an inquiry be made to determine, if possible, whether any of these informants are high in the Party. This inquiry could consist of a technical surveillance on [] residence and if unproductive, consideration be given to placing a surveillance on his office telephone. He must have good sources in order to continue to publish the articles which he has, and we ought to attempt to find out who they are. (u)
- e. ~~Place a Special Agent in the Party~~ - From a long-range viewpoint, a Special Agent within the Party would be the most ideal witness in the future that we (u) \$

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Memo for The Director

could have. The biggest difficulty in this situation would be the covering of the agent's background. It will be recalled that Agent Sullivan some time ago was to proceed to New York under cover but the plan was dropped, partly due to his background. If approval is given to this suggestion, the field should be advised that instead of discontinuing immediately the investigation of an applicant who indicated a Communist Party or other subversive background, to discreetly ascertain whether his connections could be used by him to go into the Party upon our behalf. The applicant could then be quickly given an agent's status, briefed on his duties and without any lapse of time showing on his record, be placed in a logical position in the business world and work his way up within the Party. (u)

h. Views of Representative SAC's - It is suggested that the attached letter be approved to the SAC's of the field offices having considerable Communist work, requesting suggestions concerning third party possibilities as go-betweens in reaching a potential informant on National Committee level. These Field Divisions have Communist Party Districts which are represented on the National Committee and the Offices may through the SAC's be able to furnish a good intermediary to reach a local National Committee member or even a member of the National Committee in New York. (The Offices to which this letter is being sent are: New York, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Seattle, San Francisco and Los Angeles. (u)

Other individuals and organizations have been considered such as the Railway Audit and Inspection Bureau, Central Industrial Services, and business organizations such as NAM. It is not believed advisable to use these groups if we can operate without them in view of their known activity in the labor field. Ostensibly these organizations are interested in Communist infiltration, but at the same time are more concerned with the activities of the Communists more than anything else as effecting labor relations.

Consideration has been given to religious groups, but the most militant, the Catholic Church, would be in a difficult position in attempting to approach a functionary of the Party unless it were an exceptional case such as Budenz. We are obtaining, of course, through Budenz, many leads and much information of value not only in regard to high Party officials, but also the brief. (u)

INFORMANT COVERAGE ON THE LOWER LEVELS (u)

At the present time we are operating directly 266 Communist informants, a good percentage of whom are members of the Party and minor officials. These informants are being paid on a regular basis and in addition there are a con- (u)

Memo for The Director

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siderable number who are unpaid or who receive small sums of money from time to time C.O.D. It is not deemed desirable that these ordinary informants who provide day to day coverage should be handled in any way other than directly. Most of these informants are active in their present capacity for the FBI and would cease immediately if they were told that they were no longer interested in them and that they should hereafter furnish their information to a third party. Their confidence has been obtained, in most instances, through long association and to turn their operation over to another individual would undoubtedly impair their efficiency even if they did not quit. Considerable success has been had and it is hoped will be continued in the operation of these informants who are providing information which would be impossible for a special agent to obtain. (u)

Close scrutiny is maintained over the activities of these people, both in the field and at the Seat of Government, if they are paid on a contractual basis and payments are only authorized for short periods of time. Unless otherwise directed, these informants will continue to work directly with our agents as such. (u)

For your information, there is attached a list of the number of these informants with their status in the Communist Party or otherwise subversive group. (u)

Attachment

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ON *5-18-94*
83-1343

2-6 REGULAR PAID CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

FIELD OFFICE	MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATION	POSITION IN ORGANIZATION	
2 Albany	2 C. P. Members	1	b7D
6 Baltimore	5 C. P. Members	1	
	1 I.W.O.	1	
		1	
		1	
		1	
7 Boston	5 C. P. Members	1	
	1 Joint Anti-Fascist	1	
	Refugee Committee	1	
	1 American Youth for	1	
	Democracy	1	
15 Buffalo	12 C. P. Members	1	
	2 I. W. O.	1	
	1 Polish National	1	
	Alliance	1	
		1	
		2	
		1	
		1	
5 Butte	4 C. P. Members	1	
		1	
		1	
		1	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S)
CLASS
10/20/81 *emj*

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *2550md/mab*
EXAGG. EXTENSION
FRM. H. 1-4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *2-16-91*
7-16-81

ENCLOSURE

11/18/94
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FIELD OFFICE	MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATION	POSITION IN ORGANIZATION
18 Chicago	10 C. P. Members	1 -
	1 Proletarian Party	2 -
	1 American Youth for Democracy	1 -
	2 I. W. O.	1 -
	1 National Negro Congress	1 -
		1 -
		1 -
12 Cincinnati	11 C. P. Members	1 -
		1 -
		1 -
		1 -
		1 -
		1 -
		1 -
		1 -
25 Cleveland	12 C. P. Members	1 -
	1 I. W. O.	1 -
	1 S. W. P.	1 -
		1 -
		1 -
		1 -
		1 -
		1 -
		1 -
1 Dallas	1 C. P. Member	No official position
9 Detroit	6 C. P. Members	1 -
	1 Workers Party	1 -
	1 Socialist Labor Party	1 -
3 Houston	1 C. P. Member	1 -
		1 -
4 Indianapolis	3 C. P. Members	1 -
	1 I. W. O.	1 -
1 Kansas City	1 C. P. Member	No official position
1 Knoxville	1 Southern Conference for Human Welfare	No official position
1 Little Rock	1 C. P. Member	No official position

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
Congress

in

on

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FIELD OFFICE	MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATION	POSITION IN ORGANIZATION	
32 Los Angeles	24 C. P. Members	2 -	
	2 I. W. O.	1 -	
	1 S. W. P.	2 -	
		1 -	
		1 -	
		1 -	
		1 -	
		1 -	
		1 -	
		1 -	
		1 - Mail drop - 1 - Mail coverage	
		1 -	
		1 - Trash coverage	
1 Miami	1 C. P. Member	No official position	
2 Milwaukee	1 C. P. Member	1 - Trash coverage	
3 Newark	3 C. P. Members	1 -	
		1 -	
		1 -	
7 New Haven	6 C. P. Members	1 -	
		1 -	
		2 -	
		1 -	
3 New Orleans	2 C. P. Members	1 -	
	1 Southern Conference for Human Welfare	1 -	
26 New York	15 C. P. Members	1 -	
	3 I. W. O.	1 -	
	1 National Negro Congress	5 -	
		1 -	
		1 -	
		1 -	
3 Oklahoma City	3 C. P. Members	1 -	
2 Omaha	1 I. W. O.	1 -	
	2 C. P. Members	1 -	
7 Philadelphia	6 C. P. Members	1 -	
	1 I. W. O.	1 -	
		1 -	
4 Phoenix	3 C. P. Members	1 -	

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FIELD OFFICE

MEMBERSHIP IN
ORGANIZATIONPOSITION IN
ORGANIZATION

CONFIDENTIAL

14 Pittsburgh	12 C. P. Members. 1 I. W. O.	1 [redacted] 1 [redacted] 2 - Trash coverage 1 [redacted] 1 [redacted]	b7D
3 Portland	3 C. P. Members	1 [redacted]	
1 Richmond	1 C. P. Member	No official position	
6 St. Louis	3 C. P. Members 1 S. W. P. 1 A. Y. D. 1 American Slav Congress	1 [redacted] 1 [redacted] 1 [redacted] 1 [redacted] 1 [redacted]	
3 Saint Paul	3 C. P. Members	No official position	
1 Salt Lake City	1 C. P. Member	No official position	
24 San Francisco	20 C. P. Members 1 A. Y. D. 1 National Negro Congress	1 [redacted] 2 [redacted] 3 [redacted] 1 [redacted] 1 [redacted] 1 - Trash coverage 1 [redacted]	
2 San Juan	1 C. P. Member	1 [redacted] 1 [redacted]	
15 Seattle	13 C. P. Members 1 Socialist Labor Party	2 - Trash Coverage 1 [redacted] 2 [redacted] 2 [redacted]	
2 Springfield	2 C. P. Members	No official position	
5 Washington, D.C.	5 C. P. Members 1 National Negro Congress 1 Southern Conference for Human Welfare	1 [redacted] 1 [redacted] 1 [redacted]	(u) (u)

In addition to the above, there is carried on the confidential pay roll in the Field, 9 criminal informants; 6 translators in connection with foreign language publication, Western Union contact in New York City and R. C. A. Communication in Washington, D. C.; one employee of Cuban Embassy; [redacted] who may soon be employed in Embassy. (u) (u)

71 NOV 15 1947

EX-129

RECORDED 166-2542-3-377
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL B I
48 NOV 6 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
 Mr. Clegg _____
 Mr. Glavin _____
 Mr. Ladd _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tracy _____
 Mr. Carson _____
 Mr. Egan _____
 Mr. Gurnea _____
 Mr. Harbo _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Pennington _____
 Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Miss Gandy _____

October 6, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. COYNE

FROM: J. D. DONOHUE

RE: INFORMANTS ON HIGH LEVEL
 COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

In connection with the interview with [] the following suggestions are set forth:

1. Public announcement was made on October 5, 1947 of the formation of a Communist International by the Communist Party in the Satellite countries. It looks like the reactivation of the old Comintern. It is incumbent upon us to follow any connection between the Comintern and the Communist Party, USA. The answer, of course, is an informant on a high level in the Party. We are aware that this project is the most important we have undertaken of an informant nature. [] is aware of its importance. It should be emphasized, however, to [] that upon his efforts the greatest reliance is being placed and to not forget that the future success of our Communist program depends upon the results he obtains.
2. It is suggested when [] advises the date he will commence operations, that a surveillance be placed upon [] by the best agents of the New York Office, both as a protection against physical violence if a reaction develops against [] and also as a necessary double check in a discreet manner of [] himself.
3. It is suggested that New York ascertain whether [] has a home telephone and whether a tech can be placed thereon with security. If so, a request should be made to the Attorney General for authorization, and [] be covered by a tech for at least a period of two weeks from the time of his approach by []
4. Reinstall the tech on the office of [] immediately and ask New York if a tech on her residence is feasible and secure.

When the date of [] activity is known, New York be *confidentially* ~~completely~~ advised to alert all Sutech personnel to catch any leads over any Communist Party techs indicating [] have talked about being contacted.

JDD:EHW

THIS MEMORANDUM IS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES
 TO BE DESTROYED AFTER ACTION IS TAKEN AND NOT SENT TO FILES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2542 Pm/mcljc

October 21, 1947

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SAC LETTER NO. 139
Series 1947

SAC	ALBANY	DENVER	MILWAUKEE	RICHMOND
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	BUFFALO	KANSAS CITY	NORFOLK	SAN FRANCISCO
	BUTTE	KNOXVILLE	OKLAHOMA CITY	SAN JUAN
	CHARLOTTE	LITTLE ROCK	OMAHA	SAVANNAH
	CHICAGO	LOS ANGELES	PHILADELPHIA	SEATTLE
	CINCINNATI	LOUISVILLE	PHOENIX	SPRINGFIELD
	CLEVELAND	MEMPHIS	PITTSBURGH	WASHINGTON, D. C.
	DALLAS	MIAMI	PORTLAND	QUANTICO

RE: COMMUNIST CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS - COMMUNIST PARTY HISTORY

In connection with the preparation of the Brief on the Communist Party, it was determined that the Bureau does not have the complete Party history of our confidential informants on Communist matters. As you know, the Communist Party has been requesting its members to complete an extensive questionnaire which when filled out contains rather full information on the background of the individual. In many instances we will not have as much information on the informant as the Communist Party will have when these questionnaires have all been turned in. It is imperative, therefore, that we know as much about our informants as does the Party. To thoroughly analyze each individual informant and his possibilities as a witness, his personal history is necessary.

You are directed to have the Agents handling confidential informants on Communism thoroughly and completely interview each informant, obtaining from him a detailed history of his participation in the Communist movement similar to that required by the Party itself of important functionaries and members. Particular attention should be paid to attendance at state and national conventions and Plenums; membership on education, literature or membership committees in the Party, on all levels from club or branch to state or district, and attendance at Party schools of all types including the National Training School or schools sponsored by the Comintern abroad. Information should be obtained as to his connections with the distribution of, or his subscription to, and thorough knowledge of, the various Party publications such as the "Daily Worker," "Daily People's World," "The Communist," "Political Affairs," and "New Masses."

In each item, the time and place concerned should be carefully fixed.

The informant should also be interrogated regarding his personal knowledge and acquaintance, if any, with the various national officers of the Party from the first day of his membership to the present time.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
Mr. Egan
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Hendon
Mr. Jones
Mr. Quinn
Tele. Room
Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

ORIGINAL FILED IN

The Party history of each informant should be set out in chronological form with the exception of the last mentioned item concerning national officials. These interviews as above described are not to be confined solely to Communist confidential informants but the same type of interrogation should be had of each and every national defense informant furnishing information to your Office of a subversive nature. These latter informants should furnish their history in regard to the particular organization or organizations with which they are or have been connected. Individual letters should be prepared under the caption and symbol number of the particular informant and transmitted to the Bureau as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

J. E. Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Los Angeles, California
October 7, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

Director, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY INFORMANTS ON
NATIONAL COMMITTEE LEVEL OR HIGHER

Dear Sir:

O.C. Heurlet 9/22/47.
[redacted] Los Angeles County Communist Party,
and [redacted] are two most important
Communists in this area. Both men represent the "hard core" of the
Communist Party and it is not suggested that either of these men be
approached as potential informants. (u)

I feel that the direct approach by Special Agents under an
appropriate pretext, but not under cover, is not desirable because
of the possibility that an individual of such importance might try
to turn an interview to his advantage by blasting the Bureau in the
Party and labor press. It seems to me it would be better for Special
Agents to approach such a functionary under cover. In this way,
Special Agents could be selected for the assignment who are thoroughly
versed in Communism. The approach could be made skilfully and yet
later no allegations could be made against the Bureau. The approach
made by the Russians to potential sources of information, as revealed
by the Canadian report, is recalled. (u)

Exhaustive investigation into the background of potential in-
formants should develop their personal and political weaknesses. Such
investigation might disclose among potential informants' present con-
tacts or former associates an individual who could approach such a
potential informant on behalf of the Bureau. (u)

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 [redacted]

ENSION

GDT:MMH

66-575

FCIM, II, 1-2.2

DATE 7-16-81

DECLASSIFICATION

Very truly yours,

R. B. HOOD, SAC.

RECORDED

DECLASSIFIED BY 8068 [redacted]

ON 5-18-94

83-1343

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL



Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

CHICAGO 90, ILLINOIS

October 8, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DIRECTOR, FBI

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

RE: [COMMUNIST PARTY INFORMANTS ON
NATIONAL COMMITTEE LEVEL OR HIGHER] (X)(u)

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter to New York dated September 22 last, a copy of which was submitted to this office, regarding the captioned matter.

This is to advise that I am in agreement with the suggestion that a member of the National Committee of the CP, or a member in a higher placed position in the Party, be approached by a third party on behalf of the Bureau. (X)(u)

With respect to the Bureau's request for suggestions as to any organizations which could be used as a pretext or a cover in making an approach such as described above, the following is suggested: (X)(u)

1. An attorney representing a group of companies desiring up to date information on the Communist Party.
2. A company which has been used as a cover for SIS agents.
3. A religious group - no specific denomination need be mentioned.
4. One of the many industrial research groups.
5. A national magazine, such as "Fortune" or "Newsweek."
6. The American Legion.
7. A university with an Institute for Social Science.
8. A cover company set up by the Bureau and operated by Bureau investigated employees. It is not believed that any present employee of the Bureau should be used as an employee for such company. (u) c

It is my belief that the best covers of the above mentioned organizations would be either a national magazine or a cover company set up by the Bureau. It is (X)(u)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
ADVISED BY SLIP(S) OF CLASS
DATE 10/22/47

DECLASSIFIED BY 6046 B. J. [unclear]
ON 5-12-88
89-1343



CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED 224287
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-81
7-16-81

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 25 1947 281

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR, FBI, 10/8/47

RE: [COMMUNIST PARTY INFORMANTS] (u)

pointed out that a national magazine would be in a position to supply money for information and would have an interest in Communist activities. (u)

A cover company set up by the Bureau could be one of many types of companies which might be interested in the subject of Communism, and the Bureau would be better able to control the informant than through another type of cover. (u)

With regard to the name of an individual who could be utilized as a cover for such an undertaking, I would like to submit the name of [redacted] of Chicago, Illinois. The Bureau is aware of the background of [redacted] and the Bureau knows of his position as a liberal. It is pointed out that [redacted] is financially in a position to pay a large amount for information; his name is well known to Communist members throughout the country; he is interested in newspapers which would have an interest in all matters pertaining to the Communist question, both from a national and international point of view; and it is believed that he could approach a possible informant anywhere in the country. (u)

b7D

It is known that [redacted] has been contacted by [redacted] a member of the National Committee. In this connection it is pointed out that [redacted] might possibly be approached to act as an informant on Communist matters. [redacted] has attended school in Moscow, was a member of the Far Eastern Commission of the Comintern, is a prominent member of the CP as regards Negro work, and, accordingly, could supply the Bureau with a great deal of information in the event that he would become an informant. There is a possibility that [redacted] could approach [redacted]. It is further pointed out that [redacted] who is [redacted] years of age, will probably never see the United States become a Communist country and for this reason might, for financial remuneration, become an informant. (u)

In the event that the Bureau would not consider using [redacted] for this purpose, additional consideration will be given to the submission of the name of another individual in the Chicago area who may be in a position to serve the Bureau's interests on this particular problem. (u)

With regard to the suggestion that a direct approach be made by a Special Agent under appropriate pretext, but not under cover, it is not believed that this approach should be utilized until the Bureau has endeavored to obtain an informant through the approach of a third party acting on behalf of the Bureau. (u)

Very truly yours,

G. R. McSwain

Special Agent in Charge

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
New York 7, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY *2-20-81*
R.E.A. & P.C. EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION *7-16-91*
7-16-81

October 8, 1947.

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OTHERWISE

Director, FBI.

RE: [COMMUNIST PARTY INFORMANTS ON
NATIONAL COMMITTEE LEVEL OR HIGHER] *(u)*

Dear Sir: *OC 1/12*

Reurlet September 22, 1947.

As the Bureau is aware, this office had at the time of submitting the various names for possible Confidential National Defense Informants for the Bureau's consideration also made suggestions as to a means of approach by this office. In all instances, the direct approach through a logical pretext by either contacting the subject himself or contacting him through a relative was recommended. *(u)*

An analysis of the existing possibilities of approach would seem to indicate that there are 4 main possibilities. *(u)*

1. By having an agent make a direct approach under an appropriate pretext but not under cover.
 2. By a direct approach by a Special Agent but under cover.
 3. By an approach by a Special Agent with relatives of the possible informant.
 4. By the use of a third party not connected with the Bureau.
- INDEXED 66-2542-5-380*

In further analyzing each of these possibilities, there are points for and against each of the approaches. Relative to the first approach, namely, contacting the prospective informant directly by a Special Agent under an appropriate pretext but not under cover, there could result unfavorable publicity in the DAILY WORKER if the attempt was unsuccessful. Further, it would place the Communist Party officials on notice and furnish them with tangible evidence that the FBI is actually trying to develop informants on the higher levels of the Communist Party. On the other hand if the approach were successful, it would mean that we would have direct and complete control over the informant which for obvious reasons is highly desirable. Another advantage is that whoever may be approached will be suspicious that it is someone from the Communist Party or its delegate who is testing his loyalty to the Communist movement. If an agent were to make this approach and it appeared feasible he could identify himself in such a manner so as to convince the individual of his actual identity. *(u)*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Director
62-9124

October 8, 1947

With reference to the second approach, namely, by a direct approach by a Special Agent but under cover, the advantages are that again the FBI can maintain direct and complete control over the informant if he or she is successfully developed. Further it would avoid any unnecessary publicity or reaction from the Communist Party officials against the FBI if the attempt was unsuccessful. The disadvantage to such an approach would be the good possibility of failure if the prospective informant could not be convinced that the agent were not somebody connected with the Communist Party. Also it would require some time in order to set up an agent under an appropriate cover. In connection with the above, it is believed that if a Special Agent were used for such a purpose he should not be assigned to the field division covering the territory wherein the prospective informant is located if that informant is on the National Committee level or a higher level. In that way, the contacting agent would be a complete stranger in the locality and thus would avoid any possibility of having him later identified in any way with the FBI by other members of the Communist Party. (u)

As to the third approach, namely, by an approach by a Special Agent with relatives of the possible informant, this, of course, could not be worked with all of the prospective informants but there are at least two, namely, [redacted] and [redacted] who possibly could be approached in this manner. This is true because of their background. In both of these instances, they were brought up in the Catholic faith and their families are from all reports practicing such faith today. It, therefore, can be seen that if there are any family ties left among these individuals, there is a possibility that they can be swung in the right direction through such family ties. The only disadvantage to this, of course, would be that again a Special Agent will be directly involved which may not be desirable. (u)

b7D

With reference to the fourth possibility, namely, by the use of a third party not connected with the Bureau, the main advantage in this would be that the FBI could in no way be connected with the attempt to develop the individual. Further if at a later date it was necessary to have the informant testify in court, it is believed that it would be possible to avoid having testimony come out to the effect that the person maintained his or her position in the Communist Party pursuant to instructions or requests or even suggestions by the FBI. This would appear an important factor why an agent should not be utilized for such a purpose. As to the disadvantages, there is one main one and that is that the Bureau will not have complete control of the informant. (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Director
62-8124

October 8, 1947.

It is believed that it probably would turn out whereby the informant would only be furnishing intelligence information and that it would be impossible to work it in such a way where we could have answers to all the questions that may come up from time to time. It cannot be seen whereby it would be desirable to educate the intermediary to such an extent in the Communist field or to even permit such an individual becoming aware of the full extent of our interest and particular phases of Communist activity which would necessarily result by informing the intermediary of the questions desired to be asked of the informant. It is realized that there may be a possibility that after the informant is developed of then having him or her handled directly by an agent but this seems quite remote. Further, it is believed that it will be an extremely difficult task for an outsider to convince such an official of the Communist Party that he is not actually testing the loyalty of that official. (S)(u)

Furthermore if an intermediary were used whose cover was in some way connected with big business it would immediately be objectionable to most officials of the Communist Party due to the natural antagonism the two groups have for each other. It is, therefore, conceivable that a high official of the Communist Party would be subject to defection but because of the suspected connections of the third party would have nothing to do with him. Further as far as utilizing a third party, this office does not have anybody available who it believes could be used for such a purpose unless the Bureau would consider some ex-agent who has a knowledge of Communist activity but has never engaged in this type of work since his departure from the Bureau. (S)(u)

From what has been stated above it can be seen that there are points in favor and against each of the possibilities mentioned. This office is definitely against losing control of an informant if one were developed. On the other hand, it is well appreciated that the FBI could not permit this organization to be blamed at a later date for keeping an individual in a high policy making position in the Communist Party. Therefore, it is believed that if it is possible to secure a third party whose friendship with the Bureau is such so that there is no question as to his impeachability and his willingness to turn over the informant directly to the Bureau at a later date, it is believed that the third party should be used. (S)(u)

Very truly yours,

Edward Scheidt

EDWARD SCHEIDT,
SAC.

CONFIDENTIAL

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Department of Justice

New York 7, New York

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2809m
CLASSIFICATION EXTENSION
FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-81

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 JJA/bjt
ON 5-10-84
83-1343

CONFIDENTIAL

October 9, 1947

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP1 GAK/CM 5-7-79
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW 5-7-89

Director, FBI

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OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS,
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Dear Sir:

Re New York letter dated June 19, 1947 which advised that a survey was being made of members of the New York State Committee and the personnel of the Communist Party Headquarters, 35 East 12th Street, New York City for potential informants. The names of individuals were checked in this regard and are set out below under an appropriate caption. As in the case of members of the National Committee and persons out to find higher positions in the Communist Party, their files were reviewed for exploitable weaknesses, indications of defection, and proximity to the National Headquarters.

New York State Committee

BILL NORMAN
EDWARD BENDER
ROBERT CAMPBELL
ABE CHAPMAN
SIMON GERSON
DAVID GOLDWAY
CARL VEDBO
GEORGE WATT
BEN DAVIS
PETE CACCHIONE
ISRAEL AMPSTER
MAX GORDON
THELMA DALE
ROBERT THOMPSON
CHARLES TOMAN
TONY MORTON
TOM BONSIGNORE
JOHN STEUBEN
ISADORE BEGUN
LEON WOFSY

SAUL WELLMAN
MORRIS GAINOR APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
DAIST GEORGE AND FIELD OFFICES
LIONEL BERMAN ADVISED BY ROUTING
JOSEPH STACK (S) OF Classification
FANNIE GOLOS DATE 9/1/79 (83-1343)
MAX STEINBERG
MAX PERLOW
JUAN MALSONET
FRANK DRUCKER
DAVID GREENE
LOUIS SASS
BERNARD SEGAL
ROXY URGENT
MICHAEL ORFONIK
EMANUEL BLUM
ESTHER BETZ
GILBERT GREEN
TONY SATTONAR
HELEN SAUWELS

AED:DBS
62-9124

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Director
NY 62-9124

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
October 9, 1947

ALEX SCHAEFER
JACK STRONG
AUDLEY MOORE
ESTHER SINGER
NATHAN SLUTSKY
Rev. ELIOT WHITE
ROSE WORTIS

GEORGE BLAKE
CONSUELO MARCHAL
JOSEPH ROBERTS
LILLIAN GATES
WILLIAM ALEERTSON
MICHAEL SALERNO
CHARLES LOMAN

Communist Party Headquarters,
35 East Twelfth Street,
New York City

(This list includes those names of individuals employed by the New York State Communist Party over the period of October 1, 1936 through December 31, 1946 which was submitted to the New York State Division of Placement and Unemployment Insurance. The names of National Headquarters employees are not submitted to the above department).

JULIO R. AROZARENA
HERBERT BAILIN
TED CASSETT
MAE COLLINS
GEORGE E. COOK
ALBERT DAVIDSON
JOHN DAVIS
LOUIS DISKIN
SAM DONCHIN
EVELYN FRIEDMAN-DUFONT
JAMES J. FABER
LUCILLE FAITHFUL
MAY FORRES
BERNARD FRIEDLAND
ALICE HODES GARDNER
LILLIAN ANN GATES
SIMON W. GERSON
IRVING GOFF
DAVID GORDON
CONSTANCE JACKSON

SAMUEL H. JAFFEE
HAROLD KLEIN
CHARLES LOMAN
ANTONIO LOMBARDO
ALBERT MOREAU
ELSIE NEWMAN
WILLIAM NORMAN
GEORGE POWERS
SARA RASHKIN
AL ROTHBART
MURRAY SAVAGE
HAROLD SIMON
ROBERT THOMPSON
MOLLY JACKSMAN
GEORGE WATT
FAY WEINER
WILLIAM WEINSTONE
HERBERT WHEELDIN
ROBERT WOOD
SHEVRA WOOL
ROSE WORTIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Director
NY 62-9124

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
October 9, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Miscellaneous (Prominent in Party Activities)

V. J. ~~TEROME~~
JOSEPH ~~NORTH~~
ROBERT ~~WOOD~~ ✓
ROBERT ~~MINOR~~
ANTONIO ~~LOMBARDO~~
MOSES ~~MILLER~~
MARION ~~SHAW~~
JOEL ~~REMES~~
DAVID ~~GOLDEN~~

SAMUEL ~~COLEMAN~~
BENJAMIN ~~BORDOFSKY~~
ALBERT ~~MOREAU~~
CONSTANCE ~~JACKSON~~
CLARA ~~BODIAN~~
ROBERT ~~REED~~
PHIL ~~CABOT~~
JOHN ~~BAVIN~~

(u)

(C) All of the above names have been eliminated as potential informants for the present with the exception of [redacted] whose name has been recommended previously to the Bureau and [redacted] on whom a separate letter to the Bureau is being written. On a higher level, the name of [redacted] member of the National Review Commission, Communist Party, has been considered and discarded. Attention is being given to [redacted] a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party who has been transferred recently from the State of Ohio to New York City and is presently occupying the position of National Legislative Director. The Bureau has been advised about this individual.

A separate letter is also being submitted to the Bureau on HOWARD CARL BOLDT, secretary-treasurer of Freedom of the Press, Inc., 35 East Twelfth Street, New York City which publishes the DAILY WORKER. (u)

The New York Office will continue to remain alert for any evidence of disaffection on the part of any persons mentioned in this letter which would warrant an approach to him for development as a confidential informant. The Bureau will be advised promptly of any such developments. (u)

Very truly yours,

Edward Scheidt

EDWARD SCHEIDT
SAC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5-26-93
Classified by 2803 RDD/bjs
Declassify on: OADR

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

New York 7, New York

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Boardman _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Hendon _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
October 8, 1947

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 DML/line JOC
EXEMPT FROM EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-81
[X](u)

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Re: [redacted] with alias: [redacted] [X](u)

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to New York letter, dated June 19, 1947, which stated, among other things, that a letter concerning the above named individual was forthcoming.

[redacted] a member of the National Committee, Communist Party, USA, and a [redacted] NMU, CIO, was born in Brooklyn, New York, on [redacted]. He resides at [redacted] New York City, Apartment [redacted] with [redacted] and [redacted]. She contributes articles to the "Daily Worker" and "New Masses". Recently, [redacted] collaborated on a new book, which [redacted] described as "too Red" for ordinary publication [redacted] 4/25/47. [redacted] (U)

[redacted] is a seaman by occupation, had an elementary school education and allegedly attended Erasmus High School in this city. He is [redacted] who works for the "Daily Worker" and is reportedly in charge of its mail room at [redacted] New York City. [redacted] (u)

Special Agent ARTHUR V. HART, of this office, conducted considerable investigation with an eye toward the development of [redacted] as a confidential informant. He recorded this information in a memorandum, dated June 2, 1947. [redacted] (u)

[redacted] superintendent of the premises at [redacted] New York City, has furnished considerable information to this office in regard to [redacted] in the past, [redacted] is personally acquainted with [redacted] and in September 1946, [redacted] and [redacted]



AED:JCD
62-9124

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S)

RECORDED

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 6-8-94
class INDEXED
10/20/81
11 NOV 21 1947
CONFIDENTIAL

382
M: [redacted]
Donahue
Coughlin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Confidential letter to Director
NY 62-9124

October 8, 1947

[redacted] spent a week with the [redacted] family at Bethel, Vermont. [redacted] told SA HART that he thought [redacted] was losing interest in the Communist Party. When asked for details as to why he thought this, he said that the [redacted] no longer talked to him about the Communist Party and received very little mail, whereas formerly he received considerable quantities of mail from Communist fronts. X (u)

b7D

[redacted] stated that when [redacted] NMU, he used to bring the "Daily Worker" home every night but that he was no longer bringing the publication home, so far as [redacted] could determine. [redacted] advised that he even sees papers like the "New York Journal American" formerly [redacted] could not tolerate such publications in his home. [redacted] advised that at the time of the 1946 Maritime Strike, which took place in September - October of that year, [redacted] told him that he was a Communist and proud of it. X (u)

This was the only information that appeared in the aforementioned memorandum which suggested the possibility that [redacted] was becoming disaffected. X (u)

b7D

SA HART made considerable inquiries concerning HARVEY MYERS and developed nothing derogatory concerning him. In fact, he ascertained from [redacted] Minister of the Christ Episcopal Church, 73rd Street and Ridge Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, that [redacted] who attended the church Sunday School for three years quite regularly, until January 1947. X (u)

As a result of the investigation conducted by SA HART, two avenues of approach were developed to both [redacted] and [redacted] namely [redacted] who said that he would be glad to call on [redacted] and make a discreet inquiry concerning the reason why [redacted] was no longer attending Sunday School, and secondly [redacted] a personal friend of SA WILLIAM POWELL of this office. X (u)

b7D

[redacted] is [redacted] Sealing & Jarvis of this city. He knows [redacted] personally and used to swim with him when he was a boy in Brooklyn. He said that [redacted] attended Erasmus High School in Brooklyn. [redacted] has indicated that he will be willing to contact [redacted] in some pretext (possibly an accidental meeting at the NMU and an invitation to lunch). X (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Confidential letter to Director
NY 62-9124

October 8, 1947

Interest in the development of [] as a confidential informant was further stimulated from information in his case file which revealed him as a former Browderite, who was "stunned" by the Duclos Article. (u)

b7D

Since the above memorandum, nothing has developed which would suggest that [] has swerved from his allegiance to the Communist Party in the least. In fact, SA FRANK NOWLAN, who is spot checking the NMU National Convention, which is now in session, reports that [] from all appearances is the floor leader of the Communist faction of the Union. Prominent NMU officials such as [] and [] among others, have been seen leaving the Rostrum to confer with [] who is seated among the delegates in the audience. It is conceivable that [] may be the Communist candidate for the NMU presidency in the 1948 union election. Furthermore, information has been developed recently that the [] apartment is being used as a mail drop for []. (u)

In view of the derogatory information available, this would not seem to be an auspicious time to attempt to develop [] and therefore further activity in this regard was not contemplated. (u)

However, this office will remain alert for any positive signs of defection on his part, and the Bureau will be promptly advised of all developments. (u)

Very truly yours,

Edward Scheidt

EDWARD SCHEIDT
Special Agent in Charge

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc-NY 100-9657



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice**

Detroit, Michigan

October 2, 1947

IN REPLY, PLEASE CLASSIFIED AND

FILE NO. _____

EXTENDED BY 2842 RMC
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2

Director, _____

DATE OF REVIEW FOR

DECLASSIFICATION _____

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Re: Communist Party Informants on
National Committee Level or Higher

Dear Sir: 11. 1. 1947

Rebulet September 22, 1947.

The possibilities of developing an informant on the highest possible level in the Communist Party has been considered with the following result, set forth in order of preference. (u)

1. I believe this contact should be made by a Special Agent of the FBI under appropriate pretext, but not under cover. Under these circumstances, I feel that the potential informant, if he was inclined to cooperate, would feel more secure than if he was offered considerations by a third party. It is assumed that the party approached would be somewhat opportunistic and interested in his future welfare should the world crisis reach the stage where action would be taken against the Communists in this country. (u)

If this approach failed, the Communist Party, of course, would be cognizant of the fact that its highest echelon has not been penetrated and it might grasp the opportunity to attempt to embarrass the Bureau by publicizing the unsuccessful approach. However, it would be possible to furnish the Agent handling this assignment with bona fide credentials, bearing a fictitious name and permitting a denial that said person had any connection with the FBI. (u)

2. The services of a qualified reliable former Special Agent could be employed under suitable pretext, thus assuring the Bureau of a person who knows and understands the problem involved, the Bureau's position, as well as an understanding of the CP from previous official experience. (u)

3. A "third party", such as Monsignor Fulton J. Sheen may know of members of the Catholic faith, or who formerly were, who may be approached. Under this approach, if successful, the Bureau's control of the third party would be less likely lost or the information developed diverted to a group which would interfere with FBI jurisdiction. It is assumed that after a reasonable period of time, this third party would turn the informant over to the Bureau for handling. (u)

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CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-6 GJA/gja
ON 5-19-83

CONFIDENTIAL

3-383

Letter to the Director
October 2, 1947

Re: [Communist Party Informants on
National Committee Level or
Higher] ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (u)

I feel somewhat opposed to an approach by a third party because of the possibilities of loss of control of him later and the possibilities of the exercise of poor judgment which would embarrass the Bureau. (u)


The Detroit Division has been carefully considering the possibilities of developing an informant among the top functionaries in this district, but to date nothing favorable has developed. Accordingly, at this time it is not possible to suggest the name of a person who could serve as desired. (u)

Within the recent past the Educational Director of the Communist Party in this area was replaced with James E. Jackson, a Negro, who appears to be having some difficulty in satisfying completely the top officials of the party here. Plans to have him contacted are awaiting further developments to the point where he may become frustrated—a logical time for the move. (u)

Jackson is an intelligent person, well educated and sincerely interested in the advance of the colored people. He has attended meetings in New York on occasion and accordingly is potential material for our purposes. (u)

This matter will continue to be followed closely.

Very truly yours,


H. T. O'Connor, SAC

HTO:LMR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 9, 1947

~~Confidential~~

~~CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842-10
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION~~

Re: **CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS**
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA:
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Re: WAS. *W/ B/L*

Dear Sir :

The above individual is the National Student Secretary of the Communist Party. His office is at Communist Party Headquarters, 35 East 12th Street, New York City. He was born in New York City on [redacted] and holds a very high position in the CP, considering his youth. He served in the United States Army from February 9, 1943 to February 14, 1946 when he received an honorable discharge. [redacted] is generally known as [redacted] which is his Party name. He resides at [redacted] New York City, [redacted] with [redacted] [redacted] who was born in Elgin, Illinois on [redacted] [redacted] were born in Austria. [redacted] [redacted] were both born in the United States and reside in Elgin, Illinois. [redacted] religious background is Roman Catholic and she married [redacted] before a Catholic Priest on May 25, 1946 in New York City. Efforts were made to locate this Priest, who was previously reported to be Reverend RAYMOND E. BEAST. Witnesses to the wedding were [redacted] of Brooklyn, and [redacted] New York City. [redacted] had a brother [redacted] who died on April 25, 1943 while a member of the armed forces. [redacted] was at one time associated with the I.W.O. [redacted]

From an educational standpoint [redacted] is a graduate of James Madison High School, 1940, and attended Brooklyn College for 2½ years from 1940 to 1943. By a letter dated February 15, 1946 to the Veterans Administration he expressed a desire to continue his studies at Brooklyn College, New York with the objective of obtaining a B.A. degree. *W*

62-9124
AED:MD

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 ELD/ld
ON 10/13/85

RECORDED
INDEXED

-384
CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Director
NY #62-9124

October 9, 1945

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] seems to have some sense of moral responsibility as adjudged from a letter which was sent to him when he was in the Service by one [redacted] Iowa City, Iowa. The letter, which is dated June 26, 1943, discussed the attitude of [redacted] toward women. He described [redacted] as a "model and example to womanhood" which led to the conclusion that "the male sex is not as banal as it is made out to be". The letter intimated that [redacted] had a high regard for the marriage ceremony. *CU*

Because of the unusual situation which exists in this case, namely that a high ranking Communist has a sense of moral responsibility and married his wife in a Catholic ceremony or [redacted] consideration has been given to the possibility of developing him as a confidential informant. He holds a very responsible position in the Party and at this writing seems to have an excellent future in Party work. *CU*

At the Chancellory Office of the Roman Catholic Church located at 51st Street and Lexington Avenue, it was ascertained that Reverend RAYMOND E. BLUST (correct name) was stationed at St. Pius Roman Catholic Church, 420 East 145th Street, New York City; when contacted by SA SAMUEL O. BUSH and the writer he advised that he performed the wedding ceremony when he was assigned to the Church of the Epiphany located at 414 East 13th Street, New York City. He stated that he did not know either [redacted] or the bride but that they came into the Church and asked him to marry them. Since they had complied with the Catholic regulations regarding marriage he performed the ceremony. *CU*

At the Church of the Epiphany the file relating to the marriage was reviewed and it contained the following pertinent information: [redacted] wife listed her residence as [redacted] Elgin, Illinois and she attended parochial school in St. Joseph's Parish, Elgin, Illinois. The pastor of St. Joseph's Parish sent a letter to the Church of the Epiphany on April 19, 1946 and stated that she had been a parishioner in good standing prior to leaving Elgin in 1939. *CU*

A letter dated August 22, 1945 was also located which was from the office of the Catholic Chaplain, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The letter, signed by a Catholic Chaplain, RAYMOND DUNDON, advised that [redacted] had taken the necessary pre-marital instructions prior to signing the promise for a mixed marriage. *CU*

At the office of the Military Ordinariate, R.C., 462 Madison Avenue, it was ascertained that Father RAYMOND DUNDON was now located in St. Anne's *CU*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Director
NY #62-9124

October 9, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

7/11 Parish, 42-30 58th Avenue, Flushing, [redacted] was contacted and advised that he did not remember either [redacted] or the bride, stating that he performed hundreds of similar marriages during the war. However, it is possible through the cooperation of Father DENNON that he might be able to meet [redacted] on the street in New York City sometime and renew his contact. &u

b7D

As of April, 1947 [redacted] was working for the Russian Skazka Restaurant at 227 West 46th Street. Leads were set out to the Chicago, Illinois office to determine the background of [redacted]. The Chicago office on July 8, 1947 that a check of its indices revealed that [redacted] was a member of the Hyde Park Club of the CP in 1945 and that she had been registered for the 1945 membership on December 1, 1945. The source indicated that she was not a subscriber to the Daily Worker, although her family did subscribe. This information was furnished by a highly confidential source on May 22, 1945. &u

At the University of Chicago it was ascertained that [redacted] entered that University as a graduate student in September, 1943. Her home address was listed as [redacted] Elgin, Illinois. She attended that University until the spring of 1944 and she majored in the study of humanities. The University records reflect that she attended the St. Joseph's School, in Elgin, Illinois from 1927 to 1935, Elgin High School from 1935 to 1939, and Rockford College, Rockford, Illinois from which she graduated in 1943 with a B.A. degree. She was, while at Rockford College between 1939 and 1943, an editor of the "Rockford Review", a literary publication. According to the records of Chicago University, she was listed as a member of the American Youth for Democracy in the Autumn of 1943. &u

b6
b7C

At Elgin, Illinois the Chicago office determined that her father, [redacted], was employed by the Elgin Watch Factory from 1942 to 1944 when he left the factory because he was no longer suited for the type of work available when the company discontinued its war contracts. [redacted] owns his own home, is a veteran of World War I, and is slightly deaf because of an injury he received in the conflict. He has no criminal record and the Retail Credit Bureau of Elgin, Illinois listed him as a loyal individual. &u

Father JOSEPH ROZEMAN, Pastor of St. Joseph's Roman Catholic Church, advised that he was well acquainted with [redacted] and also with the [redacted] family. He advised that both families are highly regarded, considered good members of the Catholic Church, and that nothing derogatory was known about them. &u

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to the Director
NY #62-9124

October 9, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

He stated that he knew of [] only as a former student, at St. Joseph's, and that he had come in contact with her at the time she was making arrangements for her marriage. *CU*

b7D

[] Elgin, Illinois, has known the [] family for the past twenty years and advised that they had a good reputation and were of irreproachable character. As to [] she stated that she had always been sickly and that she was bothered by Asthma. She stated further that she was considered somewhat of a non-conformist and did not mix well with other persons of her age. She stated that she suspected that [] was a Communist but could furnish no definite basis for this belief as she only met him on one occasion prior to the marriage. *CU*

It is conceivable that, while the [] family was listed in the records of the Hyde Park Club (Chicago) as subscribing to the Daily Worker, this may not have been actually a fact. *CU*

It seems that if a confidential informant is to be made of [] the logical approach to him would be through his wife and that a contemplated contact should be based on principle rather than on money, although a money consideration could logically follow at a later date. At the present time [] is very active in the Party and seems to be entirely imbued with Marxism. Further efforts will be made by this office to determine an exploitable weakness which may be present, or to detect any lurking symptoms of defection in him or particularly in his wife. The Bureau will be kept advised of all developments. *CU*

Very truly yours,

Edward Scheidt
Edward Scheidt, SAC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice**
900 Standard Building
Cleveland, Ohio

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. E. A. Tamm _____
Mr. Clegg _____
Mr. Glavin _____
Mr. Ladd _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tracy _____
Mr. Egan _____
Mr. Gurnea _____
Mr. Harbo _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Pennington _____
Mr. Quinn Tamm _____
Mr. Nease _____
Miss Gandy _____

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY SP5 (2) JMA mc / SC October 16, 1947

REASON FOR EXTENSION 2 **CONFIDENTIAL**

FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-91
7-16-81

Re: **COMMUNIST PARTY INFORMANTS ON
NATIONAL COMMITTEE LEVEL OR HIGHER** (X)(U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Dear Sir:

Reurlet September 22, 1947

Recent information indicates that at the present time the National Committee, Communist Party, possesses two members from Ohio, namely [redacted] Ohio State Communist Party) and [redacted] both of whom reside in Cleveland, Ohio. [redacted] is also a member of the National Board. Another individual, [redacted] presently [redacted] National Legislation Bureau Communist Party, likewise is a National Committee member. [redacted] who now resides in New York City, until recently was [redacted] Ohio State Communist Party, and had been active in Communist Party activities in Ohio for a number of years. [redacted] has resided in Cleveland for only a short time, having lived previously in New York City (Comments and recommendations regarding [redacted] as a possible confidential informant, for this reason, are being left for the New York Division). (X)(U)

From a review of [redacted] file, his activities, and his general approach to matters involving the party, the agents of this office assigned to Communist work submit the following observations regarding [redacted] which lead them to believe he might be receptive to an approach designed to make him a confidential informant of this Bureau: (X)(U)

[redacted] we believe, might be characterized as a "passive Communist," an individual who believes in the theoretical teachings of Marxism and the generalizations of party policy but is hesitant to implement any specific instructions which might require revolutionary, militant, or treacherous methods of execution. Communism to him is more "A Way of Life" to be explained, expounded, and discussed than to be acted upon through dynamic, forceful, and violent (X)(U)



RECORDED
INDEXED

114

385

CONFIDENTIAL

October 16, 1947

b7D

means. [] is well educated, appears to possess a mild, easy mannered temperament, and seems to enjoy thoroughly making friends, meeting people, and establishing contacts with labor, civic, or governmental leaders. As chairman of the Ohio State Communist Party he devoted himself primarily to public relations work, such as making speeches, offering suggestions and proposals to attentive legislators or municipal officials, and promoting better relations between the Party and sympathetic organizations and individuals. He enjoyed political campaigning, the publicizing of his name, and the self-esteem derived from being the top party functionary in Ohio. The carefree, easy-going routine of this type of activity, unhampered by the necessity to decide administrative or procedural problems, seemed to make a distinct appeal to [] (u)

We feel, after analyzing [] demeanor, his statements before closed party meetings, and his general attitude toward current national and international issues, that basically he is not a revolutionary. He probably would regret the coming of a revolution. Such an event would call forth Communist leaders dedicated to the use of forceful and violent methods. The leisurely calm exposition of Communist doctrine would be superceded by the practical necessity of erecting a Communist regime. In such a state of affairs, we believe, [] could not for long participate. The type of life to which he had accustomed himself in the Communist environment would have disappeared. (u)

[] moreover, lacks practical personal experience in many of the fields of American life which the Communists exploit for their own advantage. He does not possess an intimate knowledge of the mechanics of trade unionism nor the workings of the different nationality groups. He appears to feel more at ease in the company of professional and white collar groups than with the ordinary laboring man. (u)

For these reasons, therefore, we feel that [] from a personal point of view, may not be fully integrated to the requirements of practical Communism. His allegiance, in our opinion, is primarily to the historical principles of Marxism, not to their historical manifestation, the Communist Party. (u)

We feel that if [] were offered a position outside the Communist Party which entailed duties of a nature similar to those he presently exercises, that is, being more or less his own boss, not being confined to any particular hours, possessing the opportunity to contact individuals above the level of the ordinary working man, and enabling him to derive personal publicity and satisfaction, that he would be receptive. In other words, if [] were able to retain his present position and at the same time receive added remuneration we feel that he could be approached with a view of making him an informant. (u)

Director, FBI

October 16, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7D

It might be possible to approach [] either indirectly through a third party or through direct pretext. In regard to the first method, consideration might be given to utilizing a Bureau contact at Union Theological Seminary. Informants have indicated that [] still is interested on occasions in individuals whom he knew there during his school years. For instance, on May 8, 1947 [] according to [] contacted a minister at the First Methodist Church, Cleveland, Ohio, relative to a visit to Cleveland by Rev. HAROLD WARD, from Union Theological Seminary. [] stated that he was wondering if WARD could be persuaded to stay over for a few days, adding []

Relative to the direct pretext approach, informants have reported that [] always has been willing to discuss issues with individuals whom he knew to be entirely opposed to the Communist doctrine. He is not curt or brusque in these discussions and can usually be engaged to the point where the full purpose of the interview can be made clear. In other words, [] appears to have a mind sufficiently broad to listen at least to a rational counter point of view. (S)(u)

We believe the third party approach should be utilized only on condition that the New York Division possesses an absolutely reliable contact who is willing and able to adequately sound out [] If such a contact does not exist we feel [] should be approached directly, not with the purpose of changing his ideological viewpoint, but of convincing him of the advisability, financial and otherwise, of becoming a confidential informant. Regarding the financial angle, it should be noted that [] on occasions has complained that she was compelled to work in an industrial job in order to support the family, while her husband appeared unconcerned with financial problems. We feel this factor might have some bearing on [] ultimate decision. (S)(u)

b7D

Prior to [] departure from this field division territory, this office had started a review of [] file for the purpose of submitting information to the Bureau which would indicate the possibility of developing him as a confidential informant. (S)(u)

We feel, however, that [] is not a good prospect for a potential Bureau informant. [] who appears to possess a blunt, brusque personality, has a background of militant, violent trade unionism. It should be noted that [] during the Little Steel strike in Ohio in 1937, was arrested in connection with the bombing of industrial installations. However, due to the prosecutor's inability to (S)(u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

October 16, 1947

prove the bombing accusations, the charges were reduced to malicious destruction of property, to which [] pled guilty. (S) (u)

b7D

According to informants [] is a forceful administrator, and since becoming [] has attempted, through personal supervision, to change the easy going lackadaisical set-up of the party organization as practiced under []. For instance, [] has tightened security precautions relative to conduct of official business, such as not mentioning names in telephone conversations, the more secure maintenance of records, and the withholding of meeting place locations until the last moment. [] took practically no interest in such considerations. [] considers personally party problems arising in various sections and clubs and issues instructions to his subordinates. If these orders are not fulfilled, the offender frequently will be severely reprimanded and censured in a bellicose and beligerent manner, sometimes involving the use of obscene language. (S) (u)

[] through his personal demeanor and speech, not only shows his complete loyalty, both ideologically and practically, to the CP, but also his adherence to the revolutionary tenets of Marxism. (S) (u)

For these reasons, we feel that [] should not be approached as a possible informant. (S) (u)

We feel, in the interests of improving the Bureau's coverage of Communist activities, that an approach, designed to develop confidential informants on the highest possible level in the Communist Party, should be made. The development of informants represents an affirmative method of securing information which requires careful planning and execution. We further believe, in this connection, that if possible, the approach should be made on a selective basis, that is, to those individuals who, after careful evaluation and determination of the facts, would be most susceptible to the idea of furnishing information. In our opinion, the direct pretext approach would be preferable to the use of a third party, though undoubtedly the facts of each individual case will dictate the method to be utilized. The direct pretext approach, we believe, affords a greater opportunity to exercise complete and unqualified control over the informant as well as enabling the Bureau to maintain and to protect, unhampered by any third party, the security of the information furnished. Furthermore, direct handling of the informant, makes possible a better evaluation of the data obtained and allows the Bureau the opportunity to instruct the informant, not only in methods of improving his presentation of the information but for the purpose of obtaining specific facts urgently desired by the Bureau. (S) (u)

* * * *

Director, FBI

October 16, 1947

A copy of this communication is being submitted for the information of the New York Division because of the comments contained therein regarding [redacted] now a resident in New York City, and the suggestion that the New York office submit recommendations relative to the possibility of developing [redacted] as a possible confidential informant. *X (u)*

b7D

Very truly yours,

E. C. Richardson

E. C. RICHARDSON *Ed.*
Special Agent in Charge

100-989
FCS:EZ

cc: New York

CONFIDENTIAL

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

San Francisco 2, California

November 4, 1947
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
ATTENTION: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR D. M. LADD

AIR MAIL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY 2542 DMH
EXTENDED BY 2542 DMH
REASON FOR EXTENSION FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-18-91
Dear Sir:

Re: COMMUNIST PARTY INFORMANTS
ON NATIONAL COMMITTEE LEVEL
OR HIGHER

5-10-64
83-1343

Re your letter of September 22, 1947 captioned as above to New York,
with copy to San Francisco.

It is my opinion that an attempt should be made to obtain an informant on the highest possible level in the Communist Party, U. S. A. However, I feel that the use of a third party as a "cover" would diminish the possibilities of obtaining such an informant to such a point that the method should not be seriously considered. However approached, the potential informant would suspect a trap, and this suspicion must immediately, at the time of the meeting, be proved groundless. If this is not done, the potential informant would never consider the possible benefits to himself by acting as an informant. In this connection occasional information is obtained by the Bureau indicating that jealousies and intrigue are definite factors within the higher echelons of the Party, which would indicate that Party officials are capable of "framing" one another.

"Framing" by approaching a Communist official and offering money for information would be an obvious method and also obvious to the intended victim. It may well be that the Party has already "tested" questionable Communists in this manner. In such a situation many a Communist would naturally report such an approach if he were not immediately made aware of the true identity and purpose of the person approaching him.

If the individual approached knew the identity of the person approaching him as an agent of the Bureau, the fear of being trapped would not be present and he would immediately be able to contemplate the advantages to him in such an arrangement. The agent, or preferably a team of two experienced agents thoroughly proficient in the development and handling of informants in the Communist Party, making the approach should carry fictitious credentials with the purpose in mind that in the event the approach is not received favorably, the prospective informant would not be in a position to compromise an agent, and this procedure

RECORDED
INDEXED

114

386

Bureau from SAC, San Francisco
November 4, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 2

Re: [COMMUNIST PARTY INFORMANTS
ON NATIONAL COMMITTEE LEVEL
OR HIGHER] (u)

will afford better protection to the approach until and when it is successful. It goes without saying that all professional Communists are generally aware of the Bureau's interest in the Communist Party, U. S. A., and schooled as they are in intrigue, many Communists so approached by the Bureau could be expected to react only after thoughtful and private consideration of the approach. It could be intimated to the potential informant that such informants as he are available or actually operating, and thus psychologically impel the person approached to agree to becoming an informant. It is felt that in this way the frictions within the upper strata of the Party would be used as a factor for the successful development of an informant, rather than as a factor contributing to the defeat of such an effort, as set forth in Paragraph 1. (u)

If, as is possible, such an attempt is unsuccessful and the person approached is aware of the interest of the Bureau in the approach, that person would have nothing but his own story with no substantiation to relate to the Party. He may well consider it unwise to reveal to others that he had been approached, as it would cause suspicion to be directed toward himself. Those told of the attempted approach would naturally wonder why the one approached was singled out, and also whether the one approached who was revealing the approach had actually related the truth or had, in fact, been in the past an informant. (u)

It is felt that if the Bureau were completely unsuccessful, and the Party thereupon made public announcement of the approach, such announcement would not be particularly newsworthy or alienate any thinking person from the Bureau, as the nation and general public, I am sure, expect the Bureau to have such informants. On the other hand, such an announcement by the Party might well injure the Party by causing loss of membership and amount to a generally effective disruptive tactic. Security measures which would follow would have as an inevitable by-product increased suspicions within the Party and would reduce the efficiency of the Party administrative apparatus and at the same time cause the Party to incur increased operating costs. Such knowledge on the part of the Party of an attempt to turn the functionary might direct Party security measures away from present investigative procedures and tactics. (u)

An equally unsuccessful attempt through a third party intermediary would result in essentially the same reaction within the Party, and therefore would not have any advantage in this respect over a direct approach. (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Bureau from SAC, San Francisco
November 4, 1947

Page 3

Re: [COMMUNIST PARTY INFORMANTS
ON NATIONAL COMMITTEE LEVEL
OR HIGHER]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It is felt that the question as to whether an approach should be direct should be answered prior to consideration of any specific individual as a potential informant, in view of the different circumstances surrounding each individual to be considered. *X(u)*

Very truly yours,

Harry M. Kimball
HARRY M. KIMBALL, SAC

HMK:emb

*These views have
previously been
expressed by [unclear] [unclear]
JSC*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

407 U. S. Court House
Seattle 4, Washington

October 8, 1947

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: [COMMUNIST PARTY INFORMANTS ON
NATIONAL COMMITTEE LEVEL OR HIGHER] (u)

Dear Sir: (u)

In reply to your letter of September 22, 1947, I have the following observations to make concerning the approach to a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party looking forward to the development of that person as an informant. (u)

It is believed that perhaps some member of the National Committee may have a close relative who is a loyal American citizen, and who might be in a position to assert some influence on the member to be approached. It might be possible to contact this relative and through him contact the National Committee member. (u)

Another possibility along the same line would be to make the approach through a cooperative union leader who would be interested in obtaining information concerning Communist activities for a union. (u)

If it were feasible I believe another good approach would be through a religious contact. Perhaps one of the National Committee members came originally from a strongly religious family. A cooperative minister, rabbi or priest might be in a position to make the contact and influence him in furnishing information to the church. (u)

Another possible approach would be to have the matter handled by or through a special service contact. I have in mind [redacted] who resides in the Buffalo Field Division, and who is well-known to the Bureau. He is thoroughly reliable and has excellent judgment. He has numerous contacts of his own, and consideration should be given to approaching him directly for any ideas he might have in this situation. (u)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP
SERIAL
DATE 10/20/47 BMS

RECORDED

INDEXED

19 OCT 18 1947

NOV 26 1947

It has been the experience of the agents in the Seattle Field Division that one of the best approaches to develop an informant in the Communist Party is through an appropriate pretext but not under cover. In this way it has been found possible to "size up" the potential informant and to "feel him out" on his possible cooperation. In other instances it has also been found that certain Party members were in dire financial straits, and through a pretext interview determined that they were possibilities as informants. (S)(u)

At present [redacted] Communist Party, is the only member of the National Committee in this area. [redacted] has been in the Pacific Northwest most of his life, and is an old-time Communist. It is believed that he is only a member of the National Committee because he is the top man in this area. It is not felt, however, that he has much influence in shaping National policy or has information of National interest. It is also believed that he would not be a good possibility to approach as an informant. (S)(u)

At present [redacted] make up the [redacted] CP. [redacted] is from the State of Oregon and was a Lieutenant in the U. S. Air Force in the last war. He has [redacted] now in Reno, Nevada, who is believed to be a loyal American citizen, and was a Fraternity brother of SA [redacted] of this office who attended the University of Oregon with him. Of course [redacted] is not on the National Committee, but it is felt that if at any time in the future he were placed in a position of National importance that it might be possible to make an approach to him through his brother. (S)(u)

This matter will continue to receive my attention, and any further suggestions that I have I will promptly forward them to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

J. B. Wilcox
J. B. WILCOX
SAC

LAD:hg
80-37
cc: New York

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. E. A. TAMM

DATE: 11-18-47

FROM : Mr. D. M. LADD

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR NATIONAL
COMMUNIST PARTY FIGURES AS
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTSCLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2812 pmc/mc
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-81

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

Reference is made to previous memoranda concerning the efforts being made to determine which individuals, on a high level in the Communist Party, could be informant material. Various suggestions were set forth for the Executive Conference and the concurrence of the Director was given in the use of [] to contact and develop some of the high Party officials on behalf of the Bureau without disclosing his principal at the same time. The Director concurs in the recommendation that no direct approach be made on such a level. (u)

A letter was transmitted to several Field Offices, having the bulk of Communist Party activity, for the advice of the SACs in regard to a direct approach under a pretext, an indirect approach, and suggested individuals or organizations which could be used for an indirect approach. (u)

REVIEW OF SUGGESTIONS BY
REPRESENTATIVE SACs

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 LJA/SLG
ON 5-11-94
83-1343

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Replies have been received from the Field Divisions considered most conversant with the Communist Party picture, namely, New York; Cleveland; Chicago; Detroit; Seattle; San Francisco; and Los Angeles. The method of approach to a possible high level informant, either direct or indirect, was mentioned generally by all Offices and some new suggestions were advanced which will be discussed herein. (u)

Several Offices took the position that a direct approach by Bureau Agents, using a suitable pretext, could be productive for several reasons. The advantages of this method have been set forth in a previous memorandum, namely, close control, and efficiency in operation. It was pointed out by Detroit; San Francisco; and Cleveland, that the potential informant would have less fear of entrapment from the Party and, of course, the advantages aforementioned would accrue to our being able to handle an informant directly. (u)

Detroit and San Francisco made a meritable suggestion along this line by stating that if a direct approach under pretext was made that the

JDD:wma

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CLASS
DATE 10/20/81

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by 22454/SLG
Declassify on: OADR
#35674

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Agents carry fictitious credentials or bona fide credentials bearing a fictitious name. By having such identification, the prospective informant would not be able to compromise our Agents and the Bureau could deny, if necessary, that such a person had any connection with the FBI in the event an attempt was made to later embarrass the Bureau by publicizing an unsuccessful approach. *(u)*

Two Offices, Seattle and New York, suggested the use of relatives of a member of the National Committee which relatives would be in a position to influence the National Committee member and at the same time said relatives being investigated and found reliable. *(u)*

With regard to third Party possibilities in connection with making an approach to a high level Communist, SAC Wilcox at Seattle suggested the use of special service contacts. [redacted] of Buffalo was suggested as a thoroughly reliable individual with excellent judgment. It was suggested that he might be approached for any ideas he might have in this connection. There is no question of [redacted] reliability. There is attached hereto a suggested letter to the Buffalo Office outlining our program and requesting that an interview be conducted with [redacted] to determine whether he is acquainted or has any contacts which he could utilize by means of which he could approach a member of the National Committee or even a high functionary in the Party from the Buffalo area. *(u)*

b7D

The Chicago Office has suggested, in line with the decision to utilize a third Party, that [redacted] may be amenable as an intermediary. [redacted] position as a liberal is fairly well known. [redacted] Chicago Sun and established the New York newspaper P. M., which if not Communistic inclined tends to the Left. An interesting observation is made by the Chicago Office, however, in that the SAC advises that [redacted] has been contacted by [redacted] a member of the National Committee. [redacted] is very prominent in Communist Party Negro work; has attended school in Moscow; was a member of the Far Eastern Commission of the Comintern; and is fairly well advanced in age, being 65 years. *(u)*

No indication is given by Chicago, however, that [redacted] would be in any way receptive to an approach to act on our behalf and his value as a contact is questionable since he was never listed by Chicago as a special service contact. *(u)*

b7D

A letter is attached to this memorandum to the Chicago Office asking for the reasons which it is felt would result in a successful approach to [redacted] in this matter. *(u)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I disagree with the idea of making any type of approach to [redacted] at this time. J. Coyne

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Cleveland Office has suggested, what appears to be a good possibility in a high level informant, [redacted] presently [redacted] National Legislative Bureau, Communist Party, as well as a member of the National Committee. It was also pointed out by Cleveland that [redacted] might be approached directly under pretext or indirectly through a third party and it appears that this could be handled by [redacted] (u)

b7D

[redacted] (u)
[redacted] until recently was [redacted] of the Ohio State Communist Party and was active in Communist Party activities in Ohio for a number of years. He is now living [redacted] City and besides being a member of the National Committee, he is [redacted] of the National Legislation Bureau of the Communist Party. (u)

The Agents assigned to Communist Party work in Cleveland submitted their comments and views to the SAC concerning Johnson. It was their opinion that [redacted] is not the militant, revolutionary type of Communist, but is concerned with the leisurely calm exposition of Communist doctrine. In the opinion of these Agents, Johnson might regret the coming of a revolution which would call forth Communist leaders dedicated to the use of forceful and violent methods. He also appears more at ease in the company of professional and white collar groups, than with the ordinary laboring man and does not possess an intimate knowledge of the mechanics of trade unionism nor the workings of the different nationality groups. (u)

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It was the occurrence of these Agents that [redacted] may not be fully integrated in the requirements of practical Communism and his allegiance is primarily to the historical principles of Marxism and not to the practical manifestation of these principles by the present day Communist Party. It was believed by these Cleveland Agents that if Johnson were able to retain his present position and at the same time receive added remuneration, it was felt he could be approached as an informant. (u)

With regard to the manner of approaching [redacted] according to the Cleveland Office, confidential informants have reported that Johnson has always been willing to discuss issues with individuals whom he knew to be entirely opposed to the Communist doctrine. He is not curt or brusque in these discussions and can usually be engaged to the point where the full purpose of the interview can be made clear. In other words, [redacted] appears to have a mind sufficiently broad to listen at least to a rational counterpoint of view. (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

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Due to the above comments concerning [] it appears possible that an approach could be made to him, either directly by Bureau Agents under a suitable pretext or indirectly by []. It appears that he would listen to a convincing argument as to the advisability, financial and otherwise of furnishing information on a confidential basis to the Government or in the case of [] to some mythical superior. A financial angle is also involved since Cleveland has noted that [] on occasions has complained that she was compelled to work in an industrial job in order to support the family, while her husband appeared unconcerned over financial problems. (u)

A recommendation is being made at the conclusion of this memorandum that the New York Office conduct a surveillance of his activities preparatory to an approach by [] (u)

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[] (u)
[] a reporter connected with the New York World Telegram, recently suggested the name of [] as an informant. [] is listed in the mast head of the Daily Worker Freedom of the Press, Inc., which publishes the Daily Worker and the Worker. (u)

[] has been described as a Communist Party member for the past 15 years and [] is also reportedly a member. [] was born in Connecticut and after attending public schools, was educated for about 2 years at the University of Vermont. He left school due to lack of funds and drifted into journalism. He was a reporter on the Chicago Tribune about 1928 - 1929 and shortly thereafter made some money selling stories to magazines, such as "Weird Tales," "Western Stories," "Shadow," "Detective Stories," and "McFadden Publications." (u)

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Investigation to determine more data on [] background is presently being conducted by several Field Divisions and the Bureau has requested New York to contact [] for an estimate of [] as informant material. There is no clear-cut reason nor any specific information as yet that Boldt could be approached as an informant, but this possibility will be closely followed in that regard. (u)

CONFIDENTIAL

[] was [] (u)

This individual is the National Student Secretary of the Communist Party and has an office at Communist Party Headquarters in New York City. (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

He was born in New York City in 1924 and served 3 years in the U. S. Navy from which he received an honorable discharge. His parents were born in Austria and his wife's parents were born in the US. [] was married on May 25, 1946, in New York City, by a Catholic Priest to [] who has a Roman Catholic background. [] had [] who died in 1943, while a member of the Armed Forces. (u)

b7D

The New York Office checked the marriage of [] and it was ascertained that the Priest who performed the ceremony was not personally acquainted with [] or the bride, but the ceremony had been performed by the Priest at the request of the participants who had complied with the Catholic regulations. The file relating to the marriage at the Church of the Epiphany was reviewed and the letter was located from the Catholic Chaplain at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, which indicated that [] had taken the necessary pre-marital instructions prior to "signing the promise for a mixed marriage." The Priest who wrote this letter from Fort Belvoir was located by the New York Office and said he did not remember either [] or the bride. (u)

Despite the religious background of the wife of [] inquiries by the Chicago Office revealed that she was listed as a member of the AYD at Chicago University in 1943. The indices of the Chicago Office also reveal that [] was a member of a local Communist Party club in 1945. However, an inquiry was made of the Pastor of the church which was attended by the [] family who said that they were highly regarded and nothing derogatory was known. With regard to Doris, the Pastor, Father [] stated that he knew her only as a former student at St. Joseph in Elgin, Illinois, and had come in contact with her at the time she was making arrangements for her marriage. (u)

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A neighbor of the [] family advised that they had a good reputation and [] was considered somewhat of a non-conformist who does not mix well with other persons of her age. This neighbor also said that she suspected Marvin Schachter of being a Communist but could furnish no definite basis for this belief as she only met him on one occasion prior to the marriage. (u)

The New York Office concludes that [] is presently very active in the Party and seems to be entirely imbued with Marxism. At the present time the only possible approach appears to be through his wife and further efforts are being made by New York to detect symptoms of defection or an exploitable weakness which could be utilized. (u)

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From a review of the information developed into the background of [] as informant material, it does not appear that a successful approach (u)

CONFIDENTIAL

could be made by [] at this time. The New York Office will be followed on this particular individual and if other facts are developed they will be set out for consideration in making an approach by [] (u)

OTHER INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERED
AS INFORMANT MATERIAL

[] more commonly known as [] was considered by the New York Office as information was obtained revealing him as a former Browderite, but he is not regarded as informant material. Recently [] and his wife collaborated on a new book which [] described as "too Red" for ordinary publication. (u)

In addition, [] at the recent NMU Convention gave the impression of being the floor leader of the Communist Party faction of the Union. Further consideration of [] as informant material at this time has been discontinued by the New York Office. (u)

With regard to [] data is presently being compiled for the use of [] who may make an approach to [] in the near future. (u)

The results of the New York Office survey into other informant possibilities has resulted in a communication listing all members of the New York State Committee and all employees of the National Headquarters of the Communist Party and miscellaneous persons prominent in Party activities. According to New York all of these persons, numbering about 175, have been eliminated with the exception of []

[] Information concerning the status of [] is set forth in this memorandum. (u)

With regard to [] you will recall that the Director did not consider either [] as likely prospects. (u)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) It was suggested by SAC Wilcox that former special service contact Sowers of the Buffalo Division may be in a position to be of assistance as an intermediary in this matter. For your approval there is attached a memorandum to the Buffalo Division outlining the situation and (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7D

requesting that an interview be conducted with [] to determine whether he has any contacts or acquaintances who may have entree to a high party level or if [] is personally acquainted with any high ranking Communist Party functionaries. (S) (U)

The SAC at Buffalo is further being advised that if in his opinion such an interview would be valueless it need not be conducted, but in the event he feels from his knowledge of [] that something may be gained by discussing the matter with him he should go ahead. (S) (U)

(2) The Chicago Office has suggested [] as an intermediary and for your approval there is attached a letter to Chicago requesting the reason why this opinion is advanced. There is no indication that [] was previously listed during the war as a special service contact and there is no indication that he would be amenable to an approach as a third party. (S) (U)

(3) The possibility of approaching [] was outlined at length in this memorandum and if you approve, there is attached for transmittal to New York an appropriate letter requesting an evaluation of [] informant possibilities and the placing on him of a surveillance for 10 days similar to that which was done in the case of [] (S) (U)

When the results of this surveillance and New York's evaluation have been received, a memorandum will be prepared on [] or the use of [] in making an approach. (S) (U)

*signed
by MEAT*

Enclosure - 3

*enc 1 + 2
destroyed
JSC*

*not used
JSC
JSC
JSC*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 26, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. Tamm
 MR. LADD
 MR. TOLSON
 MR. NICHOLS

I note incident to the Loyalty investigations that we will likely be called upon to evaluate the informants that we referred to in our reports under numerical designations. In the investigations made under the Hatch Act we received numerous inquiries after submitting our reports asking us to evaluate the source of information. Why would it not be well in the original report to set forth the evaluation rather than to have additional correspondence and await being asked for such evaluation? Roughly speaking, there first, the paid informant of the Bureau in a subversive organization and in whom we have absolute confidence, or technical sources of information; second, the special contact informant such as leading professional or businessmen with whom we have had extensive dealings and for whose reliability we can vouch; and third, the fellow employee or next door neighbor type about whose reliability we are not well informed but about whom we can make a comment as to any motive which we might have noticed in the course of our interview during our investigation. If my suggestion is practical it would seem to me that we would then avoid the criticism that we hear made so often by individuals who are not well disposed toward the Bureau that our reports are filled with anonymous sources whose identities are not given and the value of which it is impossible for one to determine.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
 Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 JRM/MEJC

JEM:EH

66-254-3-389

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: November 21, 1947

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED BY *SP-6 JG/fly*
ON *5-11-90* *23-132*

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT *(u)*

On November 6, 1947, SA FRANCIS W. RALSTON was conducting an investigation in the office of the Valvoline Oil Company, 2240 First Avenue South, Seattle, when one of the office workers, [REDACTED] approached him and volunteered information concerning three Communist women and some Communist activities in Seattle. *(u)*

[REDACTED] stated that she had been active in a group which tried during the spring of 1947 to keep the children's play centers open in Seattle. She did this because it enabled her to be employed while her daughters, age 7 and 9, were taken care of at these centers. She stated that she soon learned she was the only active person in this committee who was not a Communist. Three of the ladies in the committee, namely [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] invited her to meetings of the Congress of American Women and tried to interest her in labor school and other Communist activities. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also tried to obtain Mrs. WYNES permission to publish some poems which [REDACTED] had written in the "New World." This permission was declined. *(u)*

[REDACTED] then wanted to know if the F. B. I. would be interested in gaining and receiving information which she might obtain by going to the meetings to which she had been invited. She was told that the F. B. I. would accept any information she had but would not under any circumstances advise her to join the Communist Party or any of its front groups. *(u)* DEFERRED RECORDING

On 11/7/47 and 11/9/47 [REDACTED] telephonically contacted the writer and stated that she had again been in contact with the above women who seemed interested in getting her to attend a labor school and a writing school, and that she had decided that although she detested Communists she thought it was her duty to go along with them and get in a position where she could give valuable information to the F. B. I. With this in mind, she came to the F. B. I. Office in Seattle to contact Special Agent RALSTON on 11/10/47 and stated that she had decided to go into the movement just as far as possible and give the F. B. I. this information. She was repeatedly warned that there were dangers connected with going into the Party; that she might suffer embarrassment, loss of work, loss of friends and other inconveniences if she decided to make this move. It was also repeatedly pointed out that she could never claim any connection with the F. B. I. and that the F. B. I. would not come to her assistance if she made this move and had cause to regret it. *(u)*

[REDACTED] stated that she realized all of this before she came to the [REDACTED] *(u)*

DECLASSIFIED ON *7-16-81*

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *2-8-81*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *2*
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *7-16-80*

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

office but had reached the decision for several different reasons. She stated her father had been Chief of Police at Wapato, Washington, for a number of years and she had helped him in the office and had come in contact with all types of public enemies and she considered the Communists about the worst. She stated that she had also worked as a case worker for Public Welfare and had been disgusted with the people who could have made a living but decided that the Government owed them everything, and another reason she stated was that [redacted] had become

b7D

interested in so-called progressive politicians such as [redacted] and she was able to see how even Communism could be upheld by innocent people because of its subterfuge. (u)

The Seattle indices, the records of the Seattle Police Department and the King County Sheriff's Office were searched for the name of the above informant, her husband and parents with negative results. (u) (u)

The records of the Seattle Retail Credit Association reflect that [redacted] and her husband are moderate users of credit and have a satisfactory rating. (u)

b7D

[redacted] description is as follows: (u)

Name:

Born:
Height:
Weight:
Hair:
Eyes:
Relatives:

On 11/15/47 [redacted] phoned this office to state that she had additional information concerning the Communist activities and would like to (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

see an agent personally. She has not been recontacted as yet but will be for the purpose of receiving this information. *S/W*

The Bureau is requested to advise this office whether they have any information concerning [] which would make it inadvisable to continue contacting her with the purpose in mind of developing her into a Confidential Informant. *S/W*

b7D

She has not been given a CI number and will not be given one until after word is received from the Bureau authorizing this office to try to develop her into a Confidential Informant. *S/W*

Sutel authority.

80-327
FWR:wp

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CC-150

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

Transmit the following message to:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NOVEMBER 28, 1947 (U)
SAC, SEATTLE
"ROUTINE"
"CODED IN PART"

390

RE [REDACTED] GMDI. REURLET NOVEMBER 21. BUREAU FILES NEGATIVE
CONCERNING [REDACTED] AUTHORITY GRANTED DEVELOP HER AS INFORMANT. (U)

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 2842 DmJ/mate
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 7-16-91
7-16-81

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 6-8-94

Tolson _____
E. A. Tamm _____
Clegg _____
Glavin _____
Ladd _____
Nichols _____
Rosen _____
Tracy _____
Carson _____
Egan _____
Gurnea _____
Harbo _____
Hendon _____
Hottel _____
Quinn Tamm _____
Nease _____
Iss Gandy _____

SENT VIA
100 JUL 9 - 1947

Per [Signature]

(F) CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL DEFENSE INFORMANT [REDACTED]

Development

In view of the increasing security consciousness of the Communist

5-23-50
SAC LETTER NO. 35
Series 1950

- 2 -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 2842 pm Dmc/jc

61-742-5-
NOT RECORDED

146 BY 1211550

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 61-742-5

50 8 1950

Party and the loss to the Bureau in recent months of some excellent informants, it has become imperative that coverage of security matters by live informants be substantially increased in the shortest possible time. You are well aware of the value of live informants in all Bureau work and the fact that it has been most difficult to obtain new informants at this time. In order to assist the field in its search for new informants, the following suggested methods of unearthing and developing informant possibilities are being offered for your consideration and utilization. Obviously all of the methods will not be feasible nor practical for all offices but a number should be suitable for any office.

1. Evaluation of complainants in security matters.
2. Evaluation of persons interviewed in connection with security cases.
3. Evaluation of the subjects of security investigations looking for indications of disaffection, disgruntlement, loss of interest, inactivity, financial hardship, or other repudiation of Party loyalty.
4. Evaluation of Bureau applicants as possible informants.
5. Evaluation of personal friends and contacts of Special Agents and other Bureau employees.
6. Continuous re-evaluation of sources of information, confidential sources and contacts.
7. Review of closed security files on individuals.
8. Review of Communist Index.
9. Ascertain possibilities of reactivating former confidential informants.
10. Survey possibilities of trash covers.
11. Review Factionalism Section of file on Communist Party - USA.
12. Consultation with present informants regarding indications of disaffection on the part of Communist Party members. They, of course, should not be informed as to the purpose of the inquiry.
13. Review of files on Communist front organizations looking for individuals who have been associated with only one or two fronts or who attended only a few meetings of a front. Such individuals frequently are innocent of Communist propensities, yet they have a basis for cultivating the acquaintance of Party members. The Progressive Party file also might prove a fertile field.
14. Investigation of Communist petition signers who live near or work with Communist Party functionaries.

15. Be alert to receive any suggestions of plant executives and highly placed personnel who are reliable and friendly to the Bureau concerning Communist Party members who might cooperate with the Bureau or employees who might be willing to infiltrate the Party. In the past such contacts have on occasion resulted in the plant's making available the services of an employee who already is an informant of the management.

16. Personnel directors in plants frequently are able to advise of members of Communist dominated unions who retain their membership merely to hold their positions.

17. With regard to both 15 and 16 above, if possible, the official should suggest to the potential informant that he contact the Bureau rather than have an agent originate the contact.

18. After the Bureau has notified the Armed Forces of a Communist in an industrial plant having Armed Forces contracts, the Communist frequently breaks down or repents when informed of the charges and is facing the possibility of dismissal or transfer to a non-restricted position in the same plant. At such a time, officers friendly to the Bureau sometimes suggest that the person advise the Bureau of his past activities. You should be alert to take advantage of such cooperation when offered.

19. Review of Communist Party registration records to ascertain what individuals merely registered but never became active.

20. Use of a reliable third party to make the contact with a possible informant when direct contact by an agent is inadvisable. After all efforts to secure such a third party have been exhausted, in an important case, you may request the Bureau to furnish the services of an individual who is available for such a service.

21. When a possible informant has agreed to cooperate but has no Communist Party affiliation he may subscribe to the Daily Worker or the Daily People's World for a time then allow the subscription to lapse. Subsequently a Party member may call to ascertain the reason which provides an opportunity for the informant to cultivate the member's acquaintance. (Prior Bureau authority for the original contact, of course, is necessary).

22. In the same situation as in 21 above good results frequently have been obtained through the informant's frequent patronage of a local Communist Party bookstore, and attendance at open Communist Party affairs and front meetings.

23. Continued pressing of present informants to assume additional Party responsibilities, encouragement to attend Party schools and advice to establish close personal friendships with Party leaders. Care must be exercised that such moves are not made so frequently or in such a fashion as to lay the informant open to suspicion by the Party.

24. Keeping alert to possibilities of transferring informants to areas lacking coverage by changing their residence. Transfers to clubs in unions or industries can be accomplished by the informants changing jobs.

25. Never discourage an informant from accepting advancement in the Party merely because to so advance would involve his transfer to the territory of another office. Such a practice would nullify the Bureau's efforts to obtain informants on the higher levels of the Party.

26. In the larger offices the SACs should consider the full-time assignment of experienced Agents to an informant program and the assignment of individual Communist Party sections and clubs to individual Agents thus centering the responsibility for and enhancing the possibility of developing informants.

In connection with these suggestions, existing rules concerning securing prior Bureau authority to contact informant possibilities should be borne in mind at all times.

The above suggestions are by no means all-inclusive and the field is invited to submit any suggested techniques not covered in order that the Bureau may make them available to all offices.

Control

Your attention is directed to Section (G) of SAC Letter No. 16 dated February 28, 1950 and Section (A) of SAC Letter No. 22 dated March 28, 1950 in which you were advised of the need for maintaining closer control over informants. Despite the fact that close contact was being maintained, recently two additional informants have divulged their confidential relationship with the Bureau to the press. In the light of this fact, you must carefully review the situation with regard to all of your national defense informants who are being contacted with any frequency with a view toward developing closer control over their activity in order that you may anticipate any contemplated disclosure of their connections with the Bureau. All Special Agents concerned with the handling of national defense informants must be constantly alert to anticipate and forestall, if possible, any actions by informants toward revealing their confidential status with the Bureau. You must immediately advise the Bureau of any situation involving an informant's publicizing the fact he has been furnishing information to the Bureau together with suggestions as to how the particular informant might best be controlled.

I am deeply concerned with this matter and want it clearly understood that your confidential informant program must receive your continuous personal supervision.

Confidential Source

In Bureau Bulletin No. 16 (C) dated March 31, 1950, you are advised to set up a new designation called "Confidential Source" which would include individuals who, because of employment or position, can furnish information or make records available to the Bureau on a confidential basis. Examples of this

type of individual would be employees of such concerns as banks, communication companies and credit unions. In the event you contemplate utilizing such an individual for purposes of assisting a Communist or related investigation, Bureau clearance must be obtained similar to that which is required before contacting an individual as a possible informant on Communist or related matters.

SA [unclear] H [unclear]

33 50



United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.
May 4, 1950

PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL

NO NUMBER
SAC LETTER

IN REPLY, PLEASE REFER TO
FILE NO. _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO FOR MR. HOOVER	BROWN, B. C.	HOLLOMAN	NEASE
TOLSON	CALLAHAN	JONES, M. A.	PARSONS
CLEGG	CALLAN	KEAY	PENNINGTON
CONNELLEY	CARLSON	LAUGHLIN	PONTZ
GLAVIN	CONRAD	LEONARD	RENNEBERGER
HARBO	DOWNING	LONG	ROGERS
LADD	EDWARDS, H. L.	MCGUIRE	SCOTT
NICHOLS	EGAN	MCINTIRE, F. H.	SIZOO
ROSEN	FEENEY	MCINTIRE, K. R.	TAMM, Q.
TRACY	GEARTY, G.	MOBLEY	WATKART
BAUMGARDNER	GURNEA	MOHR	
BELMONT	HARGETT	NANNA	
BOWLES	HENNRICH	NAUGHTEN	

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP6 EJA/PPA*
ON *5-11-94*
89-1343

RE: ESPIONAGE AND INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
(Full Utilization of Confidential Informants
and Sources of Information)

Recent events have made it necessary to re-examine our informant program to determine if we are properly utilizing the vast reservoir of information represented by our confidential informants and sources of information.

It has been the Bureau's experience with respect to confidential informants and sources of information who possess a vast fund of knowledge concerning Communist and espionage activity that, although interviewed repeatedly by Bureau representatives, they are unable to draw from their memories all the information they have obtained over a period of years. It is only natural that there are countless items of invaluable information hidden in the recesses of the memories of these individuals which can be brought to light only by refreshing their recollections by asking specific questions about individuals, organizations, or events.

As an example of this fact, [redacted] former high Communist Party functionary, although interviewed on numerous occasions since he broke with the Party in 1945, has recently furnished new information of inestimable value. This new information was recalled by Bydenz solely as a result of specific interrogation concerning the particular matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *2842 PMA/mc/50*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *2.2.2*
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *7-16-91*
7-16-81

116-3542-2
NOT RECORDED
83 MAY 10 1950

51 MAY 15 1950

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

The Bureau has many confidential informants and sources of information throughout the United States who have been interviewed from time to time. Some have been more cooperative than others; however, all are in a position to furnish certain types of valuable information.

It is the Bureau's desire that each Agent handling an important espionage or internal security investigation, in addition to following the usual leads that present themselves, consider the possibility of obtaining further assistance by having confidential informants or sources of information interviewed for additional information concerning the subject or contacts of the subject.

A certain degree of selectivity, of course, should be employed in the type of requests made of these individuals. Care should be exercised to prevent the individuals from being overwhelmed with interviews, thus destroying their cooperative spirit. Before a request is made, all circumstances should be carefully evaluated and discretion exercised.

The following individuals should be in a position to furnish valuable information concerning many phases of espionage or Communist Party activity. The office through which each informant or source of information can be contacted is set forth, as well as a brief sketch of his espionage or Party activity:

[REDACTED] (u)

New York

b7D

[REDACTED] was a former Commercial Attache for the Russian Government in Mexico City and defected about October, 1945. He has identified several individuals whom he classified as Soviet agents. He has also furnished a considerable amount of information concerning Russian diplomatic personnel in Latin America. (u)

[REDACTED] (u)

New York

[REDACTED] is Russian born and advanced in the diplomatic service of the Soviets, finally defecting in 1937, at which time he was First Secretary of the Soviet Legation in Athens, Greece. [REDACTED] has furnished information of a general nature concerning the positions and activities of agents in various Soviet Intelligence establishments in which Barmine has seen service. (u)

[REDACTED] (u)

New York

b7D

[REDACTED] joined the Communist Party about 1935 and was active in espionage activities from October, 1938 until November, 1945. These espionage activities were carried out in Washington, D. C. and New York City. She acted mainly as a courier and liaison representative between her Russian superiors and a large number of individuals who were actively gathering intelligence data. (u)

[REDACTED] (u)

New York

This informant is the widow of [REDACTED] a top level GPU agent who operated in Western Europe from 1931 until he was assassinated in Switzerland in September, 1937. He spent the majority of his time in Paris, the Netherlands, and Switzerland and his activities were directed primarily against Germany. It is believed his widow has an excellent knowledge of her late husband's operations and Soviet intelligence activity in general. (u)

[redacted] - Cleveland ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ b7D

This informant was utilized as a witness in the trial of the Communist Party leaders. He is familiar with Communist Party activities in Ohio from the period 1944 when he joined the Communist Party up until he testified at the Communist Party trial in the Spring of 1949. He has attended Ohio state conventions and the leadership and training school in 1945 and 1946.

[redacted] - New York

[redacted] became a member of the Communist Party in 1935 and made rapid rise in the movement. In 1936, he became Labor Editor of the "Daily Worker" and held varying positions until 1941 when he became [redacted] the "Daily Worker" as well [redacted] Freedom of the Press Company, Incorporated.

[redacted] became a high ranking member of the Communist Party and a member of the National Committee. He publicly broke with the Communist Party in October, 1945. He was utilized as a witness at the trial of the Communist Party leaders.

[redacted] - New York

This informant was utilized as a witness at the trial of the Communist Party leaders. She joined the Communist Party in March, 1942, attended various schools and became acquainted with many Communist Party officials, both nationally and in District No. 2 (New York State).

[redacted] (u) - Baltimore b7D

[redacted] first became connected with the Communist movement in approximately 1924 and held various literary assignments, including work on the "New Masses" publication. From 1935 until April, 1938, he engaged in courier and espionage activities [redacted] in New York City and Washington, D. C. (u)

[redacted] (u) - Miami

[redacted] was active in the Communist movement from the early 1920's until November, 1942, when he was removed as an organizer for the Communist Party in Alameda County, California because of certain differences he had with [redacted] relative to Communist Party policies. During his Party activities, [redacted] was active as an organizer for the Young Workers (Communist) League and was especially active in connection with Communist inspired strikes during the 1930's and he traveled throughout the country as an organizer for the Communist Party. (u)

[redacted] (u) - Cincinnati b7D

[redacted] was born in Italy on [redacted] and is still an alien. He is presently employed as a professor at Antioch College, Yellow Springs, Ohio. On September 1, 1919, elements of the left wing of the Socialist Party, which broke away from that Party, formed the Communist Party of America and Fraina was (u)

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elected the International Secretary. He attended the Communist International in February, 1920. He attended as a representative of the Communist Party of America, the Second World Congress of the Communist International, July - August, 1920. Fraina attempted in the early part of 1921 to bring about unity between the Communist Party of America and the United Communist Party of America. From the latter part of 1921 until the latter part of 1922, [] served as a Comintern representative in Mexico. He left the Communist Party movement in the United States as well as his services in the Communist International during the latter part of 1922. (X)(u)

b7D

[] - Cleveland

[] was utilized as a witness in the trial of the Communist Party leaders. He joined the Communist Party in December, 1943 and became acquainted with Communist Party officials in District No. 6 (Ohio State). This informant attended the National Convention of the Communist Party as a delegate from Ohio in August, 1948.

[] (X)(u) - New York

[] in 1918 aligned himself with the left wing of the Socialist Party and in 1919 he entered the Communist movement. He was arrested in 1919 under the New York criminal syndicalist law and was convicted and after serving approximately three years of his sentence, he was pardoned. [] He was expelled from the Communist Party in 1929 and from the Communist International for defiance of Joseph Stalin. [] attended the underground convention of the Communist Party in Bridgman, Michigan in 1922. [] became a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Party, a member of its Political Committee and a member of its Secretariat. [] attended executive and plenary sessions of the Communist International in Moscow in 1927 and 1928 as a member of the Executive Committee of the Workers (Communist) Party in America. In 1928-1929, [] was General Secretary of the Communist Party in this country. (X)(u)

[] (X)(u) - New York

b7D

[] was associated in [] corps practically all his life and had been [] up until 1940, at which time, he severed his relationship with the Soviet Government and fled to the United States. [] has furnished a considerable amount of information which would assist Bureau agents in identifying Soviet agents in this country and has also furnished information concerning their modus operandi. (X)(u)

[] (X)(u) - Los Angeles

[] was a member of the Communist Party from November, 1927 until November, 1938. Shortly after joining the Party, [] worked on the staff of the "Daily Worker" and afterwards [] "Labor Unity," the Communist Party's trade union magazine. In May, 1934, [] was sent to the Soviet Union for fifteen months by the Party and became then official representative of the Communist Party, USA [] After attending the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in 1935, he returned to the United States and worked in the district apparatus of the Communist Party in New York. [] left the Party after the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact was signed in 1939. (X)(u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7D

[redacted]

8/14

New York

This informant joined the Communist Party in Buffalo, New York on February 17, 1931 and remained a Party member until 1940. He attended the Eighth National Convention of the Communist Party held in Cleveland in April, 1934, at which time he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Party. He attended the Ninth Convention of the Communist Party in New York City in 1936 and was removed from his position as a member of the Central Committee at the Tenth National Convention in 1938. [redacted] helped organize the National Negro Congress and the League of Struggle for Negro Rights. He was expelled from the Party in 1940 for defying some Party policies. He has been used by the Immigration and Naturalization Service as a witness on several occasions. 8/14

[redacted]

8/14

New York

[redacted] was a Communist candidate for Congress in the Second District of Illinois in 1936 and in 1941, he was reported to be the head of all workers schools in the Middle West operating for the Communist Party. He broke with the Communist Party in August, 1947. [redacted] was a witness at the trial of the Communist Party leaders. He has lived for some time in the New York area and is considered to be "a very brilliant individual" as well as an "intellectual Marxist." He would be extremely helpful concerning "Marxist literature." 8/14

[redacted]

8/14

New York

[redacted] was a [redacted] She traveled in the United States, where she operated as [redacted] after spending a period of seven months in Moscow. [redacted] was a [redacted]

Both he and his wife were recruited by [redacted] worked primarily in Germany and came to the United States in the latter part of 1936. 8/14

[redacted]

8/14

Seattle

This informant has been a member of the Communist Party from 1936 up until the present. He can furnish considerable information regarding Communist Party activity in District No. 12 (Washington State). 8/14

[redacted]

8/14

Los Angeles

This individual joined the Young Communist League in 1936 and has been a member of the Communist Party since 1941. She is in a position to furnish a wealth of material concerning Communist Party activities in District No. 13 (State of California) and primarily information concerning activity in the Los Angeles area. 8/14

[redacted]

8/14

New York

This informant has been a Communist Party member from its inception and has attended several county, state and national conventions as a guest. He is also active in several front organizations. He has a wealth of information concerning national functionaries of the Communist Party, USA and District No. 2 (New York State). 8/14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7D

Washington

[redacted] (u) joined the Communist Party in Detroit in 1929 and continued as a member until 1936. In 1929, he was selected a member of a delegation to visit Russia at Party expense. In 1930, he became an organizer for the Party in the Detroit area and he attended the Seventh National Convention of the Party in New York City in 1930. He attended the Lenin School in Moscow from 1931 to 1932. Upon his return to the United States, he resumed his work in the Detroit area and was made the Educational Director for the State of Michigan. He attended the Eighth National Convention of the Party in Cleveland, Ohio in April, 1934. He continued his Communist activities through 1935 and was subsequently removed from office. [redacted] has appeared as a witness in several important cases. (u)

Boston

[redacted] has been a member of the Communist Party from March 23, 1944 until he testified at the trial of the Communist Party leaders in the Spring of 1949. Prior to that time he was active in the Young Communist League. His Party activity has been confined to the Boston area. He has attended state conventions and has particularly good information concerning youth activities of the Communist Party.

b7D

Houston

[redacted] (u) This informant was a member of the Communist Party from July, 1932 until April 28, 1947, when he was expelled from the Communist Party. He acted as an organizer for the Waterfront Section of the Communist Party in New York City from 1943 to 1946. He is in a position to furnish considerable information concerning maritime activities and information regarding the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. (u)

New York

[redacted] (u) was born in Poland and came to the United States in 1924. He first worked for the Amtorg Trading Company from May of 1930 to September, 1931 in New York, Cleveland, Detroit and Pittsburgh. Subsequently, he went to Moscow as an engineer and there, in May of 1932, he was recruited by the [redacted] for work in the United States. He returned to this country in June, 1932 and operated for the [redacted] principally in New York and Chicago from that date until April, 1938. (u)

b7D

New York

[redacted] (u) was active as a Soviet Military Intelligence agent from approximately March of 1931 to the time of his arrest in Paris in December, 1935. He was recruited for this work by [redacted] in New York City and operated in New York City from 1931 until May 15, 1933. When he and his wife were transferred to Europe to operate [redacted] Both acted as photographers and couriers for [redacted] having joined in this work following her marriage. (u)

[redacted] (u) - New York

CONFIDENTIAL b7D

This informant is the widow of the [redacted] who was found dead in February of 1941 in his hotel room in Washington, D. C. [redacted] had stated that he was formerly the head of [redacted] During October of 1937 [redacted] defected and subsequently in October, 1940, with [redacted] came to the United States. From 1929 to 1937, [redacted] stated that he was active as a member of the [redacted] His widow has herself admitted that she operated [redacted] and was with him during the majority of the time that he was operating for [redacted] (u)

[redacted] (u) - Seattle

This individual has been a member of the Communist Party from 1935 up to the present time. He can furnish a wealth of information concerning Party activities in District No. 12 (Washington State). (u)

[redacted] (u) - New York

b7D

[redacted] was active in the Communist movement up until the time of his defection in 1948. He was formerly [redacted] On African Affairs and has considerable information concerning Negro Communist activities. He was associated with the Communist movement in a top level capacity for over twelve years. (u)

[redacted] - Detroit

[redacted] was a member of the Socialist Party of America from 1915 until 1919 and became a member of the Communist Party of America at its inception. In 1920, [redacted] attended the convention out of which grew the United Communist Party. He became a member of the Central Executive Committee of that organization at this convention. In 1922, he attended the Bridgman Michigan convention of the underground Communist Party of America. In 1924, [redacted] was a member of the District Committee of the Workers Party of America of New York and from 1924 to 1927, he was in the New York area serving as a Communist functionary and official. From 1927 to 1930, [redacted] was in Moscow as a student at the Lenin School. In 1927, [redacted] was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Workers (Communist) Party of America. During 1930 and 1931, he was a Communist International representative in Venezuela. From 1930 to 1934, he was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party, USA. He voiced his objections to Communist Party policies at the 1934 Convention of the Communist Party. Later that year, [redacted] was expelled by the Communist Party. [redacted] has been utilized as a Government witness in several important trials.

The above list of individuals by no means represents the complete list of confidential informants and sources of information available for interview. If an office feels that it has an informant who has a wide knowledge of espionage or Communist Party activity and is cooperative, his name should be forwarded to the Bureau for consideration for adding to a supplemental listing. Other informants are in the process of being developed and data concerning them will be furnished in a subsequent list after they have been properly established.

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This program of interviewing confidential informants in espionage matters is not new. It was outlined to you in SAC Letter #167 dated December 29, 1947.

In requesting an interview of one of the above informants or sources of information, sufficient background data should be furnished so that the office handling the individual, can conduct an intelligent and complete interview.

As every Agent assigned to important espionage and internal security investigations carefully analyzes his investigations and then follows them vigorously with discretion, there should be more cases developed that will merit prosecution.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

142

April 11, 1950

SAC LETTER NO. 24
Series 1950

(B) CRIMINAL INFORMANTS - SEMIANNUAL REPORT -- A semiannual report concerning the productivity of each criminal informant, as well as other data relating to criminal informants, should be submitted to the Bureau by each office in accordance with instructions set forth hereinafter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7-16-81 BY 28422pm Jme JC

17

166-2542-3-✓
NOT RECORDED
53 MAY 10 1950

169
57 MAY 16 1950

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-24-1118

TR. 13 ON 100-1000

An original and one copy of a blind memorandum is to be prepared on each individual included in the criminal informant index of your office. This memorandum should contain the informant's name, symbol number, dates of contact with the informant, a succinct summary (identified by case) of the information furnished on each contact and the value of the information received. This can be illustrated by showing that the data furnished by the informant resulted in the solving of a particular case, the location of a fugitive, of value to the Crime Survey Report, etc. A recommendation should be included as to the continuance of the individual as an informant. The memorandum concerning a regularly paid informant should only have a comment that he is regularly paid since the Bureau is advised of the productivity of paid informants by more frequent communications. In the event an unpaid informant has furnished voluminous information the memorandum should only reflect the details of more important items furnished by the informant which will permit the Bureau to determine whether such individual should be listed as a criminal informant.

A cover letter enclosing memoranda on all informants should be submitted listing the names of the informants in headquarters city territory and the names of informants in each resident agency territory. In the event there are no informants in a resident agency territory, your letter should so indicate. A paragraph of your letter should reflect the number of informants developed by years, such as:

<u>Prior to 1948</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>Total</u>
15	12	18	5	50

A schedule should also be prepared reflecting the types of coverage afforded by the criminal informants. An example of such a schedule is as follows:

TFIS	4
ITSMV	3
WSTA	12
TGP	2
Fugitives	14
Negro criminal matters	9
General criminal matters	13
Miscellaneous	5
Total	62

In regard to the above schedule, if an informant regularly furnishes information concerning WSTA as well as general criminal matters, he would be listed under both headings.

Any other pertinent comments concerning the criminal informant coverage in your office should be included.

Listed below are all of the Bureau offices and the dates on which the semiannual report should be submitted:

<u>Office</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Office</u>	<u>Dates</u>
Albany	Jan. 15 & July 15	Miami	April 15 & Oct. 15
Albuquerque	" "	Milwaukee	" "
Anchorage	" "	Minneapolis	April 30 & Oct. 31
Atlanta	" "	Mobile	" "
Baltimore	Jan 31 & July 31	Newark	" "
Boston	" "	New Haven	" "
Buffalo	" "	New Orleans	May 15 & Nov. 15
Birmingham	" "	New York	" "
Butte	Feb. 15 & Aug. 15	Norfolk	" "
Charlotte	" "	Oklahoma City	" "
Chicago	" "	Omaha	" "
Cincinnati	" "	Philadelphia	May 31 & Nov. 30
Cleveland	Feb. 28 & Aug. 31	Phoenix	" "
Dallas	" "	Pittsburgh	" "
Denver	" "	Portland	" "
Detroit	" "	Richmond	" "
El Paso	Mar. 15 & Sept. 15	St. Louis	June 15 & Dec. 15
Honolulu	" "	Salt Lake City	" "
Houston	" "	San Antonio	" "
Indianapolis	" "	San Diego	" "
Kansas City	Mar. 31 & Sept. 30	San Francisco	" "
Knoxville	" "	San Juan	June 30 & Dec. 31
Little Rock	" "	Savannah	" "
Los Angeles	" "	Seattle	" "
Louisville	April 15 & Oct. 15	Springfield	" "
Memphis	" "	Washington, D. C.	" "

The first reports to be prepared in compliance with these instructions should be by those offices having a due date of July 15. All other offices will submit reports thereafter on the dates indicated.

(C) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE -- Reference is made to SAC letter #12, Series 1950, dated February 7, 1950, which required that each office submit to the Bureau by the fifteenth of each month a memorandum reflecting its total number of technical and microphone installations, mail covers, trash covers and confidential informants broken down into Confidential National Defense Informants, Confidential General Investigative Informants and Confidential Atomic Energy Informants.

It is noted that a large number of offices have been submitting this memorandum from one to seven days late. Accordingly henceforth, this memorandum shall be submitted by each office sufficiently in advance of the fifteenth of each month that it will reach the Bureau on that date. Failure to do so will result in a request for a detailed letter of explanation.

In addition, many offices have not been forwarding the memorandum in accordance with the Bureau's instructions regarding June matters as required by referenced SAC letter. Henceforth, all such memoranda shall be marked "June" and shall be forwarded in an envelope also marked "June."

In connection with technical and microphone surveillances there also has been a misunderstanding. In reporting the total number of technical and microphone surveillances the Bureau desires the actual number of surveillances and not the number of telephone lines or actual microphones. E.g., if there are three telephone lines on a subject at one location, the three constitute one surveillance. If three telephone lines are on a subject at two locations, they constitute two surveillances. If twelve microphones are installed on a subject at one location, the twelve constitute one surveillance. If twelve microphones are installed on a subject at three locations, the twelve constitute three surveillances. It is directed that henceforth the total number of technical and microphone surveillances be reported as follows:

- (1) Total number of technical surveillances--5 (7 lines)
- (2) Total number of microphone surveillances--3 (8 microphones)

In addition, several offices have listed individuals as both Confidential Atomic Energy Informants and Confidential National Defense Informants. They should not be listed as both even though they do furnish information in both categories. In such a situation it should be determined in which category the informant furnishes the larger volume of information and he should be listed in that category only. It may be pointed out, however, in the memorandum that a certain number of the informants in one category do furnish information relating to the other.

It is directed that you afford your personal attention to this matter in the future to assure that the above instructions are complied with.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

SAC LETTER NO. 152
Series 1947

November 24, 1947

MEMO FOR MR.	HOOVER	CALLAN	GURNEA	MOHR
	TOLSON	CARLSON	HARBO	NAUGHTEN
	TAMM, E. A.	CARROLL, J. F.	HINCE	NEASE
	CLEGG	CARTWRIGHT	JONES	PARSONS
	CONNELLEY	CONRAD	KEAY	PENNINGTON
	GLAVIN	COYNE	LAUGHLIN	RENNEBERGER
	LADD	DOWNING	LEONARD	ROGERS
	NICHOLS	DUKE	LONG	SIZOO
	ROSEN	EDWARDS, H. L.	McCABE, E. J.	TAMM, Q
	TRACY	EGAN	McCABE, N. H.	
	BAUGHMAN	FITCH	McGUIRE	
	CALLAHAN	FLETCHER, H. B.	McINTIRE	

RE: DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMANTS

A situation recently developed wherein a college student during a discussion with a Special Agent of this Bureau was asked if there were any subversive organizations on the campus of the college. The student, who it was later developed was an irresponsible, immature individual with a detective complex, subsequently discussed this matter with a professor in such a manner as to give the impression that he was being utilized as an undercover operative by the FBI to report actions and expressions of the faculty and students concerning Communist activities. The professor indicated considerable concern and thereafter discussed the matter with the president of the college. The net result was that the president of the college during a conference of college and university presidents and officials called attention to this incident and expressions of considerable concern were manifested lest the FBI was establishing a network of undercover operatives among the students and faculties of various schools for the purpose of reporting thoughts expressed in the classroom as well as the activities of persons in the college community outside the classroom, which activities were construed to be a threat to academic freedom. It was obvious, of course, from the incident related that the student in question was not developed as an informant and that the conversation which took place with the student was merely of a general nature and not for the purpose of developing security information concerning the students, faculty and individuals in the college community.

Of course, it should be very obvious to you that such a program on the part of the Bureau to indiscriminately develop informants among college students in the manner indicated would reflect on the Bureau and would subject the Bureau to considerable embarrassment and criticism.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP-4 BMM/mst
ON 7-16-87

66-2542-3-1
NOT RECORDED

24 NOV 25 1947

DEC 1 1947

INITIALS OR ORIGINAL

Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Egan
Gurnea
Harbo
Mohr
Pennington
Quinn Tamm
Isaacs
Gandy


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I desire to call to your attention the imperative necessity of abiding very carefully by Bureau instructions concerning the development of informants and that in initial contacts with anyone considered as a possible informant no information be discussed tending toward the development of security information. In other words, before potential informants are approached along those lines, their backgrounds and complete information concerning them should first be obtained so that an adequate knowledge concerning the reliability of the person being considered will be definitely known before an approach to obtain security information is made.

It is imperative that Special Agents in Charge carefully supervise the work of Special Agents in the development of informants to definitely eliminate the possibility of the Bureau using irresponsible persons as informants in any capacity or in any degree. As a general proposition, I consider it highly undesirable to use students as informants in view of their immaturity and their general lack of appreciation of the problems with which the Bureau is confronted. As you have been previously instructed, before any individual, and this, of course, would apply particularly to students, is approached with the idea in mind of developing into a confidential informant for the purpose of obtaining security information, complete background data should be obtained and such data transmitted to the Bureau.

I desire that you very carefully scrutinize the informant program as it exists in your division to be certain that the Special Agents are adhering very carefully to the requirements of the Bureau with respect to the development of informants. Special Agents assigned to your office should be cautioned concerning the careless discussion with individuals of security matters as was indicated in this case so that there can be no basis for a charge being leveled at the Bureau of indiscriminate development of informants in all walks of life with respect to security matters. As can be seen from the instance cited, if our Agents are not discreet in their contacts, irreparable damage can be done and great embarrassment will accrue to the Bureau.

Very truly yours,



John Edgar Hoover
Director